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PREFACE

It is my pleasure to present to Mongolists and other interested readers the
proceedings of the first North American Conference on Mongolian Studies, held
in Bellingham on November 25-26, 1978.
The idea for such a conference occxirred to me about two years ago. As I
recall, it was not some specific event that prompted my decision to organize
the conference; rather, it probably was disappointment, slowly accumulating
over the years, at seeing North American studies on Mongolia lagging behind
those on China, Japan, and Korea in this respect. True, larger conferences,
like those sponsored by the Association for Asian Studies and the American Ori
ental Society, have often included panels dealing at least partially with Mon
golia, and the Mongolia Society has done a signal service by holding its annual
meetings in conjunction with those conferences. Yet I felt that the time had
come to give Mongolists their own conference. The experiences of our colleagues
in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean studies clearly pointed out the main advantage
of holding a conference devoted to a single country or culture. It could pro
vide a setting in which Mongolists felt "at home," undisturbed by the clamor
of the bazaax-like atmosphere often prevailing at the larger all-Asian confer
ences.
With this goal in mind, I started my preparations on May 1 of last year by
sending out a first call for papers. The response was much greater than I had
expected and dashed my rather modest hopes of having one day of sessions. The
result was a busy schedule from 8:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. on Saturday with only
two short breaks, and from 9:00 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Sunday without any breaks.
An equally pleasant surprise was the great distances traveled by many partici
pants, coming as they did from Southern California and New England, the Middle
Atlantic states and the Canadian prairies, the Rocky Mountains and the Midwest.
Professor Kimura hastened from Tokyo on his first journey to North America, and
Mr. Dashtseren, the Mongolian ambassador to the United Nations, was all set to
come but pressing business forced him to cancel at the last moment.
The verdict on this conference was passed in the concluding session in the
form of two resolutions. One called for making such a conference an annual
event. I stressed the importance of moving future conferences around the
United States and Canada, and the idea was accepte'.. A committee, composed of
Professors Larry Clark, Paul Hyer, Keith Scott and myself, was elected and
given the task of selecting the site of the second conference, scheduled for
this year. The other resolution instructed me to edit and publish the confer
ence papers. The result is this book.
While I planned and hosted the first conference, its success could not have
been achieved without the help of many individuals and organizations. My
thanks go to all participants for their fine scholarly papers, lively discus
sions, and enthusiasm. Professors Samuel E. Martin of Yale University, John
Masson Smith, Jr. of the University of California at Berkeley, and John Street
ili
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of the University of Wisconsin gave their wholehearted support to the confer
ence even though they were unahle to attend. The National Endowment for the
Himianities granted timely and generous financial assistance. Also supportive
were grants from the Mongolia Society and from Dean James W. Davis of the Col
lege of Arts and Sciences at Western Washington University. The CanadaMongolia Society cooperated from the very start and repeatedly advertised the
conference throughout Canada. Many of the technical chores were competently
handled by Joseph Cucco, Bruce Ream, Linda Kaplowitz, Mary Crompton, Richard
Chesmore, and Sharon Edinger. Finally, Mrs. Florence Preder once again pro
duced a meticulous manuscript. To all these individuals and organizations I
wish to extend my gratitude for their trust, support, and assistance.

Henry G. Schwarz
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LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

PAST AUD PERFECT IN MODERN MONGOLIAN
Robert I. Binnick
Scaxborough College
University of Toronto

1. Introductory.
You may recall how in Stevenson's Treasure Island the "old sea dog" Billy
Bones came to the Admiral Benbow Inn, thus setting off a series of events
which led to the voyage of the ship Hispaniola to Treasure Island. Billy Bones'
one great fear had been a blind sailor on a pegleg, who inevitably arrived one
day to claim Bones' booty. Alas for Pew of the wooden leg and his confeder
ates: Billy was already dead from rtun; his hoard and his treasure map had gone
with a very frightened Jim Hawkins. When Pew urged his men into the inn to
look for Billy, bellowing in rage, "in, in, in!,"
Four or five of them obeyed at once, two remaining on the road with
the formidable beggar. There was a pause, then a cry of surprise, and
then a voice shouting from the house: -"Bill uxcixjee!"^’^ (Stivenson 28.2.2)^ in the original they shouted, "Bill's
dead!"
There are two interesting points about the translation of "Bill's dead!" by
"Bill uxcixjee!" The first is that the English present tense is being glossed
by a Mongolian past tense. The second point requires us to look further ahead
to that magnificent chapter wherein Jim encovinters the unfortunate Ben Gunn who
has been marooned for three years on the deserted island. Of course Gunn begs
Jim to take him off and offers to lead him to the famous treasure if he will.
But, as Jim recounts,
. . . at this there came suddenly a lowering shadow over his face, and
he tightened his grasp upon my hand, and raised a forefinger threatening
ly before my eyes.
"Now, Jim, tell me true: that ain't Flint's ship?," he asked.
(Chapter 15)
^
^
To which Jim replies, "Flintijn xolog bis. Flint uxcixsen." (Stivenson 85.6.2)
In the English he says, "it's not Flint's ship, and Flint is dead." Once again
the English present becomes the Mongolian past, but in this instance, although
the rootiJm- and stem affix -oix- remain the same, the translator uses -sen in
stead of -jee.
Now why does this happen? We shall see that there is a method in the use of
these two forms. In fact, this question is as good an introduction as any to
the general question of the use of the Mongolian tenses, and specifically the
three so-called past tenses, -Jee, -ev, and -Z-ee.5 At one point (p.92) Sanzeev
was led to state that "the differences between Cthe three past tensei forms,
which are almost imperceptible, are still debated by students of Mongolian; the
three past tense forms are used interchangeably." I do not think, however, that
Sanzeev meant to say this, since elsewhere, for example in his book on the
1
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comparative grammar of the verb in Mongolian languages, he clearly shows that
they are not used interchangeably and that the difference between them is hardly
imperceptible. In fact, the three forms are quite different in use, and one of
my purposes here is to describe their differences and to place those differences
within the context of a linguistic theory. This is not to say that an adequate
theory of tenses exists, but there are certainly valuable observations which can
he made within a self-consistent framework.

j
j

Furthermore, as we have seen, there is a close connection between the so-called
perfective ending -sen and these past tense endings. Is -sen (used predicatively) ;
precisely equivalent to any one of these endings, or is it yet a fourth way of re
ferring to the past? And if the English present (and perfect, as we shall see)
can he translated by at least one of the past tense endings, in this case -gee,
is there any distinction in Mongolian between the perfect and the past as tenses?
second purpose is to hazard an answer to this further question.
2. Meaning and use.
Let us start by demonstrating that the three past tenses are certainly not
used interchangeably. First of all, every grammar book, including those written
by native speakers in Mongolia, distinguish them. For example, the past {ongdrson
aag) is split up into the ongoron togsson tense (the -ev form), the dngdrdn
urgelgilsen tense (the -gee form), and the sagaxan togss’
dn tense ("the -lee form)."
In my informant work with a native speaker these forms were likewise shown to dif
fer in numerous ways, some of which I will return to later.
Supporting these distinctions is the evidence of translations from or into Mon
golian. The -Jee form is almost always coordinated with a present or the perfect
which marks a result. Thus Vietze translates 'dngoruuVSee '1st stehengeblieben'
(Vietze 26.3), and ene aag gavaxaa hoV'gee 'die Uhr geht nicht mehr. . . .'
(Vietze 1^5.3).^ Poppe translates, however, haidz 'es lebte' (Poppe 1955,188.1)
and xidz 'veranstaltete.'9 In translations of Turgenev, Cervantes, and Mao
seems consistently to gloss forms equivalent to the perfect;!*^ thus a sentence in
Mao ending boloUee (Mao 3.5) ends in the English translation 'has brought' (l have
not had the original Chinese checked). In the Treasure Island translation, —^ee
is often used to gloss presents and perfects but also past tenses.
The -lee form also often glosses presents and perfects. Vietze translates
nccmdloja 'hat sich gelegt' (Vietze 32.h) and Poppe dlirle 'ist zu Ende' (Poppe 1955>
190.7); the common expression bagarlalaa is roughly equivalent to our 'thank you'
(Vietze 23.9 ff.).^^ However, -lee has past and even future glosses as well.
While -ev can gloss or be glossed by present and perfect, as when Vietze trans
lates juu bolov^'^ (Vietze 19.6) by 'was ist los?,' a past translation is more
usual, and in the literary language at least there is generally a careful distinc
tion between, say, suusan, glossed by Vietze 'steckengeblieben' (Vietze U1.6) and
suuaixav, used to translate Turgenev (Sodov 3^0.12) where the English translation
has 'sat down.'13
If further proof is required
their use in texts of different
sentences end in -^ee. Thus in
of the first fifty sentences in

that the tenses differ, we need only consider
sorts. In folktales, for example, a great many
the story Uraip Gud Dagin (Poppe 1955, 188-223),
the narration, excluding the gene 'they say'
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which is purely a narrative device, eighteen end in —, twenty-five in —ev,
and seven in other endings. It is interesting to note that most of the -eV
forms occurred within the scope of gene. On the other hand, in the quotes em
bedded in the story, —Qee is rare. Of the first fifty quoted sentences, only
one ends in -'See, four in -ev, and forty-five in other forms. Clearly see is
used here as a narrative-forwarding device. Compare this with the more descrip
tive style of newspapers, specifically Unen.^'^ Here events in the past are
almost as likely to occur with the ending -ev. In an article on the visit of
a Russian dignitary to the Mongolian People's Republic (Montgomery 3—10), —eV
ends four sentences, -jee nine, and other forms (including several -lee's)
fif'ty. In the style of an author of a school textbook on foreign literature
(Sandag)^ --;ee is preferred over -ev for such statements as Tomas Mor . . .
dryddldgo bajSee 'Thomas More was an advocate' (Sandag 67) and 1564 ony 4
dugeer saryn 23-nd tSrjee 'he Cthat is, Shakespearei was born on April 23, 136k'
(Sandag 68).
Are these purely stylistic devices? In part this may be so, just as our
sportswriters, financial reporters, news reporters, and novelists prefer to use
different perspectives in reporting events.15 Yet underlying these various
usages there must be real differences, just as there is a real difference under
lying the virtual synonymity of "is he back yet?" and "has he come back yet?"
in English.
There are more substantive facts that argue to a contrast in usage for the
various past tense forms. First, all of the forms can be used in questions,
and to each statement there is a corresponding question, e.g., ted suusan 'they
sat,' ted suusan uu? 'they sat?'
However, the questions, like the statements,
do not serve the same pixrposes. WH-questions seeking information, e.g., juu
bolov 'what happened?,' and yes-no questions, asking facts, e.g., Ene cin'
Flintijn xblbg uu? (Stivenson 85.6.1) 'that ain't Flint's ship?,' more literally,
'this thing of yours, is it Flint's ship?,'l® take —ev. They are usually an
swered with -sen in the colloquial language; thus the answer to Ta xaanaas
irev? 'Where did you come from?' might be Bi xotoos irsen 'I came from the
city.'ll
(Hangin 10).
On the other hand, -lee is rarely used in questions. One example occurs
when the rebelling (and superstitious) buccaneers, who have come to give Long
John Silver the dreaded Black Spot, are chided by him for putting it on a sheet
torn from a Bible:
"Ah, there!," said Morgan -- "there!
Wot did I say? No good'll come o' that,
I said." (Chapter 29)
In Mongolian Morgan asks rhetorically, "Bi juu gej xellee?"^®
While most of the grammars and studies I consiilted have examples of See in
questions, like those I am about to cite, examples of See in real questions
seem uncommon in actual text. Consider Ramstedt's t'a ^nt'zxizy 'schliefen Sie
(soeben)?' (Ramstedt l8);l" Beffa's ter gore uu 'est-il sortl?' (Beffa 83);
Kasjanenko's xaa ocig 'kuda posel?'
(Kasjanenko 20). Hangin notes, however,
that in asking Ter xooloo ideg uu? 'Did he eat his dinner?' one is asking "Did
you see or find out?," which differs from merely asking if he had eaten dinner.
(Hangin llU) In fact, questions with See appear in texts mainly with the
quotative verb ge- and are almost entirely either rhetorical or confirmation
seeking echo questions, a notable exception in the texts being the folkloric
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tscamd xamd baidzu 'Was geht es dich an?' (Poppe 1955, 152.5-2). 20 ’ 21 Mt in
nearly all examples only ge^ occurs. At one point in Fathers arid. Sons (Chapter
27), for example, Bazarov asks his father for some caustic, saying that he had
cut'his finger and it might become (or already had become) Infected. When he
says that four hours have already passed,^his father asks, "Didn't the district
doctor have any lunar caustic?": ... xosnuny emo'vd. tuttiyn ouZiiu bajsanguj yog
UU?
(Sodov 360.3),22 suggesting that he cannot quite believe that he had not.
Similarly, Chairman Mao inquires, "Have people not seen or heard about these^^ ^
facts?" (English version, p. jU) -- xumuus edgeer barimtuudyg dvulg xaraaguQ
ge3 UU? (Mao TT.U).23 Notice the negative in the English translations, sug
gestive of doubt, seeking confirmation: siirely the doctor had caustic, surely
everyone knows these facts. When he harangues his hostile crew. Long John^
Silver brings up their idea of killing Jim Hawkins. He says, "Are we a-going
to waste a hostage? No, not us; he might be oiir last chance. . . . Kill
boy? Not me, mates!" (Chapter 29). The Mongolian has Ene xuug alax gej uu. ,
as if he were questioning a siiggestion right before him. Questions with ge^
often correspond to English questions with negatives25 or which presuppose the
hearer's previous statements or attitudes.2
Yet other facts are clear indications of the differences between the tenses
and are reflexes of those differences, often being cited in grammars in conjvmction with descriptions of purported uses of the forms. Thus Poppe 1951 a-nd
Hangin, for example, observe that the -gee form usually occurs in the third
person though, as we have seen, that is not invariably the case. Ramstedt,
Poppe 1951, and Street observe that -lee is not used with a second person sub
ject.
In fact, in its "future" use it is rather restricted to the first person,
though Mao has Imperialistuud urt naslaxguj bolloo.^'l (Mao 80.2)
'Imperialism
(lit. imperialists) will not last long. . . .' There are no such restrictions
on -ev or -sen.
A similar fact has to do with negation. Generally, in the modern literary
and colloquial languages, no finite indicative tense form ever occurs negated,
though in the literary language one occasionally sees the indicatives with the
old negatives es or u7.28 Instead, participles with the ending -gug '-less
(from ugiXg, 'without') are used. The three past tenses all are negated with
-sen, the perfect particple, plus -g^'. Thus when asked the negation of (la),
the native informant gave (lb); a similar response occurred for (2).
(lb) is
of course the negation of (3).
29
qo
(la) End olon xun bag'v.
'Here there were many people.'
(Notes lU)^
(lb)
(2a)
(2b)
(3 )

End olon
Olon xim
Olon £cwn
End olon

xun bagsangug.
tend baglaa.
'Many people were there.'
tend bag'sangfy'.
xiXn bagsan.^^

It is interesting that while the -^se form likewise usually is negated with
-sen + -gug, the informajat tended at times to negate it using the imperfect or
continuous participle in -ee or the perfect converbal in -eed\
(Ua) OgWo bolgee.
'It became morning.'
(1+b) Oglbo boloo(d)gug.
'It hasn't yet become morning.'
(5) Bi idee(d)gug.
'I haven't eaten yet.'
(Notes 26)^^
Another interesting fact is that the so-called future use of
like the
non-past tense form in -ne, can be negated using the future participle or
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infinitive in -ex-, thus the informant negated (6a) as (6h):
(6a) Bi odoo javZaa.
'I'm going now.'
(Said when you have not actually
started.)
,
(6h) Odoo bi javaxgug.
'How I'm not going to go.'
(Notes 22)^^ Note,
however, that (6h) while the negation of (6a), is not precisely its
negation.
The foregoing arguments serve, I hope, to demonstrate that the verh forms
in question do differ in use. But do they differ in meaning^ There is good
reason, in fact, to helieve that they do not.
First, under negation, nominalization, and embedding, the distinction be
tween the forms is neutralized, and the only past (or perfect) forms which
occur are, respectively, the perfect participle in -sen and the perfect gerund
in -eed. Thus all the statements in (7) receive, under general conditions, the
negation (8), they all form relative clauses as in (9)i they all nominalize as
in (lO), and when embedded in^an adverbial syntactic position, they all appear
as in either (lla) or (llb).^°
(7a) Luvsan irev.
|
(7b) Luvsan irgee.
j 'Luvsan came.'
(7c) Luvsan irlee.
J
(8) Luvsan irsengug.
'Luvsan didn't come.'
(9) Ter irsen xdm Luvsan gedeg.
'The man who came is called Luvsan.'
(lO) Irsenij n' bidmedeg bagna.
'¥e know that he came.'
(lla) Luvsany irsend, bid tend bagsangug.
'When Luvsan came, we weren't
there.'
(lib) Luvsan ireed, bid tend bagsangug.
'Luvsan came and we weren't
there.'37
Rather than analyze this as neutralization of semantic oppositions, we should say
that some distinction is being lost and ask ourselves what sort of distinction
can be, and is, lost in these positions.
If the forms in question differed in meaning, it ought to be the case that
there were conditions undor which at least one of them would be true and at
least one of them at the same time faJ.se; that is, there ought to be at least
one situation describable by one alone of the three fonns. If we examine the
forms in question we see that in fact this cannot be. Any of the situations
expressed by -lee or -gee can be expressed by -ev.
It may be that not every
sentence with one or the other of these forms is directly translatable into one
in -ev-. there may be some adverbs, subject pronouns, etc., that can co-occur
with-jee, say, but not with -ev. However, this need not imply a semantic dif
ference.
As regards these two forms, they again do not describe distinct states of the
world. If I say Luvsan ir'^ee or Luvsan irlee, outside of context there is simply
no difference: all we learn is that at some time in the past a man called Luvsan
came. It is true that there are minor semantic differences between these forms,
but I am concerned here with their central differences.
What we find is that the difference in use of these forms has nothing to do
with the event described, as such, and those commentators who try to make it do
so are wrong. Rather, as others have more correctly suggested, the difference
is in the way the speaker views the event. If the event is something the
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speaker is vouching for, or is information which is well-known and stated not
to convey new information hut for another purpose, the -tee form may he used.
If the event is presumptive or stated as suddenly acquired knowledge, the -jee
form is used, -ev is attitudinally neutral.
We can now explain the difference between our earlier examples uxaix'See and
It is not that the pirate in shouting "Bill lixcixjee!" is making
any claim about the time of Bill's death or its nature; he is stating that Bill
has died, thereby implying that he ts dead, and incidentally informing us that
he has just found out. ■ (But in context we know this.) It would be odd for him
to have shouted, "Bill uxcixlee'"; this presupposes that^this is known already,
not only to him, but to us. If he had shouted, "Bill iixcixev" or "Bill
uxcixsen,"38 this would be a little odd, and probably would be more appropriate
in a context where the question of Bill's death had already come up, though
which he was, dead or alive, remained unknown. When Jim tells Ben Gunn that
Flint is dead, wsoixsen, he merely states a fact; he neither assumes that Ben
knows this nor does he state that it is new information to himself.

uxaixsen.

If we accept that the differences of use of these forms are not differences
of meaning, but rather differences of what we should call discourse pragmatics,
then we have a ready explanation for the contexts of their neutralization and
for the highly marked nature of questions with these forms. It is the function
of declarative sentences to make statements, but the force of statements may or
may not be to provide new information. The function of questions may be to
request new information, or it may not. Thus the questions xn ge^ do not re
quest new information any more than rhetorical questions in English do.
The importance of the sort of analysis I have just given is, as I see it, to
enable us to clarify the problems of the past tense forms in Mongolian. For far
too long there has been no attempt to provide argumentation or a theoretical
underpinning for the rather vague and impressionistic statements of scholars,
however correct or important these statements may be. I do not pretend, as I
have said, to provide an adequate theory or a definitive solution, but I hope
that I have turned the discussion in a new and, I hope, more fruitful direc
tion.
3. Perfect and past. 39
Let us return now to the perfect.
claim is that the use of terms like
"perfect(ive) past" for the indicative forms is incorrect, and that they have
no direct semantic content which such a term can explicate. At the same time
I have admitted (a) that in numerous contexts -sen or -eed, the perfect(ive)
verbal nominal (or participle) and gerund respectively, appear in place of the
finite indicative forms, and (b) that in the colloquial spoken language -sen
replaces -ev in statements (though not in questions, where -ev contrasts with
-sen). How is it, if the finite indicatives really lack semantic content, that
-sen can replace them? And what about the distinction between past and perfect?
Is. it unreal? If not, what do these facts say about it?
Here we must observe that in fact the Indicative forms do not completely lack
semantic content. Even if they do not assert aspectual (and hence semantic) re
lations, they "implicate" them (here I am using a technical term).
For example.
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if I am involved in the discovery of a fact, it is likely that the fact has
only recently come about. But it is no part of the meaning of the -Jee fona,
say, that this is so. More importantly, though, all three past tenses do
assert that the event, E, preceded the time of the speech act, S. Otherwise
we should be able to use the present-future form. But while at any given point
it might be true, say, that Billy Bones will die, or is dying, it is not
necessarily true at
that he has died or even has been dying.
This explains how the past tense forms can be replaced by -sen and -eed, for
these forms are purely aspectual, and merely assert that E preceded some other
event Ep. Normally the past indicative tense is used when Ep = S, but in the
predicative use of -sen it can be assumed that E2 “ S; there is an implicit
copula even when bajna 'is' is deleted which, in the colloquial language, is
normal in unmarked situations. Aspectually the finite forms and the non-finite
differ only in the assumption that E2 = S. Thus -sen and -eu are essentially
fully equivalent, since -ev merely maps, atop the precedence relation of aspect,
a relatively neutral temporality. Temporal oppositions, however, play no role
in other than the positions finite verbs occur in, namely where they are used
as main-clause verbs to make assertions, etc.
(See Binnick concerning mainclause phenomena.)
I might note in passing that current semantics-based theories of tense can
provide no explanation for these facts, since they do not refer to a relation
ship of E to S. Furthermore, they do not take into account pragmatics at all.^1
This leaves us one final puzzle.
In the modern literary language -eV and
predicative -sen are distinct in both declarative and interrogative sentences.
Moreover, even in the colloquial language they are distinct in questions, since
questions with predicative -sen do occur:
(12) Ci nogoo emee uusan biz? Ene er emee uusan uu, ta min'?
'Did you take that medicine? Did he take that medicine,
men?'
(Stivenson I66.T.8; Chapter 30)^2
(13) Xuu min', xaasaa javsan ve
kk
'Vrhich way Cwas he walking], sonny?'
(Stivenson 11.2.1; Chapter 2)
(14) Bie agzaj^ oiairsen uu?
,
,^
'Have you had chills, too?' ^ (Sodov 360.I6.I; Chapter 27)
What these examples clearly show is that the -sen form has a distinction
from the preterite that we have not mentioned, and that this distinction is al
ways indicated in questions, though it need not be in statements. With uu, -sen
is used roughly like the English perfect to indicate an event which happened
prior to S but at no definite time, whereas -ev points to a definite point in
time as in the following examples; thus some scholars, e.g., Bosson, refer to
the -ev form as the "definite past tense."

kl

Compare the following examples:
(15) "5i dcigddr nom unsiv uu?
'Hast du gestern ein Buch gelesen?' (Vietze Uh)
(16) Mitjuxa ene erxem saja aamajg juu ge^ xocilsnyg duulav uu?
'D'you hear that, Mitya? . . . Hear what the gentleman called
yer?'
(Sodov 3!+5.T.l; Chapter 2)^8
(17) Eeg nusd godzulsaip mu xug iidzewu ta?
'Haben Sie einen erbarmlichen Bengel gesehen, dem Rotz aus der
Nase heraushangt?'
(Poppe 1955, 192.2.12)^9
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(l8)

Xagur xagur jauadz, soni-n saixav jum dulwu?

'Wo bist du gereist? Hast du CauchD irgend etwas Interessantes
und Gutes gehort?' (Poppe 1955, 208.2.5)
In (15) baigdSr provides a definite context; in (l6) the Just-uttered statement
provides the definite context; (l8) is uttered in the context of a previous
statement concerning the hearer's travels. Even (IT) may be explicable in terms
of a definite period of time, since it doesn't mean "have you ewer seen. ....
etc., but applies to a certain pragmatically defined stretch of time.
It should not surprise us that predicative -sen should differ in this way
from -ev, which is neutral relative to -Jee and -lee, but clearly has this ad
ditional force. Nor should we be surprised by the loss of-the distinction in
statements which happens elsewhere, e.g., in American English where went can
mean "has gone," although a precise explication of this demands further study.

1*.

Conolusion.

I have been concerned here with investigating the uses and mutual relation
ships of four forms used in Mongolian today to refer to events in the past. If
I have done nothing else, I hope that I have demonstrated that these forms do
not contrast in the time of the event referred to, nor in its aspectual nature,
but basically differ in the discourse pragmatic function to which the speaker
puts them. I hope that now we can begin to develop a deeper and more so^dly
established theory of the Mongolian, and hence the Altaic, verb system.

Notes
1 Examples from the modern literary language in Cyrillic script have been
transliterated as follows, the Cyrillic letters becoming^^respectively,

abvgdee3sijklmnooprstuufxcc_ssc"y'e JU Jorju)
2. Literal gloss: die(iJa;-)+suddenly/completely(-et^-)+FI. The following
symbols and abbreviations are used in the literal glosses:
+

morpheme boundary

/

or
ablative
accusative
caus causative
CL
converbal (gerund)

abl
acc

com
cop
dat

FI

comitative
copula
dative
finite indicative
ending

Impf
inf
neg
part
pass

pf

PL

Q
HP
VN

imperfect(ive)
infinitive
negation
particle (function
unspecified)
passive
perfect(ive)
plural
yes-no question particle
reflexive-possessive ("own")
verbal noun (participle)

gen 1

sources are gives at the end oI the paper. Generally the first nmljer
is tte p^rSriast ?he sentence or ewle, and the .iddle, if any, the p.riSL Thave given only the chapter or section for non-Mongolisn tents where
editions will differ in pagination.
1*. Gloss: Flint+gen(-iyn) ship not.

Mongolian omits the presen

cop
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-sen is literally a pf VN; strictly speaking a present auxiliary cop has been
deleted here, hut in the colloquial language, at least, -sen is often used
predicatively and, as we shall see, normally substitutes for the past in -ev.
5. -Jee does not change for vowel harmony; -ev^and -lee have four forms each,
with a, o, o, or e. -Jee also appears as -eee, -c, and -j. For details of the
morphophonology, see Street, Poppe 1951, or Poppe 1970.
6. Literally, 'completed passing,' 'prolonged passing,' and 'just completed.'
Slight variants of these terms are cited by several authors, e.g., Vietze, Beffa,
and in various Mongolian publications, e.g., §. Luvsanvandaji, ed., Oraim Cagijn
Mongol Xel Zilj (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), pp. 1L8-I53.
7-. Yidamjab Meng.
8. dngdruul- is actually the caus i-uill-) of dngdr- 'pass.' Gloss of second
example: this clock go(jau-)+inf(-ox)+RP cease(&oZ'-)+FI.
9. Poppe 1955 uses a phonemicized transcription; baidz = our fcczjJ {bag- 'be');
xidz = xigg {xig- 'do, make').
10. I have not investigated the originals, but this seems true from an examin
ation of the corresponding English translations.
11. Bolgo- is the caus of bol- 'become, happen'; namd- 'calm down'; duur(cf. note 9) 'end, stop'; bajarla- 'rejoice' (cf. bagar, 'happy').
12. Gloss: what happen+FI.
13. suu- 'sit, live'; -aix- 'suddenly/completely.' It should be noted that
this stem affix also occurs with -sen, as we saw with iXxaixsen. The form in
-sen has numerous non-predicative uses; -ev is only predicative. In its non
predicative uses, -ev is unambiguously a perfect, i.e., bngbrsdngil means 'last
year; the year (which is) past/has passed.' However, even here a preterite gloss
is possible, e.g., tend suusan xun 'person who sat there.'
lit. This is the Mongolian equivalent of Pravda-, its name likewise means 'truth.'
15. See pp. 191-192 in Sanzeev's Sravnitel'naga Grammatika Mongol'skix Jazykov
Glagol (Moscow: Izd. Vostocnoj Literatury, 1963) concerning the "free" use
of the -gee form as a purely stylistic device. For the "free" use of tenses,
an interesting article on another Altaic language is Ozcan Bagkan's "inter
changeability of tenses in colloquial Turkish" (Litera 9> Ankara, I968), pp. ^-8.
Mso in H. E. Brekle and L. Lipka, eds., Wortbildung, Spraahe, imd Morpholoqie
(The Hague: Mouton, 1968).
16. Omgdblo- 'defend'; -go is the agent nominalizer. Glosses: I56U year+gen
(-J/) i++-th month(<moon)+gen(-z/n) (Uth month = April) on-the-23rd(23-n<i) be-born
(tor-). They sit/livefpf-VN; they sit/live+pf-VN Q. What happen+FI. This your
Flint+gen ship Q.
17. Glosses: you(PL) where+abl(with -n-) come+FI. I city+abl come+pf-VH.
18. Gloss: I what g'e^(quotative particle) say+FI.
19. = our ta unta^ uu. Gloss: you(PL) sleeptFI Q.
20. Glosses: he(lit. the/that-one) go-out+FI Q; where go-to+FI; he food/meal
+RP eat+FI W. Poppe's example is camad xamaa bagj uu. Gloss: you+dat affair
be+FI Q. Here 'be'+dat = possessive, 'do you have any affairs?'
21. James Bosson in a personal communication suggested these might be impf CL
forms in elliptical sentences. This is certainly possible, as the two forms are
identical. However, the existence of -'^ee questions cited by various authors
plus the distribution of the questions in dispute suggests that they are not
elliptical; certainly the glosses do not suggest this.
22. Xosuu(n) 'district' + gen(-j/); emo 'doctor'; tamyn culuu is lit. 'stone
of hell' (lunar caustic is silver nitrate); bagsangug 'hasn't been'; geg 'saying';
flii is Q.

Robert I. Binnick

10
23. Gloss:

people these fact+PL(-ww<i)+acc hear+impf-CL see+impf-W say/mean

ige-)+FI Q.
2h. Gloss: This boy+acc(-g^) kill(aZ-)+inf say/mean-J-FI Q.
25. Thus in Stivenson 51.8.6 Ted tusguj dalajoid geo uu? 'Are they not good
seamen?' (literally: they useless seamen ge^ Q). Here the question is asked
by Dr. Livesay, attempting (Chapter 9) to clarify what Captain Smolett is say
ing about the crew of the Hispaniola.
"You say you don't like the crew," he
summarizes and then asks the captain this question.
26. Thus in Chapter 30 (Stivenson 169.8.2). Dr. Livesay visits Jim who is
held by the pirates as a hostage; he is allowed to talk to the doctor on his
honor not to escape. Jim suggests that he be abandoned to save Dr. Livesay
and the others and tells the doctor where he has the ship hidden. The doctor
says, "There is a kind of fate in this. . . . Every step, it's you that saves
our lives; and do you suppose by any chance that we are going to let you lose
yours?" [Xuu min', bid camaog busdyn gart aluulna geo uu?-, lit.: boy we
you+acc other+gen(-i/n) hand+-ed klll+caus(here = 'let')+FI. This is a rhetor
ical question, pretending to assume that Jim does indeed think so.
27. Gloss: Imperlalist+PL(-UMii) long-time endure+inf(-aa;)+neg become+FI.
As past forms of bot- can be interpreted with present sense, this is not clearly
a "future" use.
28. For example, bi band es xellilu, ezen min'! 'Did I not tell your
Grace. . . . (Sodov 83.lO) Note the use of xellee, here shortened to xett- be
fore uu in a question. Lit.: I you(formal)+d.at neg(es) say/tell+FI+Q, lord-my.
An Interesting example where es occurs before a CL-main verb combination is
Poppe 19555 19^.7: es xards tsadadzd, our es xar^ aaddSee.
'Sie konnten aber
nicht schauen.'
('They could not look.') Lit.: neg look+impf-CL be-able+FI.
Another example of es occurs at Stivenson 138.U.3.
occurs several times in
Mao (16.3, 18.5, 62.5, 62.9, etc.) with non-finite forms.
29. The word order here is significant as to the relative discourse importanc
of the modifiers. End oton xun bao'v means 'here there were many people.'
'Many
people were here' would be Olon xun end baov. I believe this is ambiguous as to
whether a definite or indefinite group is meant.
30. 'Notes' refers here to my Informant work notes of 1977. I have written
elsewhere of the value of informant work and of the great difficulty of inter
preting its results. Use 'Notes' examples with caution.
31. End 'here,' olon 'many,' xun 'person,' bao’- 'be.'
32. It is unusual for the converbal to be used non-elliptically predicatively
and for -guo' to occur on a CL, rather than a VN, form, -uo' also appears on -eed
for -guj. Apparently there is no difference in meaning between this form and
the one with -eeguo•
33. OgWb 'morning,' bol- 'become,' id- 'eat,' bi 'I.'
3^. Bi '!,' odoo 'now,' jau- 'go.'
35. There is an apparent difference in adverbial scope here, perhaps relat
ing to a pragmatic difference.
In (6a) odoo modifies j’au- 'go'; but in (6b)
the entire sentence is within the scope of the adverbial, which expresses a sort
of presupposed state of affairs. Thus the examples may not be strictly compar
able, but this should not affect the basic argument.
36. I am writing here as if there were transformation of one form into an
other in these cases. There is reason to believe, however, that this is not the
case, that the nominalized forms, for example, are equally basic and underlying
as the indicative ones. See Binnick for a discussion. This does not, however,
affect the argument here.
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37. Glosses of (9-111):(9) the come+pf-VU person Luvsan is-usually-called;
(10)come+pf-VN+acc the/his we know+impf-CL be+FI; (lla) Luvsan+gen come+pfVN+dat, we there be+pf-VN+neg; (lib) Luvsan come+pf-CL, we there be+pf-Vn+neg.
38. Usually a preterite assumes a definite time, whereas a perfect does not.
Thus in British English "he went home" cannot answer (i), though it can answer
(11); "He's gone home" can answer (i), but not (ii).
(i) Where's Bill? (l don't see him.)
(ii) What did Bill do when Sue stood him up for their date?
(She was supposed to meet him at the club.)
I am not certain whether -eu and -sen differ in -this way in either the colloguial
spoken or the more literary written languages of today.
39. The details of the pragmatic conditions on the use of the tense terms are
omitted in this version. They are being prepared for a future, complete version
of this paper.
UO. "Implicate" is used here in lieu of "imply" to indicate that the implica
tion is by certain types of logical principles called "implicatures." See,
e.g., Ruth M. Kempson, Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Ul. I am thinking of both theories in the tradition of Otto Jespersen's
Language and Hans Reichenbach's Elements of Symbolic Logic, and logical theories,
be they model-theoretic approaches to natural language or modal/temporal logics.
Recent work by Elizabeth Riddle promises, however, to provide a pragmatic theory
of tense with considerable explanatory power. A fiiller discussion will be pro
vided in the final version of this paper.
l2.
'you,' nogo'd 'this, that,' emee 'own medicine,' uu- 'drink,' biz
(copular particle with a certain pragmatic force of supposition), ene 'this,'
er 'man,' ta 'you,' min’ 'my.'
h3. Ve is described (Poppe 1951, 96) as a "copula" used in WH-questions.
Its precise syntactic analysis is unclear, though Street 126 ff. treats it as
merely an interrogative particle like uu. He does note, however, that it usually
appears in tr\incated sentences—thereby suggesting a treatment like Poppe's—
though he also gives examples with copula, e.g., nom xaa bajna ve? 'where's the
book?'
Xwl 'boy,' min' 'my,' xaasaa 'where to,' jav- 'go.'
hb- Here the English translation is more useful than the Russian original,
since the past ending in Russian also has perfect meaning.
1+6. Bie 'body/self,' agzaj- 'shiver,' aioir- 'tremble with cold,' uu Q.
1+7. Cf. the following example where bolov, although past, really has present
force: Tany aldar nerijg medef boloxson bolov uu? Lit.: your family-name
name+acc(-tyg’) know+impf-CL become+inf+perfect become+FI Q.
'May I ask your
name and patronymic?' (Sodov 31+1+.9.3; Chapter 2).
Cf. Poppe 1955, 188.2.9,
188.5.1+.
1+8.
'you,' 'dcigdbr 'yesterday,' nom 'book,' uns- 'read,' ene 'this,' erxem
'gentleman,' saga 'just now,' camagg 'you'(acc), guu 'what,' ge'^ 'saying,' xocil'give a nickname to'+pf-VN+acc(-z/g'), duul- 'hear.'
1*9. = our Beg nusaa goo'^uulsan muu xuug uzev uu ta? one mucous+RP dripfcaus+pfVN bad boy+acc see+FI Q you(PL). The ta is a postponed subject, not merely a
vocative. This is a rare exception to the rule that nothing can follow the Q.
50. = our Xaaguur xaaguur gavdf, sonin sagxan gum duulav uu?
where
where
go+impf-CL news fair thing hear+FI Q
51. I would like to thankfully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Yidamjab
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Meng which contributed much to this work.
It has been a pleasure to have the
opportunity to pick his brains and native intuitions.
At the conference a number of interesting comments were made on the
paper. Two by Professor Poppe are worth noting here. First, with the -jee
form there is sometimes the sense ”it turned out that" or "it turned out after
all that." The second comment was that example Ene cag javaxaa boZ'gee is
literally 'has ceased to work' and could equally well have been glossed hat
aufgehort zu gehen." He went on to say that often there is an interchange of
meanings, as regards such Mongolian examples in English or German gloss, be
tween present, perfect, or even preterite tenses. I thank all who had obser
vations to make during the discussion period.
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A PROBLEM IN BURYAT HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS

Laxry V. Clark
Indiana University

The Buryat Mongols are among those peoples of Siberia who may he said to
lack historical profile prior to the early seventeenth-century conquest of Si
beria by Tsarist Russia. Ethnonyms and toponyms with supposed connections to
the Buryats rarely occur in earlier Asian sources, and those that do are at
tended by ambiguity. Behind this historical obscurity follows the dark course
of the Buryat language, which began to be recorded only in the eighteenth centirry
when it hsid already by and large assumed its modern form. Lacking earlier con
crete data, we might presume that the investigation of the historical develop
ment of Buryat belongs to that kind of intellectual puzzle whose solution depends
on arguments that cannot be supported by facts.
The present paper addresses only a fragment of this puzzle, namely, the Buryat
developments of Mongol s, o, and

s :

si:
-s:

o :
5i:

d :

Sara
sira
boscasun
oino
^aqa

"moon"
"yellow"
"to rise"
"snow"
"wolf"
"edge"
"spear"

B h:
S:

-d:
s:
S:
z:

hara
Sara
bodsahar\
sono
zaxa
zada

2;
ji: j-ida
These developments highlight that distinctive shape which all Buryat dialects _
share in contrast to other Mongol languages, and which is already characteristic
of Buryat in the eighteenth century.
Thus we know the starting and the ending points of these developments, but
on the face of it the lack of earlier data might seem to preclude knowing when
these developments occurred. The present paper addresses the problem of the
chronology of these developments, and attempts to outline a research strategy
that takes into account various kinds of later linguistic sources for Buryat
whose utilization may partially compensate for the absence of earlier materials.
Several assumptions may be made in regard to these developments. The firsts
is that there were intermediate stages between the starting and the ending
points, specifically:

s
si
sets!

jedsD

ci
ji

>
>
>
>
>
>

>

h

*si
>
*aLtsl >
*jLdzl >

s
s

*e

z

*cV

>
>
*ov
Evidence will be cited below that supports the Intermediate states for c and

,
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while the others are postulated on the basis of probable phonetic developments.
A second assumption that is made is that the developments of the affricates
occi^red in tandem; in other words, the changes which affected
affected
j/ji in the same way and at the same time. This assumption is based on the
fact that these affricates begin and end with the same primary phonetic shapes
(differing only in the secondary feature of voicing) and thus ought to have fol
lowed parallel developments.
Furthermore, it may be argued that at least some of these developments oc
curred in a certain order relative to one another, that is, that they may be
arranged in a relative chronology:
(l) si > s occurred before s > h\ otherwise,
si would have become h as well {*hara < *hira < sira, rather than sara) ■, (2) s >
h occurred before c/J > s/s; otherwise, a would have become h as well {*hahar\ <
*sasar\ < oasun, rather than sdhar\). Only if we suppose that o/'^ > s/s was a
conditioned change before vowels other than i can we postulate: (3) e/j > s/s
occurred before ai/Jji > s/s; otherwise, oij'^i would have become s/s as well
[*sono < *aono < *aono < '5ino, rather than "Sono). The development -s > -d can
not be ordered in this way, but in view of the existence of this development
already in Middle Mongol (just as "/-breaking" and the contraction of disyllabics to long vowels in Buryat), it potentially existed as a feature of the
Mongol dialect base from which Buryat evolved. Thus, preliminary to its fur
ther discussion below, -s > -d may be placed at the beginning of this ordered
arrangement.
As a consequence of these considerations, the Buryat treatments of s, c^and

"3 may be arranged in the following relative chronology where ik) is divided
into two stages for reasons that will be evident below:
(1)
(2)
(3)

-s >

si >
s >
(ka.) o!3 >
(Ub) ^clo >
(5)
ailoi

-d
*si > s
*e > h
*e/j

sjz
> *cVl3V > s/S

For the evidence that might enable us to assign some of these changes to specific
periods in time, we turn now to an examination of each of the linguistic sources
of Buryat.

Written Mongol Among the Buryats
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Lamaism was propagated
by Olrat and Southern Mongol clergymen among the leading tribes of the TransBaikal area: the Khori Buryat who migrated there from the Sis-Baikal in the
seventeenth century; the Mongols of the Selenga River area, essentially the
Congol and Sartuul who were emigrants from Mongolia; and the Barguzin Buryat,
originally Ekhirit Buryat from the Sis-Baikal, who began to settle the Barguzin
area in the seventeenth century. One of the significant consequences of the
spread of Lamaism among these tribes was the introduction and adoption of the
Written Mongol literary language.
The first mention of the existence of this literary language among the Buryats
is located in the Noord en Oost Tartarye (1692) of Nicolaes Witsen who remarked
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that "the Bratsi have a special writing, although few of them know how to
read."^ A number of texts in this "special writing" (i.e.. Written Mongol)
have been edited or studied, from which it is evident that many manuscripts
reflect Buryat phonetic shapes, grammatical forms, and lexica, that appear at
the indiscretion of their scribes, in the otherwise Classical literary language
in which they were written.3 While the importance of this body of texts for
aspects of later Buryat linguistic history is incontestable, it is the case
that no manuscript datable to before the late eighteenth century has yet come
to light, so that this source cannot be utilized for the present problem.

Early Western Recordings
It was noted above that Buryat had developed in most respects its character
istic modern shape by the eighteenth century. Our witness to this consists of
some stray recordings made in 1723 by Daniel Gottlieb Messerschmidt and of
several glossaries passed on in the compilations of Johann Eberhard Fischer (ca.
1730) and Peter Simon Pallas (1786-1789).^ Of these, the Fischer glossary is
especially important as it reflects in a relatively systematic fashion a Western
Buryat dialect that is unambiguous in regard to most of the developments which
concern us:
(l) —s > —d, cf. F totaho "clay," B todxo "a fine dust," WM toyosqa
"brick"; (2) si > s, cf. F Sahara "yellow," B 'sara, WM sira\ (3) s > h, cf. F
chakal "beard," B haxal, WM saqal-, {k) Cl'S > s/z, cf. F sfagun "snow," B sadum,
WM oasun',^ (5) ci/ji remains a/y in Fischer, but Messerschmidt reflects the
change
> s {sahonno "wolf," B 'Sono, WM "dino-, gusahyn "30," B guSa'^, WM yii&in) ■,
while for ji it may be that Messerschmidt' s spelling dsh represents z (dsheron
"60," B zarar], WM
nadshir "summer," B nazar < *naSir)
Taken together,
then, Fischer's and Messerschmidt's recordings establish that the major sound
changes characteristic of all modern Buryat dialects were already in existence
in the Western Buryat dialect area in the 1720s.T

Dialects
Although numerous problems and issues in Bixryat dialectology remain unresolved,
we are in possession of basic monographs describing the major dialects. Without
violating general views toward their classification, Buryat dialects may be
divided into the following groups:®
I. Western-. Ekhirit and Bulagat, with Bokhan and Bar guz in (where z > y,cf.
Siruya "ambler" > zor5 > yard). Alar, Kudara, Nizhne-Udinsk, Tunka, etc.;®
II. Eastern: Khori, which is the basis of the literary language, with Aga,
Ivolga, and other sub-dialects
III. Southern: Selenga, consisting of Congol and Sartuul; Bargu.
One might suppose that those dialects which have participated in all the
major Buryat changes, and which are spoken by ethnic groups who are core com
ponents of the present Buryat people, would be those dialects most pertinent to
problems of the historical development of Buryat. However, it is the case that
the Congol dialect, which linguistically stands closest to Khalkha, provides us
with a key to the solution of the chronology of one of the Buryat changes.
An important aspect of Congol is that it is spoken by people whose movement
out of Mongolia into the Selenga region may be dated with some precision. It
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is known, both from Russian administrative dociunents and from historical chron
icles composed by the Selenga Buryats that the Congol clans migrated into the
Selenga area in the contact zone with the Buryat language in the l680s, largely
as the result of the war between the Oirat prince Galdan Busugtu and the Khalkha
prince Sayin Khan.12 Another important facet of Congol is that in the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries it belonged to the Khalkha dialect group ac
cording to features which it still retains:
(l) s remains s in Congol, Khalkha
Sara "moon," but B hara-, (2) 5/j become c/j in C, Kh cever "clean, pure," but B
seber, and C, Kh jugan "thick," but B zuzan; (3) oi/'^i remain in C, Kh aono "wolf,
but B Sono, and C, Kh ^oro "ambler," but B zord.^^ The Buryat influence on Con—
gol shows up in certain phonetic details (-s > -d), and more pronouncedly in the
lexicon.
One element of the latter kind of influence is the postposition—perhaps
better described as an enclitic—co, which has in Congol an inessive-illative
function meaning "in, within"; e.g., C gerco "within the house."1^ This
enclitic, in the form so and with the same function, is found in all Buryat di
alects, but in no other Mongol language.15 Consequently, its appearance in
Congol may unequivocally be interpreted as a borrowing from Buryat. Moreover,
on the basis of the initials of co and so, the immediately preceding form *co
may be postulated.1^
What makes the Congol reflex of this enclitic so significant is that its
adoption from Buryat can be dated to the period after the l680s when the Congols moved into contact with Buryat. Congol co cannot have been borrowed from
Buryat so, that is, after the latter had undergone the change a > s, because in
that case Congol would have the form so, since Congol had and has the phoneme
s. Nor should it have been borrowed from the reconstructed Buryat *co at a
stage before Buryat had made the change c > s, because in that case Congol would
have the form c5, as the phoneme c has always existed in Congol.
Therefore, the only possible inference to be drawn from Congol co is that it
was borrowed from Buryat *co. With this we are in a position to establish two
facts of Buryat linguistic history:
(1) the intermediate stage a/^ > c/g, which was postulated as (Ua) above,
was a reality in the Buryat dialect area at some point after the l680s (CongolBuryat contact) and before the lT20s (Fischer-Messerschmldt);
(2) the sound change (l*b) c/j > s/z occurred between the l680s and the 1720s,
since its starting point is entailed by the Congol reflex co and its ending
point is attested in the Fischer-Messerschmidt recordings.

The Buryat Element in Yaqut
Among the problems connected with the Mongol elements in Siberian Turkic
languages,17 none is more pertinent to the present theme than the Mongol borrow
ings in Yaqut, at least one layer of which was thought to be of Buryat origin
by the chief investigator of this question, S. Kaiuzyfiski.l^
The Mongol loanwords in Yaqut display two reflexes of Mongol c/g:
(a) cjg
!■ s; cf. Y suguVdn "assembly" -<— M, WM ^ylayan, B sugldr]-, Y s-uarya
’"_sirya "sled" <— M, WM 'birya, B sarga-, Y subgdi "cream" -e- M, WM gbgekei, B
xZxei;
•
(b) S/J —> afg', cf. Y cayvlyan "lightning" -<— M, WM bakilyan, B saxilgar\-.
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Y Hoik "decoration”
M, WM HHg "writing," B beseg-, Y Zfoyus '-^JaY^s "suit
ability" ^ M, WM gokis, B zoxid-, Y gilai "resin" ^ M '*jilei, B zell. ^
Kaiuzynski supposed that the two reflexes indicated that the Mongol^loanwords
entered Yaqut from different Mongol dialects; that, since Mongol o/g become
sibilants slzjslz only in Buryat, layer (a) must be the Buryat layer in Yaqut;
and that the Biiryat layer is the most recent.20 According to this view, then,
Yaqut is a potential source for the linguistic history of Buryat.
However, it can be shown with some clarity that a different interpretation
of the two reflexes of Mongol o/g must be correct. In the first place, the
fact of intensive contact between predecessors of speakers of Buryat and Yaqut
is indisputable. This is nowhere more evident than from the example of the
designation of the "rainbow" in the two languages: B unegen sektete and Y saszl
iktSbif, literally "the fox pissed."21 Here the parallel expressions which emidoy native words imply a connection that is deeper than ordinary borrowing,
namely, the common conceptualization of an atmospheric phenomenon. Because this
conceptualization is unknown elsewhere in Siberia, it is possible to infer some
period of community among peoples who later formed components of the Buryats and
the Yaquts.22
Even among the Mongol borrowings in Yaput, it is possible to detect specif
ically Biiryat loanwords: Y Jars%n "thin; book" -<— B^*cdrsan > sarhar\, cf. WM
oayasun. Middle Mongol 'oa'alsun, Kalmyk oasy^, Ordos oasUj Khalkha cas(an)', Y
gon "people" -t— B *gon > zor\, a word that is not found in other Mongol lan
guages. 23 These borrowings alone prove that layer (b) S/U >■ 5/J is a Buryat
layer in Yaqut.
The status of layer (a) o/g —> s must be evaluated in light of the sound
changes which affected the Turkic portion of the Yaqut lexicon. By the time of
the compilation of Witsen's Noord en Cost Tartarye (1692), but undoubtedly sev
eral decades earlier, a small Yaqut word had been recorded that already reflec
ted the major Yaqut sound changes, including the change 25/? > s in ^1 positions
Us "3" < MC; Suis "face" < 'teSs < *guz \ Sili "marrow" <*ciH < *^ilik.'^'^ The
Mongol borrowings of layer (a) show precisely the same reflexes in Yaqut as do
the native Turkic words, from which it may be inferred that layer (a) existed
in Yaqut prior to the Yaqut sound change 5/? > s and, of course, prior to the
entrance of layer (b).25
As a result of these considerations, it can be seen that layer (a) borrow
ings which, it goes without saying, are probably also to be attributed to those
Mongol dialects which formed modern Buryat,26 cannot be utilized as a source
for the present problem since internal Yaqut developments served to "mask^ the
original phonetic shapes of the borrowed words. Layer (b) borrowings, which
are demonstrably Buryat, cannot be assigned even an approximate absolute chron
ology due to the still obscure historical relationship between the Buryat and
Yaqut peoples.
On the positive side, however, it has been established that
layer (b) reflects a stage of Buryat that existed prior to the operation of the
sound changes which concern us here.

Buryat Loanwords in Evenki

Several dialects of Evenki, a Northern Tungus language, are spoken on the
territory of modern Buryatia.Of these, only the dialect of the Barguzin
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Evenki has been described in any detail, from which it is clear that it con
tains a substantial nximber of words borrowed from Buryat.28
One of these borrowings has immediate significance for the present problem.
The name for the Russian Tsar in Barguzin Evenki is
kSn, which represents
Mongol cayan qayan "White Khan."30 Since this term should not have come into
existence prior to the first penetration into Buryatia by the Russians in the
1620s, we may infer from its presence in Barguzin Evenki that a form *cagdr)
existed in Buryat between the l620s and that point in the period between the
l680s and the 1720s when a form *cagax\ would have regularly developed in Buryat
(see above under Dialects).

Written Mongol Elements in Buryat
Although it is probably true that the use of Written Mongol accompanied the
introduction of Lamaism among the Biiryats at the end of the seventeenth century,
it is at least possible that Written Mongol was known in this area as early as
the l660s since Witsen's information noted above could have dated from this
time. Over several centuries. Written Mongol cannot have failed to leave its
impress on Buryat, especially in the lexicon where borrowed elements may be
identified on the basis of their phonetic and semantic characteristics. As an
example, B el’gese- "to sympathize with" must be borrowed from WM eligese- "id.,"
both because we should expect B *el'gehe- and because this word is typical of
literary, religious contexts. Indeed, many of the aberrant forms of Mongol
words in Biiryat, that is, those which seem to have defied regular sound changes,
probably reflect borrowings from Written Mongol.
Such is the case, it may be argued, with B tiibheri "level, smooth; peaceful,
calm," which corresponds to WM tubsin "id." Had this word developed regularly
as a part of the Buryat lexicon, it would have undergone the sound change (2)
si > s and ended up as B *tubser\. Rather, B tubhen may be explained as a bor
rowing from WM tubsin that occurred after (2) si > S and before (3) s >
since it shows the effect of the latter change. Because this borrowing could
not have taken place prior to the introduction of Written Mongol, whose earliest
possible attested date is the l660s, and because the change (3) s >
is known
to have existed in the 1720s (Fischer-Messerschmidt), we can establish two
further facts of Buryat linguistic history:
(l) the change (2) si > s demon
strably occurred before the change (3) s > h, as argued above; (2) the change
(3) s > h occurred at some point between the l660s and 1720s.

Russian Loanwords in Buryat
Due to the fact that they cannot antedate the period of first contacts in
the 1620s, the Russian borrowings in Buryat may eventually prove to be one of
the most important sources of Buryat linguistic history. The Russian element
is devilishly difficult to Investigate and no systematic effort to do so has
been expended for the present paper. Here only one aspect of this question
will be commented upon.
The Buryat sound change (l) -s > -d had certainly occurred by the 1720s, as
it is reflected in the Fischer-Messerschmidt materials. Moreover, as Doerfer
pointed out, the change is reflected in the name Fedot, which represents a

Larry 7. Clark

20

Buryat form of the Russian name Feodosij and which is attested in a Russian
document from 1701.31 Furthermore, certain Russian loanwords in Buryat also
have this reflex: Rus' —> orod "Russian," roz’ —> orod "rye" (Bokhan dial.),
peskar' —>■ pedger "gudgeon-fish; gobio gohio" (Mukhorshibir dial.).3
Barring
mediation through Siberian Turkic languages, these words co\ild not have been
borrowed before the l620s, so that one might suppose that the change -s > -d
occurred after that time. However, several factors should be considered before
reaching such a conclusion.
It was already noted above that the change -s > -d is attested in the Middle
Mongol period and so could have existed in the dialect base of later Buryat.33
More significantly, it may be posited that the change -s > -d in Buryat is
morphophonemically determined, that is, that the phonetic structure of the
Buryat word conforms to a constraint against the occurrence of final -s such
that it automatically becomes -d. Support of this hypothesis may be foimd in
the false back formations that occur in several Buryat dialects; e.g., Alar
buidt "steel" ~ butahlye (Acc.) < *butdslye (WM bolod —Persian pulad), pdtdt ~
pdldhdr (Instr.) < *pdldsar
Russ, plat)
Such cases in which *s > h ap
pears in declined forms could not occur, did not Alar speakers sense that they
belonged with cases as utdt "people" ~ uldhd (Gen.) < *ulasd (V/M ulus
Turkic
ulus)—in other words, did they not sense that t{d) paradigmatically replaces s
in final position.
Thus on the diachronic plane, the change (l) -s > -d probably occurred before
the seventeenth century, while on the synchronic plane, the change -s > -d is a
structural rule of Buryat that already existed in the seventeenth century.

Conclusions
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we may now attempt to assign an
approximate absolute chronology to each of the sound changes which were aligned
in a relative chronology above:
(1)
(2)

-d
si > ^

(3)

s > h

-s >

occurred before the seventeenth century
occurred before (3) (WM tubsin
B tubhex])
thus before some point in the period l660s-1720s
occurred at some point in the period l660s-1720s
(WM

tubsin

B

tubher\)

(ita) d/o > d/j

occurred after the l620s (B *aagdr\
Barguzin Evenki
dagST]) and before (4b) (B *ao
Congol oo), thus
before some point in the period l680s-1720s

(4b)

occiirred at some point in the period l680s-1720s

(5)

o/o

> s/s

oil'si > s/z

(B *go
Congol ao)
occurred after (4) but before the 1720s (Messerschmidt),
thus toward the end of the period l680s-1720s

It is significant that (l) and (2) are already
sources and thus need not be peculiarly Buryat at
features (3)-(5), on the other hand, all occurred
from the l620s to the 1720s, and are concentrated

attested in Middle
all. The uniquely
over the course of
in the period from

Mongol
Buryat
a century,
the l660s
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to the 1720s. Prior to this cluster of so^lnd changes, then, the special char
acter of Buryat phonology had not yet taken shape, so that the dialects spoken
in the Sis-Baikal area differed hut little from other dialects of the central
Mongol group.

Notes
1. Throughout this paper, s, a, j, are used for these soimds "before vowels
other than i, while si, ei, Ji, are used for the latter environment. Abbrevia
tions used are: WM = Written Mongol (F. D. Lessing, MongoZian-English Diationary, Berkeley and Los Angeles i960), B = Buryat (K. M. Seremisov, Burjatskorusskij slovar’, Moscow 1973).
2. Only the second edition of 1705 is available to me; cf. Volimie II, p. 668.
Although Witsen spent three yeajrs in the Muscovy state {l66h~l66T), where he
consulted many of the Russian sources which he used for this compilation, he
also continued to receive information in Holland from his Russian correspondents,
as well as from traveling Dutchmen, for the next thirty-five years—thus, it is
not possible to date this mention precisely; cf. E. P. Zinner, Sibir' v
izvestijakh Zapadnoevropejskikh putesestvennikov i uaenykh XVIII veka, 1968,
pp. 10-35.
3. The basic monograph on this subject is now C. B. Cydendambaev, Burjatskie

istoriaeskie kkroniki i rodoslovnye.

Istoriko-tingvistioeskoe issledovanie,

Ulan-Ude 1972 (cf. the review by Lajos Bese, Acta Orient. Hung.
31 (1977),
pp. 391-39^)* Here may be found a complete survey of Buryat historical chron
icles and genealogical tables, as well as an exhaustive examination of the lan
guage of such texts. Other groups of texts from this area include: grammatical
treatises and dictionaries (e.g., cf. the remarks of P. B. Baldanzapov, JiriXkenu tolta-yin tayilburi. Mongol'skoe grarrmaticeskoe sooinenie XVIII veka, UlanUde 1962, pp. 16-17; also R.Ye. Pubaev, "The Tibeto-Mongolian dictionary com
piled by the Aga Buryat, Galsan Jimba Tuguldorov, of the Khuatsai clan," Mongolia
Society Bulletin 10:2 (1971), pp. 6U-71); legal codes (cf. B. D. Cibikov, Obyanoe
pravo selenginskikh burjat, Ulan-Ude 1970) and official documents (cf.
Cydendambaev, op. cit., pp. 555-569; Rlntchen, "A propos d'une piece de
chancellerie bouriate du XIX siecle," in Studies in General and Oriental Lin
guistics, Tokyo 1970, pp. 5OO-50U); popular and religious texts (cf. N. Poppe,
"An essay in Mongolian on medicinal waters," Asia Major 6 (1957), pp. 99-105;
id., "a Buriat literary source of the XIX century on shamanism," in Traditions
religieuses et para-religieuses des peuples altatques, Paris 1972, pp. 109-113;
id., "Opisanle mongol'skikh 'samanskikh' rukopisej Instituta vostokovedenija,"
Zapiski Instituta vostokovedenija I (1932), pp. 151-200), story cycles of
Indian origin (cf. C. Damdinsuren, "Burjatskij pereskaz Ramajany," in
Issledovanija po VOsto'Snoj filologii, Moscow 197^*, pp. 61*-88; N. 0. Sharakshinova,
"Les contes du cadavre ensorcele chez les Bouriates," Acta Orient. Rung. 16 (1963),
pp. ^5-5^; E. V. Barannikova, "Simvolika belogo cveta v burjatskikh volsebnykh
skazkakh," in Filologi'Seskie zapiski, Leningrad 1973, pp. 103-118), and the very
important Buryat copies of the Geser epic (cf. Rintchen, "En marge du culte de
Guesser Khan en Mongolie," Journal de la Soci^te Finno-Ougrienne 60:li (1958),
51 pp.; A. Ulanov, "Burjatskaja unginskaja versija 'Gesera,'" in Trudy XXV.
Mezdunanodnogo Kongressa Vostokovedov, III, Moscow 1963, pp. 252-257; C". B.
Cydendambaev, "On the language of the Mongol and Buriat versions of the Geser
epic," in Mongolian Studies, Budapest 1970, pp. 565-579; L. Lorincz, "GeserVarianten in Ulan-Ude, Ulan-Bator und Leningrad," Acta Orient. Rung. 25 (1972),
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pp. I75-I9O; id., "'Khurin Altaj’ i ’Erensej,’" in Issledovanija po vostoonoj
filologii, Moscow 197^s pp. 119-125)U. See my "Two eighteenth century Buryat glossaries," Mongolian Studies 3,
(1976), pp. 53-82.
5. In my study cited in the previous note, I erred in stating (p. 57) that
Fischer represented s by both j and sj; rather, in German orthography,J always
represents z and sj always stands for s (ss).
It is a pleasure to acknowledge
that my honored teacher, Denis Sinor, brought this error to my attention.
6. Messerschmidt's dsah presumably represents 3 {dsohegen "glutton, wolver
ine," WM jegegen, as against B zeger\-, dsahebbon "trout," WM ^ebege "Siberian
salmon, lenok"), but then one must wonder why he should record J where Buryat
has z and 2 where Buryat has z. This is not clear to me.
7- G. Doerfer, in Orientalistisohe Literaturzeitung 6k (1969), cc. 506-507,
on the basis of the Pallas glossary, had supposed that the Buryat changes of
Sj 5,
occurred during the eighteenth century. G. Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute
de Witsen," Aata Orient. Hung. 25 (1972), p. U33, accepts Doerfer’s view but
points out that these changes are already present in the Fischer glossary.
8. Cf. N. Poppe, Introduction to Mongolian Comparative Studies (Helsinki,
1955) LMemoires de la Societe Finno-Ougrienne llOIl, pp. 22-23; G. Sanzeev,
Sravnitel’naga grammatika mongol'skikh jazykov, I, Moscow 1953, pp. k2, U6-55;
G. Doerfer, "KLassifikation und Verbreitung der mongolischen Sprachen," in
Handbuah der Orientalistik, V/2. Mongolistik, Leiden/Koln 196U, pp. U2-43, k6kbN. Poppe, "Die burjatischen Mundarten," Memoires de la Societe FinnoOugrienne 67 (1933), pp. 331-335; D. A. Alekseev, "Dialekty burjat-mongol'skogo
jazyka," Ucenye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 19^9> no.
98, pp. 161-202.
9. Of. B. V. Matkheev, "Ocerki ekhirit-bulagatskogo govora," in Issledovanie
burjatskikh govorov, II, Ulan-Ude 1968, pp. 3-^6; M. P. Khomonov, "BokhanskiJ
govor," in Issledovanie burjatskikh govorov, I, Ulan-Ude I965, pp. 35-70; E. R.
Radnaev, "BarguzinskiJ govor," in Issledovanie, I, pp. 70-107; A. G. MitroSkina,
"Govor kacugskikh (verkholenskikh) burjat," in Issledovanie, II, pp. ^7-73;
N. Poppe, Alarskij govor, I-II, Leningrad 1930-1931; I. D. Buraev, "Nekotorye
foneticeskie osobennosti govora alaro-unginskikh burjat," in Issledovanie, II,
pp. 117-135; C. B. Cydendambaev, "Kratkaja kharakteristika govora kudarinskikh
burjat," Kratkie soob'S^enija Instituta narodov Azii 196k, no. 83, pp. 57-68;
M. A. Castren, Versuch einer burj'dtischen Sprachlehre nebst kurzem Wdrterverzeichnis, ed. A. Schiefner, St. Petersburg 1857; G. D. SanSeev, Foneticeskie
osobennosti govora nizneudinskikh burjat, Leningrad 1930; D. A. Abaseev,
Tunkinskij govor," in Issledovanie, I, pp. 3-3^; C. B. Cydendambaev, "K itogam
ekspedicionnogo izucenija govorov dobajkal'skikh burjat," in Issledovanie, II,
pp. 16I+-175.
10. Cf. A. D. Rudnev, Khori-burjatskij govor, I-III, St. Petersburg 1913-191^;
L. Bese, "Contributions to the Khori-Buriat subdialect of Ivolga," Acta Orient.
Hung. 15 (1962), pp. 15-21; id., "Ob affrikatakh khorinskogo dialekta," Kratkie
soob^denija Instituta narodov Azii 196k, no. 83, pp. U6-l*8; N. Poppe, Zametki o
govore aginskikh burjat, Leningrad 1932; L. D. Sagdarov, "O nekotorykh jazykovykh
osobennostjakh tmgujskikh i aginskikh bxirjat i stepeni ikh otrazenija v
literaturnom jazyke," in Issledovanie, II, pp. 15^-16311. Cf. N. Poppe, "Uber einige Besonderheiten des Tsongol-Dialektes,"
Zentralasiatische Studien 5 (I97l), pp- 1^5-155; I- D. Buraev, "Sartul'skij
govor," in Issledovanie, I, pp. IO8-I5O; C. B. Budaev, "Congol'skij govor," in

Buryat Historical Linguistics

23

Issledovanie, I, pp. I5I-I86; C. B. Budaev, "izmenenija v leksike i frazeologii
congol'skogo govora," in Issledovanie, II, pp. 136-153; N. Poppe, "Skizze der
Phonetlk des Bargu-Burjatischen," Asia Major 7 (1932), pp. 307-378.
12. Of. W. Heissig, "A Mongolian source to the Lamaist suppression of shaman
ism in the seventeenth century" Anthropos U8 (1953), pp. 506-507; Poppe, "Ober
einige Besonderheiten des Tsongol-Dialektes," p. 1U5.
13. Of. Poppe, ibid., pp. lk6-lhi.
14. Ibid., p. 147.
15. Cf. N. Poppe, Grarmatika burjat-mongol’skogo jazyka, Moscow and Leningrad
1938, p. 181. The enclitic so, which does not observe vowel harmony, should not
be confused with the terminative suffix .Saya, found in Buryat dialects as
.sd/.se/.so/.so■, cf. ibid., p. 130, and Poppe, Introduction to Mongolian Com
parative Studies, p. 206.
16. The etymology of so is still somewhat problematic. Rudnev, Kkoriburjatskij govor, I, pp. Ix-lxi, communicated Ramstedt's opinion that so derives
from *dosd from *docd, which is etymologically related to dotona "inner, within,"
dotur "inner." 0. J. Ramstedt, Einfilhrung in die altaische Spracbwissenschaft,
II, Helsinki, 1952 ZM^oires de la Societe Finno-Ougrienne 104:2I, pp. 52-53,
derives B so from *doc3, parallel to Kalmyk dota "inner," by a special develop
ment. Poppe, Introduction to Mongolian Comparative Studies, pp. 206-207, says
that so "is an abbreviation of doso ~ zoso < *docaya ~ *dotaya 'within,' cf.
Mo. dotoyadu 'inner,' Kh. dotoda id., cf. the analogous form Mo. yadayadu
'outer,' Kh. gadd 'outside,' Bur. gaza id." Although so ought to be an abbrevia
tion of some form whose root is common to that of dotona, datura and *dotaya
(Kalmyk!), it cannot have developed from *docaya, which could only have become
Buryat *docd > *da > *sa. Rather, so is a regular development of *co < *cuya <
*docuya, and the latter form contains an element
that is not otherwise
noted in the derivational morphology of adverbials of this nature.
17. Some aspects of the Mongol loanwords in South Siberian Turkic have been
treated in N. Poppe's "Ober einige Vokalentspreehungen in mongolischen
Lehnwortern im Tuvinischen," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 118 (1968), pp. 113-123, and "On some vowel correspondences in Mongolian
loan words in Turkic," Central Asiatic Journal 13 (1969), pp. 207-214, while
Hasan Eren, "Sibirya Turk Dillerinde Mogol Unsurlar," Turk Dili Belleten l4-15
(1950), pp. 35-43, merely extracts, without conseguence, the Siberian etymolo
gies of B.Ja. Vladimircov, "Tureckie elementy v mongol'skom jazyke," Zapiski
vostohuxgo otdelenija Imperatorskago Russkago arkheologideskago obscestva 20
(1910), pp. 153-184. The Buryat borrowings in the language of the Tofalars, a
small group who live intermixed with the Biiryats in the Oka area and who speak
a language most closely related to Tuva and Toji, have been studied by V. I.
Rassadin, but these loanwords already show the modern state of Buryat; cf.
"Burjatskie leksiJeskie zaimstvovanija v tofalarskom jazyke," in Issledovanie
burjatskikh govorov, II, pp. 187-191; see the same scholar's "O tjurklzmakh
V burjatskom jazyke^" in K izuceniju burjatskogo jazyka, Ulan-Ude I969, pp.
129-134, and L. D. Sagdarov and V. I. Rassadin, "Ob upotreblenii tofalarami
burjatskogo jazyka," in Issledovanie, II, pp. I76-I86. The following contact
studies are devoid of methodological value: A. A. Bulakaeva-Barannikova,
"Sopostavitel'nye materialy po leksike sovremennogo tatarskogo i burjatmongol' skogo jazykov," in Sbomik trudov po filologii, Ulan-Ude 1958, pp. 157175; P- P. Baraskov, "O mongolo-burjatskikh i jakutskikh jazykovykh zvjazjakh,"
in ibid., pp. 176-206; A. A. Bulakaeva-Barannikova," Obscie slova v leksike
sovremennogo kirgizskogo 1 burjatskogo jazykov," Uaenye zapiski Burjatskogo
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gosudarstvennogo pedagog-i5eskogo Inst-ituta imena D. Banzarova l6 (1958) > PPII3-1U3; id., "Turecko-burjatskle jazykovye parallel!,” ibid. 23 (1961), pp.
237-266.
18. Mdngolisahe Elemente in der jakutisohen Spraohe, Warsaw 1962 :Prace

Orientalistyczne 10!.
19. Ibid., pp. U5-J+8.
20. Ibid., pp. 123-126.
21. I. A. Podgorb\mskij, Russko-mongolo-burjatskij slovar', Irkutsk 1909,
p. 257; E. K. Pekarskij, Slovar’ jakutskogo jazyhx, I, St. Petersburg 1907,
p. 911.
22. This is hardly the place to broach the complex problem of the southern
origin of the Yaquts which, since the fundamental researches of A. P. Okladnikov,
Yakutia Before its Incorporation into the Russian State, Montreal and London
1970 [Anthropology of the North: Translations from Russian Sources, 8!, has
been localized in the Sis-Baikal region where the Buryats evolved, and where
the Mongol-Yaqut contacts presumably occurred prior to the northern migration
of the Yaquts. Nonetheless, I should like to recall two facts that somewhat
obscure this picture. First, on the basis of his study of the geographical and
demographic distribution of Siberian peoples in the seventeenth century, B. 0.
Dolgikh, Rodovoj i plemennog sostav narodov Sibiri v XVII veke, Moscow i960,
was able to complete a map (between pp. 61U and 615) which shows a group of
"Korintsy" (= Khori) and "Daury" settled in the region northeast of Yakutsk.
This important proof of probably Mongol elements co-existing with the Yaquts as
late as the seventeenth century was first pointed out by G. Kara, Le glossaire
yakoute de Witsen," p. 1+32. Second, it may be recalled that one of the com
ponents of the Yaqut people were the Khoro who, according to Yaqut legends,
spoke in the special xoro t%'la "Khori language”; cf. G. U. Ergis, Istorioeskie
predaniga i rasskazy gakutov, I, Moscow and Leningrad i960, pp. I8, 100-103,
2l|4-2l+5, 298. This suggests the presence in the north of a Mongol-speaking
people, specifically the Khori who also took part in the formation of the
Buryats, over an indeterminable period prior to and perhaps during the seven
teenth cent+iry.
_
.
. ,
.
23* Tliess exajnpl6s aj(*6 cited. Toy G. Doerfer in 0v%€Tii^cil/i'&'t'VSOnQ
58 (1963), C. 506; cf. Kaiuzynski, op. ait., pp. 124-125.
24. Cf. Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute de Witsen," and note 2 above.
25. That layer (a) is older than layer (b) was already the conclusion reached
by N. Poppe, "Das Jakutische," Philologiae Turaioae Fundamenta, I, Wiesbaden
1959, P- 683, and accepted by Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute de Witsen," p. 434.
26. On the essentially Buryat character of both layers of loanwords in Yaqut
I agree with Doerfer, in Orientalistisahe Literaturzeitung 58 (1963), cc. 506507, although my conclusions concerning the chronology of Buryat so+ind changes
differ from his.
27. Cf. the recent sketch of A. S. Suhin,
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evenkov Zabaghal'ga (XVII-XX vv.), Ulan-Ude 1973*
_
28. Cf. N. Poppe, Materialy dlga issledovaniga tungusskogo gazyka. Narecne
barguzinskikh tungiisov, Leningrad 1927; W. Kotwicz, "Le dialecte tongous de
Bargouzine (materia+ix recueillis par D. Rincino)," Rocznik Orientalvstyozny 16
(1950), pp. 315-326; the work of V. A. Gorcevskaja, Kharaktervst^ka govora
barguzinskikh evenkov, Moscow and Leningrad 1936, is based solely on the mate
rials of Poppe.
.
29. This example was brought to my attention by Professor Poppe during his
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comments on my paper at the Bellingham conference, for which I wish to express
my gratitude at this time. To my regret, I have not otherwise investigated the
Buryat loanwords in Evenki.
30. Cf. Poppe, Materialy dlja isstedovanija tungusskogo gazyha, p. 59.
31. Cf. Doerfer, Oriens 18-19 (1965-1966), p. ^3^+; G. N. Rumjancev and S. B.
Okun', Sbomik dokumentov po istorii Burjatii. XVII vek, I, Ulan-Ude i960, p.
h22. Both Sanzeev, Sravnitel'naja grarmatika mongol’skikh jazykov, I, p. 9,
and Doerfer, in OrientaZistische Literaturzeitung 58 (I963), c. 506, interpret
the Mongol data in such Russian documents as Buryat. In the light of my new
conclusions concerning the chronology of Buryat sound changes, I am inclined
to accept their view as the most probable, but have not yet examined this mate
rial in detail; cf. my "Two eighteenth century Buryat glossaries," p. 6l Con
p. 82, n. 33, I have wrongly criticized a statement of San2eev, which I simply
misconstrued!!; also cf. the view of Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute de Witsen,"
p. k33.
32. Cf. M. P. Khomonov, "Bokhanskij govor," in Issledovanie, I, p. 6k-, T. A.
Bertagaev, K issledovanigu leksiki mongol'skikh jazykov, Ulan-Ude 1961, p. 77
Lnurai pedger "a fish of the carp species, a koras'-t±sh," but see G. U. Lindberg and A. S. Gerd, Slovar' nazvanic presnovodnykh ryb SSSR, Leningrad 1972,
pp. 157-159, for this species!.
33. Cf. my remarks in Mongolian Studies 3 (1976), pp. 123-125, and in "Turkic
loanwords in Mongol, I. The treatment of non-initial s, z, s, S," Central
Asiatic Journal 23 (1979), in press.
34. Cf. Poppe, Alarskij govor, p. 25.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MPR STATE COMMITTEE FOR TERMINOLOGY:
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN FORMULATIWG NEW VOCABULARY
Hisao Kimura
Asia University, Tokyo

Under the provisions of the Japanese-Mongolian Treaty for Cultural Coopera
tion, a research team of Asia University was invited by the MPR Academy of
Sciences to visit Mongolia in September 1977. The research theme of the group
was "a Study of Mongolia's Modernization." My task was to investigate modern
ization in the linguistic field of tenninology or neologisms.
As a result of the revolution in 1921, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR)
became the second socialist state in world history. Since then the MPR has
exerted great efforts in building a modern socialist nation.
It has been par
ticularly successful in the educational field in the three decades since the
second world war.
In spite of much turmoil immediately following the revolution in 1921, the
Mongolian government mapped out plans for the national development of education.
One problem that blocked the success of the plan was the lack of necessary vo
cabulary due largely to the traditional nomadic background of the Mongols. It
was therefore imperative to create or standardize academic terms essential to
the modern development of education, particularly for ideological education.
To meet this necessity, efforts were made to create new terms by translating
or adopting foreign terms. To promote and coordinate this task, the Mongolian
government established a Committee for Terminology under the State Committee of
Sciences (to become the Academy of Sciences in I961). At the first Great Peo
ple's Khural, held in November 192U, Jamyan, chairman of the Committee of Sci
ences reported;
"Almost everyone is inventing new words or new terms as they
please. To protect the purity of the Mongolian language and to meet a rising
demand of the times, we have set up some ten specialized subcommittees and
assigned to them the scientific study of needed new academic terms."
In 1930 a Translation Committee for Political and Economic Terms was organ
ized under the Committee on Propaganda and Education of the Central Committee ^
of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). This translation com
mittee soon published a Russian-Mongolian dictionary for political and economic
terms containing some 6OO ideological terms from Marxist-Leninist works. A
Russian-Latin-Mongolian botanical dictionary was published in 1931. In 1932
an Academic Terms Committee was established within the Department of Philology
and Phonetics of the MPR State Committee of Sciences. This committee later be
came the State Committee for Terminology. In 1935 this committee published a
Russian-Mongolian dictionary of mathematical terms and a Russian-Mongolian
dictionary of geographical and meteorological terms. In 1937 it published a
Russian-Mongolian dictionary for chemical terms, a Russian-Mongolian dictionary
for physical terms, and in 19^5 it published a Russian-Mongolian dictionary of
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academic terms. Since 1959, the State Committee for Terminology has been pub
lishing a quarterly periodical, "Supplementary Volume on Academic Terms," to
announce newly adopted industrial and agricultural terms. To publicize and
popularize new terms among the common people, the state committee publishes a
quarterly, "News of the State Committe for Terminology."
It has published to date three volumes entitled "Collection of Academic
Terms," containing more than 30,000 terms. The Political Bureau of the MPEP
Central Committee adopted a resolution in 1963 entitled, "Work of the Language
and Literature Committee of the MPR Academy of Sciences." The resolution di
rected that in formulating or standardizing academic terms, the State Committee
for Terminology should adhere to the principle of motivating and assisting the
Mongolian people to understand the best scientific, cultural and technical
achievements in the world, of facilitating the students' studies, and of con
tinually enriching the vocabulary of the Mongolian language. The State Committee
should constantly investigate actual usage of new terms in the society and if
necessary, correct and improve them on the basis of public opinion. This resolu
tion continues to be the fundamental guiding policy of the committee today.

On September 12-13, 1977> I had the opportunity of interviewing Professor
Lubsandendeb, president of the Language and Literature Institute of the Academy
of Sciences in Ulaanbaatar and concurrently chairman of the State Committee for
Terminology. I also interviewed Professor Lubsanjab, dean of the Literature
Department of the Mongolian State University and concurrently member of the
State Committee for Terminology. They explained how new academic terms are
formulated in the Mongolian People's Republic. The following remarks contain
the gist of their statements and several articles written by Mongolian scholars
on the subject of terminology.
There is presently a Department of Academic Terms within the Language and
Literature Institute of the Academy of Sciences. Apart from this, there is the
State Committee for Terminology consisting of nine scholars appointed by the
central government. All government offices and affiliated agencies are required
to propose new terms they desire to incorporate in their various activities.
They do so in cooperation with the above-mentioned Department of Academic Terms.
The proposals drafted are then submitted to the MPR State Committee for Termin
ology. Several subcommittees of specialists within the State Committee then
study the proposals with the assistance of other specialists from various fields.
If necessary, the subcommittee amends the proposed draft of terms and, after
approving them, the State Committee for Terminology announces them officially.
Official announcements of new terms are incorporated in the quarterly magazine
published by the State Committee. From time to time, the State Committee also
publishes dictionaries or collections of terms in various industrial, scientific,
and cultural fields. The State Committee for Terminology strictly observes
certain fiindamental principles in creating new academic terms so that the new
terms are formulated on a scientific basis; they should be nationalistic,
systematic, standardized and unifying.
The Mongols formulate new terms by borrowing from Indo-European languages.
Almost all new or modern words come from or through the Russian language. This
is an inevitable consequence under present circumstances. There is, however,
a fundamental policy that the new terms should be derived from basic Mongolian
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vocabulary as much as possible.
1. New words or terms are taken from classical Mongolian literary words or from
local dialects. They include the names of animals, plants, minerals and
social phenomena. Ebcample: ekh 'mother* + bari- 'to restore' + suffix -gch
= ekh harigch 'midwife.'
2. New words or terms are derived from old Mongolian literary words or local
dialects by giving them new meanings. Examples: old word nokhbr 'friend'
now means comrade; old word tsakhilgaan 'lightning' now means electricity,
as in tsakhilgaan ermeleg 'electric medical treatment'; old word tengri
'heaven' now means god.
3. New terms are formed by combining old Mongolian words in both subordinatlve
and coordlnative combinations. Examples: old words orlogo 'income' + zarlag
'expenditure' = orlogo zarlaga 'budget'; old words moljikh 'pluck' + yus
'system' = n^ljikh yus 'exploitation.'
4. New terms are derived by translating the meaning of foreign terms. Examples:
old words gerel 'flash light' + zurag 'image' = gerel zurag 'photograph';
old words nevterkhii 'detailed' + tol' 'dictionary' = nevterkhii tol' 'ency
clopedia; old words surga- 'to teach' + khdrmujuulekh 'to raise, to bring up'
+ ukhaan 'knowledge' = surgan khdmuujuulekh ukhaan 'pedagogy.*
5. New terms are made by a simulated translation of foreign terms. Examples:
us 'water' + t3r3- 'to give birth to' + suffix -goh 'element* = us t3r3goh
'hydrogen'; klvXahil 'sourness' + t3r3- 'to give birth to' + suffix -gah
'element' = kMiahil tor3goh 'oxygen.'
6. New words or terms are created by adding suffixes to old Mongolian words.
Examples: old word ukhuula 'to propagate' + suffix goh 'element or person'
= ukhuulagah 'agitator.'
7. Categories of foreign borrowings:
a. Foreign words or terms adopted with some phonological changes.
Examples: oktyabri 'October*; autobus 'bus'; tsirk 'circus.'
b. Foreign borrowings with explanatory term.
Examples: nisekh 'flying* + ongots 'ship' = nisekh ongots 'airplane';
niigem 'social' + juram 'system' = hiigem Juram 'socialism.'
c. Foreign borrowings with double meanings are translated differently.
Examples: the Russian term fizioheskaya nauka becomes Mongolian fizikiyn
shinjlekh ukhaan 'physical science.' The Russian term fiziaheskiy trud
becomes bieiin 'body' + kh3d3lmor 'labor' = physical labor.
d. Terms are created by combining foreign borrowings and Mongolian words.
Example: khushuuoh 'vanguard leader' + general = major general; kino
'cinema' + zurag 'picture' = movie; zuragtai 'with picture' + radio =
television.
As one may see from the above examples, the neological technique is ingeniously
developed with the priority given to the basic Mongolian vocabulary. Only when
deemed unavoidable are foreign borrowings or terms adopted. Even in adopting
foreign terms, it is done in a consistent, sophisticated manner. That is to
say, instead of simply adopting a Russian word or term as is, the item in ques
tion is traced back to its original meaning or original form in Greek or Latin.
Then it is translated into Mongolian directly from its original meaning or it
is adapted in its original form from the Greek and Latin.
In spite of the fact that Russian is presently playing a leading role in the
development of a modern Mongolian vocabulary, it appears that deliberate, studied
efforts are being made to avoid borrowing terms directly from Russian. Foreign
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borrowings of Greek and Latin origin adopted into Mongolian through Russian are
defined by Mongolian linguists as international words. It is noteworthy that
the number of Mongolian words borrowed directly from pure native Russian is far
less than the number of so-called international words or terms. Mongolian lin
guists are very aware of this phenomenon. They welcome the Increased use of
international terms in the political, economic, scientific and cultural fields
to enrich the Mongolian vocabulary. Nevertheless, in order to avoid confusion
in the practical field of technical or academic terms, these linguists emphasize
the absolute priority and importance of formulating terms from basic native Mon
golian vocabulary.
After going through dozens of articles written by the Mongolian linguists on
the subject, I have come away with the impression that all of them shared a
firm and profound nationalistic respect for Mongolia's traditional culture,
particularly of its language. Today the MPR is conducting advanced education
and academic research on its own language. It is true that a modern Mongolian
vocabulary is still in the process of being developed, but there can be no doubt
that the Mongolian vocabulary has already been improved and modernized to the
extent that higher education and academic research can be conducted in the lan
guage.
It is instructive to compare Mongolia's experience with that of other moderniz
ing countries. In Japan such words as society, individual, freedom, rights,
philosophy, insurance, and company had not been formulated until the Meiji era
(1868-1912). Although Japan had a long tradition in the use of Chinese char
acters {kanji), it was not an easy task to create precise or apt words or terms
expressing certain abstract concepts because many such expressions had never
existed in Japan. Traditional Mongolia, too, lacked many abstract expressions.
Mongolia, therefore, also experienced great difficulties in developing abstract
terms.
In spite of the differences in the political and social systems, I can
see many common problems and similarities in the experience of Mongolia and
Meiji Japan in the rapid adoption of foreign culture.
The MPR State Committee for Terminology is playing a leading role as a driv
ing force in formulating, standardizing and popularizing new terms in Mongolia
in a comparatively short period of time. Judging from its activities in the
last half century, the role and achievements of this committee in promoting the
modernization of Mongolia should be highly esteemed and commended.

JURCHEN AND MONGOLIAN
Nicholas Poppe
Seattle

Jurchen (.Jiiraen) is a language very close to Manchu and can be regarded
either as the older form of Manchu or as a dialect very close to Old Manchu.^
The speakers of Jurchen appeared in history in A.D. 1115, and their dynasty
bearing the name of Chin ruled over Northern China until 123^.^ The oldest
available monument of the Jurchen language is an inscription of II85 which was
followed by a number of other steles, but the most important source is the col
lection of materials, i.e. documents and a glossary, known as Hua-i
which contains, inter alia, a petition of 1526.^
Jurchen has been studied little. The first investigation of Jiirchen was
published by Grube^ which remained the only one until the appearance of Ligeti 's
articles.^ There is also a brief description of Jurchen by Menges."^ The most
recent edition of Jurchen linguistic material is that by Kiyose cited in note
3. The present article is based on it.
As mentioned above, the Jurchen appeared in history in the twelfth century,
i.e. at the end of the Ancient Mongolian period or at the beginning of the
Middle Mongolian period.^ However, their contacts with the Mongols or the
ajicestors of the latter began at a still earlier time. As it will be seen be
low, some Mongolian elements in Jurchen go back to Ancient Mongolian.
Ligeti has discussed the old Mongolian elements in Manchu and found that a
number of such words already occurred in Jurchen.9 It is true there are AMo
loan words in Manchu which, for chronological reasons, cannot be regarded as
direct borrowings from Mongolian but must have been inherited from Jurchen.
Being close to Manchu, Jurchen has, however, preserved many features which
are considerably older than the respective developments in Manchu. Thus Jurchen
still had t before *i, whereas in Manchu the affricate a corresponds, e.g.,
J 805^® tatiburu 'to study' = Ma tacibu- 'to teach.Some words in Jurchen
have preserved the second syllable which has disappeared in Manchu, e.g., J 209
fa'a 'window' = Ma fa id.^^ etc. Consequently, one should expect Jurchen, a
language much more archaic than Manchu, to be an important source for the study
of Ancient Mongolian. Indeed, as it will be seen shortly, Jurchen has preserved
a niimber of the oldest reconstructable forms of Mongolian words.
Before we proceed to the discussion of AMo loan words in Jurchen, let it be
said that the Mong. elements in Jurchen can be divided into two main groups.
The first group is composed of such words which lack features characteristic
of any particular stage of language development. Thus, JJ^a^YaGU 'the brother
of the mother'13 is a Written Mongolian prm, cf. Mo nagacu 'maternal uncle'
which is identical with MMo nayaau id.,1^ but, on the o^her hand, almost identi
cal with Ord naga't’si 'maternal relative.'^5
Another example is J ^asa- 'to
rule, order, de$ree'^° which is identical with Mo and MMo ^asa-and Ord
DZasa- (phonetically the same as ^asa- id.).l® If it had been unknown that the
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J forms in question are attested in the J section of the Hua-i i-yu, the words
in question could not be regarded as old borrowings from Mongolian. It goes
without saying that such J words as irge-n 'people,' arki 'liquor,' ^asa- 'to
r\ile,' naya^ 'maternal uncle,' and yuvixan 'lamb'll do not contribute any
thing to historical phonology of Mongolian, and are important only as proof
that they existed at that time in the forms attested in the Hua-i i-yu.
The other group of Mong loan words in Jurchen comprises words which display
features characteristic of particular periods of language history. Thus,
J xdlin 'sea otter'20 is certainly a MMo form, cf. MMo qali'un 'beaver,'21 Mo
qaliyun 'otter' etc. This is a rather new form which might have penetrated
into JiiTchen no earlier than in the twelfth or thirteenth century. Another MMo
form is J 170 ajir morin 'stallion,' cf. Mo a^irga, MMo a^irya id.22 As for
the AMo form of this word, it is *adin’ga attested as a borrowing in Solon.23
A MMo form is also J J*57 dauli- in dautimei 'to snatch,' cf. SH da'uli- 'to
plunder, capture,'2^ H da’uli- 'to plunder,'25 L daulin 'enemy raid,'^6 mo
tayuli- 'to chase, attack, seize.'2T
The above examples demonstrate that Jurchen was under Mong influence both
in AMo and MMo periods. No wonder that Manchu, the continuation of Jurchen or
its closest relative, has also many old and new Mong loan words. It is sur
prising, however, that Mongolian does not have borrowings which could be re
garded with certainty as taken from Jurchen, although one would have expected
to find such loan words in view of Jurchen's importance at a time when the
consolidation of the Mongolian tribes was in its very initial stage. This
might be another proof that the reason for borrowing of words is not the politi
cal or cultural Inferiority of the speakers of the borrowing language. The
most convincing other examples are Russian and Persian, both of them possessing
a large number of Turkic loan words, notwithstanding the fact that both of them
were culturally and otherwise considerably superior to the Turkic tribes.
After these preliminary remarks, we proceed to the AMo loan words in Jurchen.
1. Preservation of AMo *i in the second syllable
In many cases the original *i in the second syllable was assimilated to the
vowel of the initial syllable as early as in Ancient Mongolian.28 Cf. Mo
gedesun < AMo *gedelsun ~ *gedilsicn < *gudilsun 'intestines' but Vio gVt^ige <
AMo *gudige, cf. Ev gudiy'e 'peritoneum'29 < AMo; Mo gede < AMo *gede ~ *gedi
'occiput, nape,' cf. Mo gegige <AMo *gedike 'queue.'30
Jurchen has preserved AMo *i in the following words: J U83 medige < AMo
*medige 'tidings,' cf. Mo medege < *medige 'information,'31 J 228 hudila < AMo
hudila < AMo *kudirkd 'crupper' > Mo qudurga id.32 Although Middle Turkic has
only qu&uryun 'crupper,'33 i.e. an assimilated form. Ancient Turkic may have
had *qudtryin 'crupper.'
2. Preservation of AMo *d before *i
In Ancient Mongolian *d before *i was still preserved, cf. AMo *gudige
'stomach' > Ev gudiye 'peritoneum.'3^
J\u’chen has preserved several AMo forms with *d before i, cf. J 383, k&9,

756 dirgala- 'to take pleasure, enjoy, be cheerful' < AMo *dirga- > Mo ~giraa'to be happy, be joyful,' cf. Yak s'iryd- 'to enjoy food' (a later borrowing
from Mong);35 j U83 medige 'tidings' < AMo ’’‘medige > Mo medege, Kh medke
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'information,' cf. the younger loan word Ma medege ~ medexe 'information, news'
id.;36 j 228 hudila 'crupper' < AMo *kudirka
Ma quduryan id. and Ev
kudurga id. being new borrowings from Mong.3°
However, there occur also two typical MMo forms with 3 < *d which are to be
regarded as later borrowings taken at the end of the Jurchen period. These ^e
J 225 cQir a^il 'deed' < MMo, Mo d^il < AMo *adil 'work,' and J 170 dSir movin
'stallion' (see above).

3. Preservation of AMo *fAncient Mongolian had the strong stop *p or the bilabial voiceless fricative
*<l) at the onset of many words.39 it developed into h in Middle Mongolian,
and is still preserved as x in some Mongolian languages.
Jurchen has at least one AMo loan word with
cf. J jtlO fute- in futemei
'to see off < AMo *pUde- (or *^ude~) id., MMo (H) hude-^^ Mo ude- id.^ This
word occiars also in Manchu-Tungus languages, cf. U1 pudeai- 'to expel ("see
off") an evil spirit,' Nan pude- ~ fude- id., Ma fude- 'to see off.' It occurs
in the Northern T\ingus languages only as a new borrowing from Mongolian, cf.
ude-.^^
w

The other Jurchen word with f- is J 2k3 fila 'dish,' but this is certainly
not an AMo loan word because Mo has bila 'dish, bowl' which is a borrowing from
Turkic, cf. Osm, Crm piyald 'bowl, mug,' Uzb piyala 'tea cup,' Cum piala 'gob
let,' Kaz piyala < Pers piydla?^'^ Therefore J fila is to be regarded as a word
of Pers origin but borrowed via Turkic together with such words as Ma gindana
'prison' < Pers zinddn etc.^^
4. Initial AMo *k
The initial *k has developed into J h /x/ in most cases both before back and
front vowels, cf. J 393 halabi 'to alter' = Ma xala- 'to change, exchange,
alter,' Neg kala- 'to replace,' Ud kala- 'to replace, change,' etc.;'*5 J lt6T
hendu- 'to say' = Ma xendu- 'to speak, explain,' Or feen- 'to speak, converse,'
etc.;**^ J 508 hefuli 'abdomen' = Ma xefeli id., Ev kSal 'stomach,' cf. Mo
kebeli < AMo *kepeli 'belly.On the other hand, there are very few Jurchen
words with k-.
There are the following AMo loan words with initial h: J 272 hagan (ha^tmni
genitive) 'emperor,' cf. Mo qayan, MMo ga'an ~ gan id., cf. Ev kagan etc.;
J 92 halgun 'hot' < AMo, cf. Mo qalayun, MMo qala'un id.; J 112 hudila 'crupper
< AMo, cf. Mo qudurga id.; J 336 huldhai niyarma 'burglar' < AMo, cf. Mo
qulagai id.; J 258
'cup' < AMo, cf. MMo quduga, cf. Mu quduya 'pitcher;
Il^iiihoni 'sheep' <AMo *konin^ MMo Mo qonin id., cf. Ma x^^dn, Ev konin 'sheep,
xuani 'ram,' etc.50 < Mong; J huo-li-han /xurixan/51 or /quriqan/ < AMo, cf.
MMo (H) quriqan 'lamb,'52 mo quraqan. Bur xurigan id.
An exceptional development *k- > Zero is found in J
also occiors in Manchu and most Manchu-Tungus languages
the onset, the consonant having been preserved only in
Tsintsius reconstructs a deep velar stop in cases like

655 orin 'twenty' which
'without a consonant at
Ul, Or, and Nan.53
this.5

5. The medial AMo *k
The medial. *k is likewise represented by h in Jurchen, cf. J 336 andahai (in
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andahai niyarrm) 'guest' < AMo *andakait cf. Mo anda^i 'oath, sworn statement,'
Kh andgag id., cf. Ma anda 'friend,' Nan andaxa 'guest,' Neg andaxa 'guest, a
good fellow,' all < Mong;55 j
mahila < AMo *makllai, cf. MMo (Mu) mcuqalai
'cap,' Kalm ma\Vd id.. Mo malagai id., cf. Ma ma\ala id. < Mong;56 j 519 turha
'lean' < AMo *turka(n) 'lean, emaciated,' MMo (Mu) turqan id., cf. Ma turxa id.
< Mong.
6. Preservation of AMo -^gIntervocalic *g has been preserved in Mongolian before an original short
vowel (strong position), but it has disappeared before an original long vowel
(weak position).57
In Ancient Mongolian -g- was still preserved in all cases.
Jurchen has preserved -*g~, cf. J lk6 bugu 'deer' < AMo *bugu (strong position)
id., MMo buyu (cf.
buyuyin tuyul 'fawn,'lit. 'the calf of a deer').
Mo bum
id., Kh bug id.; J 92 halgun 'hot' < AMo *l<alagun (weak position) > MMo qala'un.
Mo qalayun, Mog qaloun id., Dag \alo id.; J 9^ dulgan 'warm' < AMo *dulugdn <
Mo dulayan, Kh dula<m id., cf. Ev *dul- 'to warm,' duli 'warm'; J 93 sergun
'cool' < ^o *serigun > Mo serigun, Kalm serun id. Cf. Ma serguven, U1 seuruli.
Nan sgrguQ id. < Mong; J 137 temge 'camel' < AMo ^temegen. Mo temegen, Kh temee
id., cf. Sol t^ege, Ma temege id. 59 < Mong;_J 597 Tiegun 'left' (in the glossary
incorrectly translated as 'right') < AMo *gegiXn, Mo gegun, Kalm zUn id. Cf. Ev
^eyin 'left,' Neg Jiyinidgg'dg 'left side,' ^a.n '^euntu 'left-handed,' possibly
all < Mong; J 287 degun 'younger brother' < AMo '^degU > MMo de'Vi, Dag dgw, Mog
Mo. deguu, Kalm dU id., cf. Ma deo id. < MMo; J 523 badgai 'meal' (probably
a genitive) < AMo *budaga 'grain, cereal, millet, gruel' > Mo budaya(n), Kh
budaa id. Cf. Neg buda 'millet,' U1 'millet, gruel,' Nan boda 'gruel,' Ma buda

7. Syllable- and word-final r in AMo
The syllable-final r in Mong loan words in Jurchen has been preserved: J 83
erte 'early' < AMo *erte. Mo erte id.; J k83 dirga- 'to take pleasure' < AMo
*dirga- > Mo girgp.- 'to be happy, to enjoy'; J 6U9 durhon 'fourteen' < AMo *d3r(in *dbr-ben 'four') + *hon 'ten,' cf. AT on 'ten'; J 6J*8 gorhon 'thirteen' <
AMo *gur- (in *gur-ban 'three') + *hon 'ten'; J 8U3 irge-be 'populace' (acc.)
< AMo irge(n) ■> MMo (Mu), Mo irgen 'people'; J 519 turha 'lean' < AMo *turka(n)
> MMo, Mo turqan id.
The word-final r has been preserved only in J 329 nekur 'friend,' cf. Mo
nbkur, KaJjn nblpg id., cf. however, J 8OO nekulemai 'to keep company,' cf. Mo
nokiirle- 'to befriend, to be friends with someone.' Otherwise, word—final r has
been replaced by n as in all Tungus languages, cf. Ev hirugen 'blessing, benediction' < AMo *piruger^ An example in Jurchen is J 18T 'binkoan 'falcon' < AMo
*sinkor. Mo scirijor, Kh sonxor id. This word was borrowed from Jurchen into
Manchu, cf. Ma sonqon 'peregrine falcon.'
The substitution of n for r is also found in medial position in J 6hl ningu
'six' < *girgu, cf. Mo jirguyan < *gir-gu-bdn 'six' which has undergone the same
development in all Manchu-Tungus languages, cf. Neg, Ev ftunun, Lam
etc.
< *girgi4T^^ < Mong.
It is obvious that
> Zero, -*r > n, and the preservation of -*r as such
date from different times. It is possible that the words with the final n were
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borrowed from Ancient Mongolian, i.e., J sinkoan < AMo *sinkor 'falcon.' The
words with final r in Jurchen must have been borrowed later, i.e., from Middle
Mongolian, i.e., J nekur 'friend' < MMo. As for nekulemai 'to keep company,'
this goes back to ’^nokuvle-, the cluster vt having lost its first component.
In J ningu the medial *r> has developed into nfr\/ under the influence of the
initial n, and was assimilated (velarised) to the following g, i.e., *givgu >
*nirgu > ningu /ningu/.
8. On some Jupohen numerals
The Jurchen numerals 11 through 19 are of interest for two reasons. First of
all, some of their components are of Mongolian origin and second, the numerals
in question display a non-Altaic order of components. The Jurchen numerals
were investigated for the first time by Laufer,^3 and from the Altaistic point
of view by Miller.
The numerals in question are:
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

amso 'eleven' = Ma omson (in Ma omson biya 'the 11th month')
girhon 'twelve' = Ma gor^on (in gor^on biya 'the 12th month')
gorhon 'thirteen' < AMo *gur (in *gur-ban) 'three' + *hon 'ten'
durhon 'fourteen' < AMo *d3r (in ddr-b^) 'four' + *hon
tobohon 'fifteen' < AMo *tabu (in *tabu-n) 'five' + *hon
nilhun fnirhuni 'sixteen' < AMo *^ir (in *gir-gu-bdn) 'six' + *hon
darhon 'seventeen' < AMo *dal (in *dal-u-ban > Mo doluyan 'seven' + *hon
niyuhun 'eighteen' < AMo *nai (in *nai-bdn > Mo naiman) 'eight' + *hon
oniyohon 'nineteen' <Juyun 'nine' + *hon

6U6
647
648
649

650
651
652
653
654

Of these numerals nilhun 'sixteen' is of interest because it has preserved
the syllable-final *r {nilhun stands for *nirhun) whereas J ningu 'six' is an
assimilated fonn.
The other interesting form is 652 darhon (probably /dalhon/) 'seventeen.'
It corroborates our reconstruction of Mo doluyan 'seven' as *dal-u-ban. 5
On the other hand, the numerals mentioned are interesting because of the order
of the components, namely, the smaller mmibers precede the niimeral ten as in
English or Latin, an order quite unusual in the Altaic languages.
The general conclusion from the above discussion is that Jurchen is an im
portant source for the study of the history of the Mongolian languages in that
it has preserved a large body of AMo forms. On the other hand, Mongolian data
can be useful for the reconstruction of Jurchen and other Manchu-Tungus forms.
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STHOrPAJM VERSUS VTCAATHU 3YP1
Mary Prances Weidllch
Takoma Park, Maryland

Since 1921 many loan words have been introduced into the vocabulary of the
Mongolian language in order to bridge the gap between the vocabulary of a no
madic society and that needed to express twentiety-century cultural, economic,
political, sociological, scientific and technical concepts.
The following questions come to mind in conjunction with the introduction of
foreign words: To what degree do loan words survive in Modern Mongolian? Are
they always accepted? Or are they used synonymously with native counterparts
which over a period of time have absorbed the essence of the meaning of the loan
word? Or are they displaced by indigenous terms?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the current status of the loan word
3THOipa4iH with respect to its acceptance into Modern Mongolian, its alternation
with native terms, and/or its displacement by indigenous terms.
The occurrences of 3THOrpaJ>H and its native counterparts were observed for a
consecutive seventeen-year period—that is, from 1961 through 1977—in articles
focusing on social science topics or in sections of general articles dealing
with social science subjects.
The data presented in this paper were taken from available issues of IlbHJKJBX
yxaan (Science) published in Ulaanbaatar from I961 through 196h, its successor
IUHHHcn3X yxaau aMBHpan (Science and Life)^ published in Ulaanbaatar from I965
through 1977, and BHMAV IlhtBKJisx
AKafleMHftH Msfl33 (Transactions of the MPR
Academy of Sciences)2 published in Ulaanbaatar from 1962 through 1977.
"Ethnography" is expressed in Modern Mongolian either by the loan word
yrcaaTHH
literally trans
lated "science of peoples," and YHtPCTHyYWtiiH a» 6alinan, Sc saHUMn 6a coSnar
cynnax yxaan,^ literally translated "studies of the way of life, customs, and

3THorpaJ)H or by the following two native terms:

cultures of nationalities."
During the seventeen-year period studied, 3THOrpa<i)H was noted once in 1962,
three times in I963, once in I96U, twice in 1966, once each in I967 and 1970,
four times in 1971> once in 1973, twice in 1975» and six times in 1976 for a
total of twenty-two times.
yrcaaTHH ayftj the first indigenous term examined, was observed seven times
in 1962, nine times in 1963, thirty-four times in 1965, eight times in 1966,
nine times in 1967, seven times in 1968, eight times in 1969> six times in 1970,
seven times in 1971, once each in 1972 and 1973, four times in 197^ and once
each in 1975 and 1976. Thus, yrcaaxHbi syft occurred for a total of 103 times.
Neither 3THOrpaiJ)H nor yrcaaTHH syft were observed in 196I and 1966.
During the seventeen-year period investigated, the other indigenous rendition
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YHrpcTYYflH0H aac 6afwaji, Sc aamiHn 6a coSnar cyxinax yxaan vas never noted.
Of its twenty-two occurrences, STHOipa^H appeared in the genitive case
fourteen times. The genitive form of 3THOrpa$H modified both loan and native
words. Examples of 3THorpa$H in the genitive case as a modifier of loan words
include the following:
3THOipa$HftH MaTepHan "ethnographic material"
3THOrpa$HfiH fiysefi "ethnographic museum"
3THorpa4>HflH 3KCTiaE(Hij; "ethnographic expedition"
Examples of 3THOrpa$H used in the genitive case as a modifier of native words

include the following:
3THOrpa4)HfiH cyjpiaraa "ethnographic research"
3TTOrpaI)HaH Y33CT3J13H "ethnographic exhibition"
3THOrpa(J)H0H ntHHaoinr33 "ethnographic investigation"
Furthermore, seventeen of the twenty-two occurrences of 3THOrpa$H were in
the immediate vicinity of another loan word, such asapxeQqora and najieoHTcnorn.
Of the 103 occurrences of the indigenous term, yrcaaTHtJ 3 0 occurred in the
genitive case fifty-two times and modified both loan and native words. Examples
of yrcaaTHU 3Y0 used in the genitive case as a modifier of loan words include
the following:
yrcaaxHbi syftH axjiac "ethnographic atlas"
yrcaaxHH sYfe Maxepsiaji "ethnographic material"
yrcaaxHfcj syflH oxp55i "ethnographic unit"
Examples of yrcaaxHU ayfi in the genitive case as a modifier of native terms
include the following:
yrcaaxHU syKn 3ypar "ethnographic map"
yrcaaxHH syKH cywian "ethnographic study"
yrcaaxHH sySH xoji6ornan "ethnographic significance"

The ratio of use of 3XHorpa$H to yrcaaxHtasyft was 1:7 in 1962, 3:9 in 1963,
1:0 in 196k, 2:8 in I966, 1:9 in 1967, 1:6 in 1970, h:^ in 1971, 1:1 in 1973,
2:1 in 1975 and 6:1 in 1976.
It is evident from these ratios that in 1963 and 1966 there was a slight
tendency to use 3XHOrpa4>H interchangeably with its native counterpart. However,
this tendency became stronger in the seventies, especially in the years 1971,
1973, and 1975. In 1976, 3XHorpa$H for the first time actually challenged the
indigenous term.
It is clear from the above discussion that 3XHOrpa<I)H, both as an independent
word and as a modifier, is gradually being accepted in Modern Mongolian and
that its use seems to be somewhat dependent on whether another loan word is
nearby. It is too early to predict whether 3XHOrpa4>H will only be used synon
ymously with the indigenous tem or whether it will ultimately advance to the
role of the preferred term.
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THE THREE SORROWING HILLS, MONGOLIA’S FIRST OPERA:
AN EXAMINATION OF LITERARY AND MUSICAL GENRE*
Winston Wu
University of California, Berkeley

Although Mongols had loved song, music and dance as a form of domestic enter
tainment for centuries,! the appearance of more highly developed secular forms
of synthetic art"^ resembling theater as we know it came relatively late with the
consolidation of Manchu power in Outer Mongolia. In the beginning of the eight
eenth century local pang-tsu opera from the Chinese province of Shansi
was mported by Chinese traders into several urban centers, and in all probabil
ity indigenous court theaters in several outlying districts3 sprung up as a
result of this. By the second half of the nineteenth century social ballads and
dialogue operas, built on a four-line folk song form often on the theme of so
cial protest or longing for a lover known as hariltsaa duu, came increasingly
into vogue, to the extent of becoming a type of nucleus for the creation of a
national dramatic theater in the initial decades of the twentieth centiiry.
Lubsan Huurchi, the famed epic singer and musician turned people's artist and
composer of revolutionary songs, was the key person responsible for these social
ballads and dialogue operas to become "urbanized" and "professionalized" in the
capital and to be developed on stage right up to the opening of the State Music
and Drama Theater in 1931. Stage plays fashioned on Chinese opera and employing
Chinese dramaturgical effects en masse were performed side by side with classical
repertoire of the regional variant of Chinese opera mentioned above. These plays
often portrayed khans, princes and lamas as buffoons exploiting the arats. They
generally circulated among "amateur circles" and, while successfully conveying
political messages, were simplistic with regard to plot line and staging.
The Seventh Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in November

1929 a.nd the Fifth Great Khural in January 1930 discussed the raising of cultural
and educational levels in the country. It was pointed out that the "amateur cir
cles" in question had indeed furthered the development of theatrical creativity,
but were still unable to fashion a new theatrical art.^ As a result, new reper—
toire was not planned as such from then on, but rather intended as an experimental
arena for new dramatiorgists.
With the closing of Chinese theaters^ in 1929, a
lacuna had somehow to be filled.
The Resolution of 1932, insuring Party control over new literary and artistic
organizations in the Soviet Union, and Zhdanov's defining the aims of socialist
realism at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934 had inevitable
repercussions on Mongolian literary and ciiltural life of that decade.
following the successful performance of Noi I by the Mongolian State Music
and Drama Theater at the International Olympiade of Revolutionai^ Theatrical
Collectives in Moscow in 1933 and its participation that same year in the tenth
anniversaiy of the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in Ulan-Ude, the
director of this work, D. Namdag, approached its author, today known as the
4l
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founder of Mongoliaai national dramaturgy, 7 D. Katsagdorj, once again with a re
quest for more new repertoire.
Natsagdorj chose as the theme of this musical tragedy the legend of Yunden
Googoo which is found in a hook hy B. Sodnom about Natsagdorj.” It goes as fol
lows:
In the middle of the nineteenth century lived the master craftsman
Tsend. He had a tall, handsome son by the name of Yunden. Yiinden was
twenty-five years old when he set out on a caravan for China. He sud
denly fell ill on the way and was farced to sojourn with the Khorchin
tribe in Inner Mongolia. Having gotten well soon after, he could not
depart from his host's house without a horse. But before long, when it
was discovered that he was a literate person, he was assigned to the
local clerk's office and made many acquaintances. Eventually he fell in
love with Siriima who lived with her poor family in the neighborhood.
The pampered Garva from a rich family, it turned out, was in love with
Yunden. At that time the local Prince Bal was trying to marry off his
son, but could not find a suitable bride. Garva heard about this and
presented Siriima to him. Feaxing Yunden, Prince Bal summoned him,
bestowed on him an official title, made him a retainer and quickly sent
him off to China on official matters. Thus ridding himself of Yunden, he
married his son to Siriima. Yunden got the news of what transpired through
his trusted comrades, returned and angrily attacked the prince. For this
offense the youth was sentenced to death. Upon hearing of Yunden's death,
Siriima took her life as well.
Natsagdorj carefully preserved the poetic origins of the legend in the course
of writing the libretto for his new opera. He exalted above all the loftiness of
true and undaunted love in the first version of the opera which appeared in 193U.
The name of Yunden was retained from the legend; his beloved was called Nansalmaa
The rich feudalist Baldan resembled Prince Bal in the legend. However, this
legend was reworked on a grand scale following its premiere in 193^ in order to
present a clearly defined class viewpoint and to stress the psychological makeup
of the characters. The perfidiousness of Garva was personified with greater
detail in the character Khorolma, now a procuress. The relationships between
Khorolma and both Yunden and Balgan were focused on in particular by the author
with the intent of sharper delineation of the plot line.
In the period of autonomy in Mongolia (1911-21), a three-stanza social ballad
of protest was composed about the fate of Yunden and is known to this day through
out Mongolia.9 Its lyrics are as follows:
With a braid down his back
Walking with a confident stride
The infinitely handsome
Yunden Googoo Da-wang.^*^
Walking with a sedate stride
With his braid plaited in three locks
Noble and light-hearted
Wonderful you are, Yunden Googoo.
Da-wang of a Khorchin banner,
You sit at the place of honor in a yurt^"^ for naught
Hy beloved so far away
Why not return, Yunden Googoo?

The Three Sorrowing Hitls

U3

It is evident from Namdag's memoir on The Three Sorrowing Hills that Natsagdorj
was so inspired by this song that he was determined to create a brand new genre
with his work.12 It took him only two days to write the first act and to have
it ready for rehearsal. Only a half month elapsed from the first rehearsal to
the premiere performance of this unique musical drama. With personal concern
for its success NatsagdorJ often went to rehearsals to listen to advice from the
artists.
Curiously enough, the original producer of The Three Sorrowing Hills, E. Oyun,
is also the author of Ardyn Hariltsaa Duu, Tuiinii Ulamjlal (The Four-line Folk
Song and its Traditions). In non-Mongolian sources hariltsaa duu is called
^Vechsellied or "Dialoglied” by Heissig,13 "conversation song" by Bawden,!^ and
four-line song" by Saiga.15 Oyun basically agrees with Heissig that the founda
tions of indigenous Mongolian literary theater lie in this highly versatile song
form. She divides the genre into six categories: robber's songs, satirical and
jesting songs, laments, lyrical songs, epic songs and odes. She is of the belief
that repertoire in all six embodies national, class and ideological content to
varying degrees and that its heroic-dramatical formsl^ reflect the struggle
against the oppressor class. Mention is made of lyrical-humanistic songs and
those instructive in love which reflect the social problems of the day.
The theme of humanism is touched on briefly in the secondversion of our opera
where mothers rock their children to sleep with cradle songs and gather young
lads for a hunt at sunrise the following morning. The young maidens now enter
and join them together in a chorus about the sun overcoming darkness and emitting
golden rays of happiness to people. On the other hand, in the Buryat ballet
Blossoms of Life the central theme is this very dualism of light and darkness
where the noble and valiant folk hero Bator overcomes great odds to lead Mother,
her three daughters, and the people to light and happiness.
In resolving the problem of thematic content in both versions of The Three
Sorrowing Hills, another Bviryat ballet In the Home of Love, composed by Zh.
Batuyev and others in 1956—7, provides parallels more focal to the main themes
in both. In very broad terms, this ballet, known as lyrical-heroic drama,^'( in
effect combines the lyrical-melodramatic of the first version of our opera with
the heroic-epic of the second version staged in 19^+2, for it unites the fate of
the protagonist Zorigto with that of the people amidst tragedy, the death of
their beloved Seseg. It stands in contrast to the first version of The Three
Sorrowing Hills which concludes in semi-tragedy with Nansalmaa killing the
wicked feudalist Baldan and the wounding of the hero Yunden, but with the common
people playing no role in it. The second version does unite the fate of the
protagonists with that of the people throughout the entire opera, but amidst
comic relief provided by the joyous wedding of Yunden and Nansalmaa.
The theme of eternal love and the presence of the so-called masses on stage
are not unfamiliar phenomena in theater elsewhere in the world. The I93I* version
of The
Sorrowing Hills is quite appropriately termed romantic-pathetic
melodramal° with a theme of eternal love on the order of the very popular Chinese
legend and opera Liang Shan-po and Chu Ying~t'ai
^ and, to a
lesser extent, of the Uzbek poetic legend Farkhad and Shirin.^^ Strangely enough,
when we revert back to the original legend of Yunden Googoo, Siriima takes her
own life upon hearing of the death of Yunden - the same fate befalls Juliet upon
the death of Romeo.
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When examining such heroic-epic classics of Russian opera as Borodin’s Pvinae
Igor and Glinka's Ivan Susanin, we note that the traditional amorous-intimate
plot line is seldom an essential part of these operas. Yet once it becomes an
integraO., subordinate component of them, it is transformed into a domesticverismo plot line. These two operas, and ours as well, do not fit well into the
standard mold of amorous love, seen by Stalinist opera critics as a Western petty
bourgeois aesthetic tendency.20 Thus the Mongolian hariltsaa duu form, instruc
tive in love, somehow found its identity with such classical tragedies as Romeo
and Juliet, Othello, Hamlet, and Boris Godianov which in the eyes of these critics
all focus on inevitable or probable consequences of various social problems.
As Mussorgsky puts it, the developmental aim of tragedy is the common fate of
the individual and the people.21 Seen in a broader Soviet context with regard
to both classical Russian and the best of Soviet opera, the experiences of the
individual become an organic peirt of the depicted social events, with the inner
conflicts of the protagonist transformed into conflicts of his society. As ap
plied to our opera, it was death as a natural consequence of a sequence of causes
rather than a portrayal of eternal love which made Ivan Susanin acceptable in
Stalinist eyes but not the first version of our opera staged in 193^.
The appearance of mass scenes in Mongolian and Buryat opera is particularly
vivid in the 19^2 version of our opera, in which we find amazing similarities
with Glinka's legendary opera Ruslan and Ludmilla.
In place of Chernomor's
slaves and servants are the khan's servants and Yunden's warriors. At the end,
instead of the people of Kiev rejoicing and glorifying Prince Ruslan's awaken
ing Ludmilla, it is the arats who joyously celebrate the marriage of Yunden and
Nansalmaa. In both operas a fair5rtale atmosphere is evoked with magnificent
stage sets depicting magical castles and palaces.

Right up to the beginning of the 1930s the highly skilled art of improvising
on musical core units known as hariltsaa duu by huurchis with Lubsan Huurchi at
the fore continued hand in hand with the spontaneous composing of lyrics, now
increasingly in step with the times. The accompaniment to new so-called revolu
tionary songs still remained heterophonic, characteristic of a number of tra
ditional musics of ^ast Asia and medieval EJuropean music. The traditional
pentatonic scales,^ more or less intervallically equivalent to the Dorian and
Mixolydian modes, remained intact up to this time.
After the State Music and Drama Theater was founded in 1931, such traditional
plays as Prince Sian'ya, known as one-actor dramas23 because all the performers'
parts were sung in one and the same motif, began being actively reworked. Satir
ical dramas in a semi-improvised style such as Deceptive Trust, The Avaricious
Lama, and Conversation of the Old Man and Woman were simiiltaneously staged.
Perhaps the first time anything resembling operatic art song was used was in the
play Dark Force by Buyannemekh in what B. Smirnov, a co-composer of The Three
Sorrowiiw Rills, terms pesennoye nachalo spektaklya, the vocal beginnings of
drama.2^

193^ and 1935 were a turning point in Mongolian theatrical history for they
marked the beginnings of a new art form with a new aesthetic basis.25 The Three
Sorrowing Hills was already a considerable step forward from Prince Sum’ya in
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that it contained four, instead of merely one, distinct motifs based on folk
songs. This increase, however, was not matched by a corresponding increase in
the number of individual character traits. Moreover, it was premature to intro
duce feelings of the characters in terms of psychologism into such a work.^^
In the second version of The Three Sorrowing Hills B. Damdinsuren and co
composers added leitmotifs to the original motifs, yet the same monotony of mu
sical expression prevailed throughout the work. What the composers did accom
plish, musically speaking, was to introduce Western-style duo singing, for
example, in the dialogue of love between Yunden and Nansalmaa which was wholly
constructed in parallelism, the most widespread manner of folk poetry discourse.
It was actually a musical realization of the call-and-response character of the
hariltsaa duu which was traditionally always soloistically sung.27
Poetic lyricism and imagery are well known in the works of D. Natsagdorj who
employed them generously in the libretto of his first opera. Natsagdorj drew
from the rich treasure of epithets, similes and metaphors in folklore, especially
from aiigers, and utilized his own techniques of pastoral lyricism. He expanded
as well on themes from folk songs of different genres. In the newly conceived
second version he attempted to show as vividly and graphically as possible the
basic principles which distinguished the main characters of the drama. Nansalmaa'
poetic image was now to become the embodiment of the finest traits of Mongolian
women and could perhaps be likened to the psychological depth and fidelity to
life of Natasha in Dargomyzhskii's Rusalka. All we are able to say about musical
imagery in the opera is that it is watered down and lacks the maturity of form
the libretto had attained.
In spite of the Buryat opera In the Name of Love being composed in a much later
era and thus being more musically sophisticated than our opera, we see a potential
for musical maturity in an opera such as The Three Sorrowing Hills, as was the
case in subsequent Mongolian operas. The Buryat ballet makes extensive use of
polyphony, in particular a device known as contrastive polyphony (polymelody ?)
or modulatory imitation of key pitches. The theme of love in the solo arias of
Zorigto and Seseg is conveyed in a light type of major tonality against a bus
tling backdrop, whereas the opening measures of Dalyu's theme employ the salient
tritone of B minor in sharp contrast. In general, dissonant harmonies in the
form of unstable, clashing tonalities bordering on the grotesque depict the coldhearted and implacable Dalyu.
In 193^ and 1935 two new theatrical works. The Three Sorrowing Hills and Prin
cess Dolgor and Arat Damdin, appeared under the appelation hogjimt jujig "musicdrama play." However, it was not by coincidence that these operas, also called
ayalguut jufig, were quite similar in the style to the so-called song-operas pre
vailing in the thirties in the Soviet Union. The Three Sorrowing Hills, very
broadly speaking, shares with song operas like Khrennikov's Into- the Storm such
basic principles as simplicity, directness and folkishness, and with Asafiev's
ballet music a concreteness in musical language with regard to national color
and popular customs. Nonetheless, our opera was set in pre-revolutioneiry Mongolia
and thus could not identify with very concrete aspects of thematics in Soviet
operas and the developing of appropriate artistic devices for them. The short
comings of The Three Sorrowing Hills were consequently of a very different nature
from those of many short-lived Soviet song operas of the thirties. We may draw
a few analogies from the Ukrainian historical opera Bogdan Khmel'nitskii by K.
Dankevich, presented at a dekada of Ukrainian art and literature in Moscow.
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Although its libretto and historical genre were quite different from our opera,
it was likewise an underdeveloped music-drama play or musical folk drama.28 as
in our opera, its operatic episodes were based on authentic national melodies
{dumas), and it had little variation with respect to musical characterization of
the main characters. As opera critics saw it, downplaying the role of the people
in Bogdan Khnel'nitskii end omitting it altogether in the first version of our
opera surely fell short of the great historical-folk drama traditions of Glinka,
Mussorgsky and Tchaikovsky.29
Similar tasks of overall revision, enriching the thematic content and raising
the ideological and aesthetic levels, lay ahead of these two operas. As Stalin
formulated the task of creating a classical Soviet opera, so Mongolia was obliged
to create a classical Mongolian opera.
To achieve this meant reverting to or repeating the prior classical cycle of
development of Russian music culture30 or, more specifically, using folk melodies
in art music, a trend having its origins in nineteenth-century European national
ism. We sho+ild recall a review of Glinka's first opera in the Moscow Observer
in 1836 where a talented composer of the time, G. Verstovskii, postulated that
to create an opera meant employing unadulterated folk motifs and sometimes imi
tating them, whereas Glinka would study the character of the folk music and sub
sequently employ full freedom to musical creativity. This level of creativity
was impossible to attain in the initial versions of The Three Sorrowing HiVLs,
not to mention those first operas of several of the Soviet Central Asian repub
lics where so-called professionalism in music was non-existent prior to 1917.
What these initial attempts at opera amounted to were loosely strung sequences
of medleys, often sharing with Soviet operatic fiascos such general musical
traits as insufficient expressivity in arias.
Natsagdorj did not change the first version of the libretto of The Three Sor
rowing HiZZs enough to conform to the positive hero type in modern Soviet operas
and thus to insure its subsequent success although, as we have seen, positive
heroes had already existed in classical Russian opera. We might add here that
Prokofiev was looking for less schematic librettos about positive and heroic
types and suitable to be set to music to avoid creating mere "dramas set to mu
sic,
whereas in our opera it was the musical motifs rather than those in the
libretto which fell short of the norm in terms of schematism.

By way of concluding, let me say that The Three Sorrowing HiZZs became fore
most among several stage plays covering a wide range of love themes, from the
traditional dialogue opera Prince Sian’ya to several others featuring arats,
often female, as central characters. Unlike the Soviet song-operas of the thir
ties mentioned earlier, o+ir opera served as a model for subsequent Mongolian
operas and has survived to this day as a major work of national operatic reper
toire. Because it contains a good deal of folkloric idiom and imagery not un
familiar to the common people, our opera has been widely performed by amateur
circles on club stages outside the capital.
The new budding Mongolian opera at the same time was very far removed from
such schools as expressionism, formalism, primitivism and exoticism contending
in the Soviet Union at the time. They were avoided in Mongolia in order to
nationalize various musical forms within the country and to train theatrical
cadre in conformance with Soviet norms.31
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A gap in Mongolian performing arts had now been essentially filled, some
thing so vitally needed upon the conclusion of the International Olympiade of
Revolutionary Theatrical Collectives in 1932. Suddenly such new paraphenalia
as stage sets, stage presence, lighting and applause made their first appear
ance on the Mongolian thea^i^ stage, yet the aura of the Chinese "costumed
drama {ku-ohuang hsi-ohu ^
) still lingered on.32

Analysis of the Music Transcription
Our opera consists of a prelude, an Interlude, a battle scene and several
songs, including arias and duets.33 The two solo arias we are examining are
basically constructed in two pentatonic (five-tone) scales, Baldan's song being
in the so-called Dorian mode (E G A B D) and Nansalmaa's song in the so-called
Mixolydian (Bb C Eb EG). In the former, brass and percussion predominate to
depict evil, whereas in the latter the warm timbres of strings (pizzicato is
utilized to accentuate beats) and woodwinds in occasional imitation of the
vocal line convey a lyrical-amorous quality.3^ Both are constructed in strophlc
form, disregarding the orchestral tuttl at the beginning of Baldan's song. The
Russian terms kuplet and pripev are used to denote this particular form.
The use of motifs in both songs are of particular interest. Baldan's song
is totally in the style of the Soviet mass song employing a dotted rhythm in
the first four measures and a syncopated rhythm thereafter as recurring rhythmic
patterns or rhythmic motifs to evoke a march rhythm feeling. In Nansalmaa's
song we find a melodic or folk song motif beginning with BCE, which G.
Uvarova erroneously calls maiTnachenskiye notivy, 35 This recurring pattern is
then transposed a fifth higher, becomes a reverse motif in measure 3, is inverted
in measure 4, then is finally resolved in measure 5- Nansalmaa's song generally
takes on the character of a lyrical-romantic song with measure 9 briefly making
an incursion into the relative minor of Eb major, then reiterating the notes of
the scale one last time in the style of the long song with the last two six
teenths reminiscent of a laryngeal trill. The usual dominant—tonic resolution
then follows.

Winston Wu

1|8

The Three Sorpoaing Hills

Libretto by D. Natsagdorj and Ts. Damdinsuren
Music by B. Damdinsuren and others
Accompanied by the Mongolian State Theater Orchestra,
Chuluun, conducting
3ALDAN ^ S S-OHS------ soio ma i e ana sung by Hoioonjav
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NANSALMAA'S SONG - solo female aria sung by the Merited Art Worker Tsogzolmaa
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Text of the ballad Yunden GddgdS
(B. Smirnov, Mongol’skaya Narodnaya Muzyka)

53. K)Hfl3H reeree
K)Hfl3H roro'>
Animate

J^OnO.lbHO >KRRO, C HyBCTHOM
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Aanarap Aa»arap ajixaaTaiiJia, xee!
Aajiaa 6yt3’3C^h ra*j'jrTaMc3, x«e!

Jl& BaHTMMH IOhadh re&reo
^aaHH u3B3px3H T6p>K33, xee!
Tywarap rywarap aJixaaraMBa» xee!
Typsaap AapcaH r333rT3M63, xee!

PyHxcaH caMxaH K)h;i3h reeree
TyHMrrYM u3B3px3H Tepx<33, xee!
XopMvtH xyuiyyHbi fla-Ban MMHb, xee!
XoMMpoop MopMJiox Hb loyHbix B3, xee!
XojiA BBcaH K>ha3H reeree MHHb, xee!
XoHropxoo Mp3x Hb Haraa b3, xee!

C KocOK), naASKSLueii Ha cnwHy,
lUaraiomHM ysepcHHOM

hoxoakom,

EcsMepHO npcKpacHbiM,

K)ha3h Toro J[la-uanu*^
CrenCHHOM

hoxoakom

LuaraB,

C KOCOM, aanjicTCHHOM M3 Tpex npaACM,
Mmctbim

m

6e33a6oTHbiM,

ripeKpaceH Tbi, K)ha3H Toro.
Jla-BaH xopHMHCKoro ye3Aa,
Hero paAM pacnojiaraeiubcB Ha xoMMope^\
Jla.ieKo yexaBmiiM Moii B03JiK>GjieHHbiii,
IlOMeMy He BOSBpamaembCH. KDha3h Toro?
1) AjIMMHMCTPilTMkIKUH SHH 8 CT8pOH

MoHrO^HM.

2) rioseTHOt MecTO b wpre.

c &4A K
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Notes
*The name of our opera as it exists today is 0 Tryokh Sud’bdkh (The Destinies
of Three) with no allusion to sorrow.
("Tvorcheskoye sotruzhestvo masterov
kul'tury" CJoint artistic creativity of the masters], Mongoliya, no. 10 (238),
October 1978, p. 10.
1. G. A. Uvarova, Sovrermennyi Mongol'skii Teatr CContemporary Mongolian
Theater] (Moscow-Leningrad: "Art" State'Publishers, 19^7), pp. 15-l6.
2. The religious counterpart of synthesized art was to be found in tsam,
so-called mystery plays featuring masked pantomime and ritual dances which were
imported from Tibet into Mongolia in the l870s. According to Uvarova, pp.
21-22, religious and secular drama developed completely independently of each
other due to their different functions in society.
3. Chinese theatrical troupes became established in such towns as Kobdo,
Uliastai and Klakhta where Chinese trading communities known as maimaiahen had
sprung up. In Urga Chinese theaters were set up rather late with the increased
influx of Chinese settlers and consequent staging of Chinese theatrical perform
ances in more sedentary Mongol areas. Yet at the palaces of the spiritual
rulers of Mongolia, the gegens, epic-singers and musicians were always present
to offer entertainment for their families and guests.
U. These forms are dealt with in a number of works primarily as literary or
folkloric genre. K. H. Yatskovskaya in her article "K voprosu o zhanre pesni v
sovremennoi mongol’skoi literature" COn the problem of song genre in modern Mon
golian literature] in the Proceedings of the Third International Congress of
Mongolists (Ulaanbaatar: Permanent Committee on the International Congress of
Mongollsts, 1972), pp. 262-265, uses the word pesnya (song) to mean a literary
form in vocal style, citing the play Ih Avgai CThe Old Woman] with the role of
the khuurchi being absent. We are, on the other hand, only interested in those
forms where his active musical role is present.
5. Uvarova, p. 60.
6. They performed both authentic Chinese and Mongolian dramas in Chinese
style such as Ushandar Khan.
7. Ludmilla Gerasimovich, History of Modem Mongolian Literature (1921-1964)
(Bloomington: Mongolia Society, 1970), p. 90.
8. B. Sodnom, D. Natsagdorjiin Uran Zohiolyn Tuhai COn the Works of D.
Natsagdorj], Ulaanbaatar, 19599. Boris Smirnov, Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Muzyka CMongolian Folk Music]
(Moscow: Soviet Composer, 1971), pp. 1^+9-150. See facsimile of original work
on pp. 1:9-50.
10. An administrative rank in old Mongolia (< Chin.
).
11. Holmor.
12. Klara N. Yatskovskaya, Dashdorzhiin Natsagdorzh: Zhizn' i Tvorahestvo CD.
Natsagdorj: His Life and His Works] (Moscow: "Science" Publishers, 197^),
p. 117.
13. Walther Helssig, Geschichte der mongolisahen Literatur CHistory of Mon
golian Literature] (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1972), p. 61+1.
ll+. Charles Bawden, "The Mongol 'conversation song,'" in Aspects of Altaic
Civilization (Bloomington, I963), pp. 75-83. On p. 80 he uses an alternate
term "ballad-opera" and speaks of "not a very wide variety of theme, as far as
can be judged" dealing with bold warriors, dissolute girls and lamas, the
parting of lovers through death, marriage to another, and the returning of a
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traveler whose beloved has married another. Compare with E. Oyun's classifica
tion of hccriltsaa duu genre in the main body of the text.
15. Maria Saiga, "On Mongolian four-line songs in general," Canada-Mongolia
Review 2:2 (1976), pp. 120-126.
16. D. Batsuren and J. Enebish, Duunaas Duur’ Hiirsen Zam: Mongolyn Orahin
dyeiin Hogjmiin Uran ButeeZiin Tuuhen Toim CFrom Song to Opera: A Historical
Sketch of Contemporary Mongolian Musical WorksH (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Com
posers' Union, 1971), p. 139* Compound adjectives in Russian and Mongolian
are frequently used to specify song and opera, as well as mention literary
genre of one kind or another.
17. Muzykal’naya Kul'tura Buvyatii CMusic Culture of Buryatia], the fourth
in a series on the history of fine arts issued by the Buryat Academy of Social
Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Ulan Ude: Buryat Book Pub
lishers, 1967, p. 66.
18. Uvarova, p. lilt.
19. G. Mikhailov and KLara N. Yatskovskaya, Literatura Vostoka; Mongol'skaya
Literatnra - Kvatkii Oohevk COriental Literature: A Brief Sketch of Mongolian
Literature] (Moscow: "Science" Publishers, 1969), p. I68.
20. It is perhaps appropriate to mention here a controversy over the kiss
in Ulaanbaatar several decades ago.
21. Ye. Grosheva, "Obraz naroda v sovetskoi opere" CThe image of the people
in Soviet opera), in Sovetskaya Opera: Sbomik Kritioheskikh Statei CSoviet
Opera: A Collection of Critical Essays] (Moscow: State Music Publishers,
1953), p. 235.
22. Their relationship to the complexities of the Chinese adjustable penta
tonic systems which in actuality consist of seven tones will not be dealt with
here.
23. One-actor dramas or one-actor theater (Bawden, p. 78) shares similarities
with various northern Chinese baUad-operas as single-instrument accompaniment
with Pei-ohing ah'in-shu ik. % ^ %
or tan-oh'in ta-ku
(Peking
ballad-opera) and singing from a sitting position with tsuo-oh'iang mei-hua
(Mei-hua "sitting vocal style" ballad-opera)^ See Shan-tung taku: Li-hua ta-ku, Chiao-tung ta-ku
CThe BalladOperas of Shantung Province], ed. by Yii Hui-jrung ^
(Peking, "Music" Pub
lishers, 1956), p. 22. Singing all performers' parts in one and the same motif
is uncharacteristic of Northern Chinese ballad-opera vocalization in general.
2k. Smirnov, p. 62.
25. Ibid., p. 61.
26. Saiga, p. 122, speaks of the manifestation of feelings in the four-line
song as follows: "The folk singer chooses the aptest of expression from the
inventory freely used by the community." This traditional sense of social
identity could be construed as the element of folkishness in later versions of
our opera.
27. In this connection we should take note of the appearance of duo singing
as a distinct musico-literary genre in Inner Mongolia in the second half of the
eighteenth century. This "two-actor theater" both with singers and dancers
became particularly known with the works of Erzen'tei (Smirnov, p. 65). I
believe it is now called holboo shuleg (couplet poetry). See G. Kara, Chant
d'un barde mongol (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1970).
28. "On the opera 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii,'" in Sovetskaya Opera, p. 2929. A. Shaverdyan, "Plsatel' i sovetskaya opera" CWriters and Soviet opera],
in ibid., p. 150.

The Three Sovrowing Hills

53

30. P. Apostolov, "Nasuschchye problemy Kazakhskol muzyki" CUrgent problems
in Kazakh musicD, in ibid., p. 197.
31. Uvarova, p. 76.
32. In the premier performance of The Three Sorrowing Hills the actual ward
robes of the former nobility apparently provided some costumes for the performers.
See D. Namdag, "Uchirtai Gurvan Tolgoi" CThe Three Sorrowing Hillsi in D.
Natsagdorjiin Tuhai Durtgal, Temdeglel [Accounts and Memoirs Relating to D.
Natsagdorj] (Ulaanbaatar: Committee on National Publications, I966), p. 21.
33. Batsiiren and Enebish, p. 77.
3^. A similar use of these orchestral timbres is found in the ballets of Zh.
Batuyev {Muzykal’naya Kul'tura Bnryatii, p. 65)-

HISTORY

IMPRESSIONS OF INNER MONGOLIA, 191*5-1950
Frank B. Bessac
University of Montana

The following essay briefly chronicles three trips I took to Inner Mongolia,
some events, serious and humerous,which took place on these trips, and some of
my impressions cast in terms of Chinese-Mongolian relations.
The trips to and within Inner Mongolia were made for various reasons, to dif
ferent areas, and by diverse means of transportation—by plane, jeep, horse,
truck, and camel. Nfy first trip was by jeep and plane from Peiping to Kalgan,
Dolon Nor, and Peitzemiao and back in the late winter and early spring of 191*6.
The second trip was from Peiping to and throughout the Ordos (ikechou) and
Ulanchap areas and return from May to October of 19l*8. The third trip I took
as a Fulbright scholar from Lanchow to Ninghsia and Tlng-yiian-ying, the admin
istrative center of the Special Alashan Banner, and from there by camel across
the Gobi to Shan-tan in the Kansu Corridor in the summer of 191^9.
Each trip was made under different auspices and for different purposes. At
the time of the first trip I was a member of the organization which was a con
tinuation of the wartime Office of Strategic Services. There were a series of
administrative changes which those of us in the field paid little attention to
as we still thought of ourselves as members of the O.S.S. I recall that at the
time we were as yet not called the Central Intelligence Group and that the re
organization into the Central Intelligence Agency was to occur months later. I
had just returned from a mission to the Chi-Chung Liberated Area south and south
east of Peiping, where we studied the type and causes of truce violations taking
place.
At this time the peace talks between the Commiinists and Nationalists, luider
the auspices of the United States and the personal guidance of General George
Marshall, were still taking place but were steadily losing impetus for a number
of reasons. One of these was the continual skirmishing between small units of
Communist and Nationalist forces. From what I could observe, the skirmishing
in the Chi-Chung was set off by groups of foragers on the Nationalist side.
These troops were not well provided for, seemed to resent the villagers for
harboring the Communists, and apparently felt little compunction about taking a
moderate amount of hay for their animals and grain for their own consumption
from the countryside. The Communists, on the other hand, could hardly allow
foraging of this type to take place as it would show a lack of Communist ability
to protect areas iinder their control and because it could be interpreted as a
form of taxation. The Chi-Chung at this time was a well-establsihed Communist
area even though it had been surrounded by the Japanese for years. As such it
had developed a history as a guerrilla base. Both the intricate system of tun
neling and the sense of unity testified to this history. With the completion
of this mission we learned that the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base area wished some sort of
liaison with our unit, perhaps because of the flexibility with which we could
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operate and, at that time at least, impartiality in the civil war.
stage was set for additional trips into the Chin-Ch'a-Chi area.
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Thus the

My first trip was precipitated, from the American point of view, hy events
taking place in Inner Mongolia. Mongols living in the area, to a large extent
former members of the Japanese-sponsored semi-autonomous political organization
in Manchuria, held a meeting in a village near Wang-yeh-miao in the west-central
Hsinggan Mountains and authored the rationale for an Eastern Mongolian Autono
mous Government. This was hardly a revolutionary act as the area, as I came
to linderstand it, was largely self-governing although more hy default than hy
the assertion of independence or autonomy. Representatives of this government
were sent to various powers in the region in order to secure sponsorships. The
Soviets replied that the time was inappropriate but that at a later date the
Mongols might indeed benefit from Soviet influence. Authorities within the Mon
golian People’s Republic (M.P.R.) replied in very similar terms. At that time
the M.P.R. was very concerned for its own standing as an independent government
and wished to secure recognition from the United Nations. The representatives
who traveled to Peiping to discuss the issue of sponsorship with the Chinese
Nationalists had hoped to travel on to confer directly with Chiang Kai-shek, but
were not allowed to do so. They were mostly met with indifference. In part as
a consequence of these failures, a meeting was scheduled for March 19^6 in
Ch'eng-te with the permission and probably with the encouragement of local au
thorities within the Chinese Communist political organization which controlled
this part of southern Manchuria.
It was agreed upon that I leave for Kalgan, the administrative center of
the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base area, to learn more about this Mongolian movement and
the Chinese Communist responses to it.
Upon my arrival in Kalgan I asked Ulanfu about the meeting at Ch'eng-te and
was astonished to learn that he had not heard of the eastern Inner Mongolian
movement. The next morning Ulanfu departed for Ch'eng-te. Ulanfu gave me the
impression of a Chinese Communist official although he wore a Mongolian gown
during our second meeting.
It was said that he did not speak Mongolian which
was not surprising for a Tiimet of his generation. The Independent Provisional
Mongolian Republic which had come into existence in the fall of 19^5» upon the
arrival of troops from the M.P.R. and the Soviet Union, had been terminated
when the Chinese dominated the area. Leaders of the Independent Provisional
Mongolian Republic allegedly were executed hy the Chinese after they had been
invited by Ulanfu to leave Shangtu and come to Kalgan.
Not only Ulanfu but no one else seemed to be knowledgeable about the
tion in those areas of Inner Mongolia inhabited chiefly by Mongols when
Kalgan. Therefore I decided to travel to Dolon Nor by jeep, accompanied
resentatives of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Liberated Area to discover for myself
in control.

situa^
I visited
by rep
who was

Dolon Nor turned out to be a Chinese town on the margin of the area inhabited
by Mongols. We visited the temple just outside of town which the Chinese Com
munists said had been saved from total destruction by troops from the M.P.R.
Soviet troops had apparently begun to burn down this temple when M.P.R. troops
surrounded the temple and thus saved it from further destruction.
There were no representatives of any Mongolian government at Dolon Nor and
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no one who seemed to have any information about the situation in the Mongol
regions. Amazingly I was able to persuade a U.S. Army plane to fly to Dolon
Nor, pick us up and take us to Peitzemiao to the northwest of Dolon Nor in
Shilingol League and then to return in a few days to pick us up again at
Peitzemiao and bring us back to Dolor Nor. We would have used the jeep instead
if we had carried with us or been able to obtain sufficient gasoline, but this
rather bizarre means of transportation turned out to be the only way. The air
fields at both Dolon Nor and Peitzemiao were emergency landing fields, built by
various military forces, Japanese or Soviet, that had passed this way. The one
at Dolon Nor had more of the outline and structure of an airfield than that at
Peitzemiao. As there were no communications between Kalgan and Peitzemiao, let
alone between Peitzemiao and Dolon Nor, we could only hope that the field at
Peitzemiao was operational and that we woiild be welcomed when we arrived.
All came off splendidly with the Chinese in our party excitedly pointing out
yurts below us on the steppe as we skimmed over them, slowly circled the temple
complex, and landed on a field outlined by the red gowned lamas from the temple.
After jumping from the door of the plane to a friendly welcome, pilot and crew
were invited to take tea at the temple. This they declined. The plane took
off and we settled down for an interesting time.
Government in Shilingol was in local hands, considered itself temporary and,
for the most part, consisted of members of Prince Te's (Demchukdongruba's)
former Meng Chiang government. These officials had the reputation of not favor
ing one side over the other in the civil war nor of committing themselves to any
other government or movement. I suspect they would have welcomed the return of
Prince Te as their leader, but this was not actually stated. The Chinese
Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement had a representative in
the area who was staying at the temple. He was a considerate and knowledgeable
young Mongol who seemed to be well liked but not much listened to. He held
what seemed then only a remote chance of representing a movement or government
that would ensure peace in the region, let alone dominate it.
While at Peitzemiao, we rode camels about twenty miles (twenty ip'ao-Vi) to
visit a Mongolian encampment, one of the closest civilian encampments near the
temple at that time. In hindsight, it seems that the family we visited may have
been more than usually sympathetic to the arguments of the Inner Mongolian
Autonomous representative. The family had lost both husband and father and was
in strained circumstances. This impression would not have occurred to someone
who had seen poverty in China proper. In comparison, the Mongol family seemed
quite well off.
During our visit the son of the Mongol family felt called upon to deliver
what seemed an impromptu lecture. He chided the Chinese Communists and their
representative for allowing so much power and wealth to remain in the hands of
the elite of the Meng Chiang period. The representative appeared embarrassed.
He was in no position to make promises, denials, or apologies.
During the academic year of 19^7-19^8 I was no longer in intelligence. I
was enrolled at Fu Jen University in Peiping studying Classical Chinese and
spoken Mongolian.
In May 19^+8 I went to Paot'ou as the executive officer of
the Paot'ou branch of the China Relief Mission, an interim organization which
filled the gap between the demise of UNRRA and the creation of the Economic Co
operation Administration which later came to be called A.I.D. I had several
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reasons for accepting this position. For one, it offered a job and a break from
school during the summer months. It also promised to allow me to increase my knowl
edge of Mongolia while doing something worthwhile. I^y main reason, though, was
more subtle. For the past several years, and especially during the academic year
when my contacts had been almost entirely with Chinese, I had come to see sit
uations largely from a Chinese point of view. Through my brief experience with
the Mongol way of life the previous year, my studies of the literature on Inner
Asia and of the Mongolian language, and my discussions with Mongolian acquaint
ances, I had begun to realize that one could look at China and Inner Asia from
points of view other than those of the Westerner looking at "Orientals" or of
the Chinese looking at "barbarians." It was time to qualify my sinification,
and so I took this position which would allow me to travel some more in Mongolia.
There existed a very real need for the China Relief Mission in the China of
In meiny places in North China the 19^7 harvest had been inadequate. Spring
and early summer of 19^8 were lacking in sufficient moisture. It appeared that
another crop failure was in the offing. The hardest hit population in the area
of Paot'ou were the almost totally agrarian and industrialized Chinese and thus
the bulk of relief went to Chinese people. A part of the relief goods, however,
had been set aside for Mongols, to be distributed from a small branch station
at Paot'ou. We had been able to obtain trucks for transporting grain and other
materials. These trucks were specially designed with a very high clearance to
enable them to overcome flash floods, dry sand and even quicksand on occasion.
They had to be driven from Peiping to Paot'ou by way of the Southern Gate (Nank'ou), through Kalgan and Northwest Shangtu southwest to Kueisui where the
trucks and some Mongolian refugees were placed on railroad cars and then shipped
to Paot'ou.

19^8.

Transporting the trucks to Paot'ou did not take us through Mongolian ter
ritory, strictly speaking, although the region leading to and from Shangtu was
a border area. The town of Shangtu, the one-time summer capital of Kublai Khan
and now largely inhabited by Chinese, was a small town surrounded by a wall
which enclosed mostly empty space. Maybe the empty space had at one time been
covered by imperial palaces. Now it was used as a place of refuge by Mongols
and their flocks from raiding parties. Perhaps the wall had originally been
built with this purpose in mind, an alternate means of assuring safety to the
flocks of vassals, similar in function to the twin cities built by the Khidat
(Chin) deeper in the steppe.
Upon arriving in Paot'ou the great need of the Chinese to the south became
very apparent. A grain distribution center was established for this purpose
south of the Yellow River for a few days. Expecting people to come to the dis
tribution center proved a hardship for them, so we simply shipped the grain to
different points south of the Yellow River which were operated by other relief
agencies. Fu Tso-yi, the commanding general of the area, refused to allow
refugees fleeing the famine area to cross the river.
Grain, including buckwheat for late spring planting which it was hoped would
replace the ruined winter wheat crop, was distributed to the banner administra
tions or directly to Mongols living on banner lands. Some Mongolian banners
were almost entirely pastoral. None were as dependent upon agriculture as the
Chinese living in this region, and thus the Mongolian need was not as acute as
that of the Chinese.
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During this period I made trips by jeep and truck to most of the Ulanchap
and Ordos areas. When distributing grain to UJin Banner of the Ordos we halfemptied each sack of grain and tied the sacks to the backs of cows which were
then herded to the points of distribution. The half—filled sacks balanced well
on cow back. We relied on cows rather than on camels for transportatidn be
cause the Mongols like to rest their camels during the summer, allowing them
to recuperate from the winter and to accumulate fat. The men rode horseback.
Ujin had no roads because the land was sandy but also as a result of deliberate
policy. The absence of roads plus the negative attitude of the banner govern
ment helped deter Chinese colonization.
Ujin Banner was the first area where I was personally responsible for relief
distribution. It made a deep impression on me. Even though there were no roads
the people of Ujin Banner practiced both pastoralism and agriculture. From
what I could observe, they lived in well-built houses of Chinese style, open to
the swallows which built their nests along the rafters and kept down the fly
population. In back or to the side of the baishing, as the Mongols called them,
a yurt was generally set up either for storage or to accommodate guests or grand
parents. The Mongols preferred goats to sheep here for both milk and wool as
they found goat wool of greater commercial value.
As the people of Ujin Banner were both pastoralists and farmers, there was
really no rationale for settling Chinese on banner lands. The banner administra
tion allowed the settling of Mongols from other banners to farm Ujin Banner
lands while discouraging Chinese encroachment. The movement of Chinese onto
banner lands elsewhere was not simply the result of Chinese land hunger, although
without this the strategies of both Chinese provincial governors and banner
governments could not have been accomplished. The Chinese strategy was to en
courage enoiigh Chinese to move onto Mongol lands so that, in due time, the area
would come under direct Chinese administration and be incorporated into a hsien,
the approximate equivalent to our county.
The Mongolian banner government's strategy was to allow Chinese settlement
to a limited extent. This would allow greater income through taxation to the
banner government and could be used to Increase the banner nrince's personal
expenditures. I saw a small palace built in the middle of the steppe
with various gimcracks. These funds also allowed the support of banner
schools (cf. Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria, 193^*K In the long run, these
strategies worked to Chinese advantage and the gradual erosion of Mongol control
of their lands.
One point which became strikingly clear was that the Mongols, on the whole,
had a higher standard of living than the Chinese. The comparison is somewhat
difficult to make with regard to housing. A well-built yurt cost as much as an
ordinary Chinese house. The frame-built houses, such as those found in Ujin
Banner, were of the middle range of Chinese homes. I did not see evidence of
extreme poverty in any of the yurts or houses I visited while I had seen a great
deal of poverty in Chinese villages. The Mongols dressed better and also ate
better than the Chinese.
There was an obvious difference in wealth apparent among the Mongols. A sharp
difference existed between the ordinary Mongols and members of princely families
and some administrators. So-called palaces were not very elaborate, about on a
level with well-to-do Chinese households, if one does not include space and
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buildings used for administrative purposes, the banner school, and space used
for markets and workshops. Taking into account differences in subsistence base
between the Mongols and Chinese, the one depending on pastoralism and mixed
animal husbandry and agriculture, the other dependent on intensive agriculture,
the Mongol population was relatively less dense than the Chinese population in
China proper. The Chinese living in Mongol areas as farmers, artisans, or
merchants appeared well off or even wealthy.
To the north of the Yellow River, where the Meng Chiang government had oper
ated under Japanese auspices, various tactics had been attempted to limit the
movement of Chinese onto banner lands and to limit Chinese influence. In one
case, lands along the Chinese ethnic border had been given to Mongolian families
who were supposed to fann the land, thus creating a buffer zone through which
Chinese settlers could not move. In this area Chinese were prohibited from
owning banner land. This did not work as planned. The Mongols rented their
lands to Chinese farmers and moved further into the steppe with their flocks.
In a neighboring banner lands occupied by Chinese were simply cleared of all
residents, Mongols and Chinese alike, creating a great habitat for gazelles.
In addition to limiting the influx of Chinese farmers, some banner officials
also set about to control the number and occupations of other Chinese allowed
to live in the area. In many banners permits had to be obtained for a Chinese
artisan or trader to enter Mongol land. Naturally these controls varied. In
Ujin Banner trade was reportedly controlled by one Chinese merchant who was
making it a lucrative business.
In other banners the large temples were the
main trading centers. Here access was limited by the banner government and by
the frequency of temple fairs. It may well have been too difficult for a trader
to wait out the time between temple fairs. In at least one banner, artisans
were not allowed to bring their families. By this time, then, the Mongols in
most areas tried to control Chinese access to Mongolian lands. The Mongols had
obviously realized that there were vastly more Chinese than Mongols. If the
Mongols hoped to maintain their identity as a people they had to limit access
to their banner lands.
While the Mongols were trying to regiilate Chinese colonization of Mongol
lands, the Chinese on their part were trying to control the Mongols themselves.
The Mongols naturally resisted these attempts. On one level these attempts
were mostly to integrate the Mongols into the Chinese socio-political concerns
rather than a simple desire to dominate the Mongols. The organization of Mon
gols into the Chinese Communist sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement
can be seen in this light as can the efforts made by the Kuomintang to ensure
Mongol representation within the party and national assembly.
The younger brother of the former prince of Ujin had reportedly become so
engrossed in Kuomintang affairs that he seldom was to be found within the ban
ner, leaving its administration to appointees selected by his brother or, to a
lesser extent, to those of his underaged nephew. The princess of Mu Mingan was
engaged in a somewhat similar manner in Chinese political affairs, leaving that
administration to a relative. An example of a less subtle means of exerting
control was to be found at Dsassak Banner where the former prince supposedly had
tried to bring the Ordos into the Meng Chiang state. The Chinese Nationalists,
not surprisingly, opposed this scheme, put him under house arrest, and placed a
more "reliable" brother in charge of banner affairs.
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At a lower level, opium was used to control banner policy. In one case the
Nationalists and in another the Communists were said to have ensured a steady
flow of opium to key personnel in their efforts to secure policies favorable to
them.
In still another case, a Kuomintang party representative, a Chinese,
had been assigned to a banner in order to enlighten banner personnel about
national goals as distinct from the provincial aims of the banner p;v;vernment.
This particular very personable individual had, however, found himself so much
in agreement with the Mongol point of view that he did not dare leave the Mongolcontrolled area for fear of being arrested by the Chinese. There is an equation
here. The more a banner administrator was concerned with the welfare of the
banner, the more power he had in the banner and the less he had with the Chinese
authorities. This was well exemplified in the Alashan, Ordos and in Ulanchap.
third trip was as a Fulbright scholar in 19^9. I entered the Alashan
from Lanchow, or rather from Ninghsia, past the crumbling walls of the Hsi-hsia
capital and a small city commemorating the fall of the Tanguts and their city.
This city, empty now, had remarkably well-preserved walls and gates. After
studying Mongolian for several months at Ting-yuan-ying, the capital of the
Alashan, I set out by camel across the Gobi to Shan-tan, a trip of nineteen
days. I was accompanied on this trip by a young American who was permanently
stationed at Shan—tan, working in the Cooperative School, and by two Mongol boys
who planned to attend this school in order to learn a trade and other virtues.
It was necessary to leave Ting-yuan-ying at this time because we feared the
retreat of defeated and disorganized Chinese Nationalist troops pursued by Chi
nese Communists through this area. I feared that the Chinese Communists would
have made me study about Inner Asia from the greater safety of Peiping.
The prince of the Alashan, a cultivated gentleman, spoke little Mongolian
but excellent Chinese and some Manchu. His linguistic hybridization had come
about because the princely family had been marrying daughters of Manchu noble
families for generations, thereby tightening their ties with China, Chung Kuo,
the Central Kingdom. People at Ting-yuan-ying had told me that the prince, as
a young man, had tried to thwart the power of a Muslim warlord at Ninghsia and
had spent several years under detention for his pains.
When I was in the Alashan he had become largely a spokesman for the banner
to the Chinese and to Westerners. The banner was meanwhile run by a tostokahi
or administrator from a collateral family. The Mongols of the banner were
naturally well aware of this sharing of responsibility and gave little credit
to the prince. The prince derived his income from lands specifically allotted
to him and from hay provided by bannermen for his horses. The Mongols resented
this gift, or tax, of hay. The lands allotted to him were actually looked after
by his Manchu relatives. The tostokahi, on the other hand, understood little
Chinese, had little to do with foreigners, but had allegedly some ties to the
Mongolian People's Republic.
These two, dichotomized in terms of responsibility and viewpoint, exemplify
the point I made earlier, that the more power a man had in the banner, the less
he had with outside powers, especially the Chinese. In the Ordos and the Ulan
chap symbols of this dichotomy varied, with language being an important marker.
Another was the type of home the leader lived in.
In three cases families ad
ministering the banner, who were thought of as especially solicitous for banner
welfare, lived in yurts. Sometimes they even lived next to a closed "palace"
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vhich had heen built in the past by some relative.
Inner Mongolia in the period 19^5-1950 was an area quarreled over by the
Nationalists and the Communists. The Mongols were generally not committed to
either side but, instead, were committed to Mongolian nationalism. This ex
plains the frequency with which the Mongols changed allegiances in the civil
war. I remember one man who when I first met him was affiliated with Ulanfu.
Troubled by some of the latter's tactics, he turned to the Nationalists, only
to return in time once more to the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.
The Mongols sought three guarantees from the Chinese. One was the right to
be represented as a unit in the central government rather than through provin
cial governors. Another was their right to speak Mongolian and the use of
Mongolian as the primary language in their schools. The third was the right to
retain banner lands and develop them for their own benefit. The Chinese Com
munists spoke to all three points while the Kuomintang did not take these
asperations seriously. The Chinese Communists have maintained the first two
points, but as to the retention of Mongolian lands for Mongols, this seemingly
was dropped during the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution. The man in Inner Mongolia who best symbolized these Mongol goals
was Prince Te.
Before my first trip to Kalgan and Peitzemiao I was quite ignorant about Mon
golian issues. I did not become aware of the importance of Prince Te and his
associates until Ulanfu suggested that I had learned of the Wang-yeh-miao meet
ing from some of them. My friendship with associates of Prince Te strengthened
through the years. We decided to increase the understanding of Mongol affairs
in the Western world. To this end, we organized a Friends of Mongolia Society.
This fledgling organization metamorphosed into the Mongolia Society. Now the
Mongolia Society has structure and substance while that earlier association had
only the ideal. The Friends of Mongolia initiated the migration of several
Mongol intellectuals to the United States. The ultimate success of this venture
was due to the backing provided by established American scholars like Lattimore
and Lessing.
It was with pleasant surprise and considerable puzzlement that I learned while
in Ting-yiian-ying of the impending meeting of Mongols which was to take place
there for the purpose of proclaiming an independent Mongolian government. This
event which took place in the summer of 19^8 was based, I think, on the belief
that the civil war would weaken China, thus allowing the existence of an inde
pendent Mongolian government. Delegates from different Mongol areas came to
gether but especially associates of Prince Te and those who had maintained con
nections with the Nationalists, perhaps only because they lived in regions
controlled by the latter at that time. This independent Mongolian government
was not sponsored by either the Nationalists or the Communists. Neither had
sent an official delegate.
The formation of an independent Mongolian government was based upon several
factors. As already stated, the Mongols hoped that a divided China would be
unable to control them. Another was a somewhat natural result of dissolving
ties between Mongols and Chinese Nationalists, but a reluctance to join the
Communist side. Some of the most faithful apologists of the Nationalists could
be observed at the meeting as they were in the process of changing allegiances
from the now nearly defeated Nationalists to the soon-to-become dominant
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Communists. A third factor was an effort to proclaim to the world that move
ments for Mongolian independence and autonomy were not simply projections of
Soviet, Japanese, or Chinese Communist political maneuverings, hut the expres
sion of the wishes of the Mongolian people themselves. Some of the delegates
hoped that should Ting-yuan-ying he overwhelmed hy Chinese forces, they could
first retreat into the Gobi and then make their way to the M.P.R. That is exactly
what some of the delegates finally did. The M.P.R. did give most of these Mon
gols asylum, hut there were some tragic exceptions. It must he remembered that
the M.P.R. was soon to establish close ties with the Chinese People's Republic,
even if these proved to he temporary. Finally, the meeting seemingly took
place due to inertia. Men who had been trying to form Mongolian governments
ever since 19^5, hut who had constantly been frustrated in this, went ahead and
formed a government even though it dissolved before its functions could be
exercised.
l^ty trips to Mongolia were of course not only somber lessons in realpolitik.
This was hardly the case. They did force me, however, to realize the importance
of ethnicity and of inter-ethnic relations and their influence on intra-ethnic
social organization, ideas developed by Lattimore in his Inner Asian Frontiers
of China (l95l). One of the less somber memories which floats to mind is/the
crippling effect of riding a camel between thirty and forty miles a day. On
that first camel ride the insides of my thighs were rubbed raw by the long
strides of the camel. And then I remember the delightfully lonely sound of the
long trumpets rising from a lamasery as one nears it at night; or the feeling
of homesickness for Chinese things after a month on horseback in Mongol areas;
or amusement with a British friend, a journalist, who overindulged in Mongolian
summer cheese (a type of half-dried irgen, I believe) which almost did him in.
Then there was the relief at recovering from severe sunstroke contracted while
setting up a grain distribution center south of the Yellow River. Some wise
guy suggested aspirins and whisky luntll my temperature rose to lOU degrees and
a Chinese doctor finally cooled me off. Other memories: the flash of wolf or
gazelle in front of vehicle or horse; yurts on the steppe or a lamasery nestled
in the foothills; receiving a ceremonial scarf at Edsin Khoro, supposedly the
tomb of Genghis Khan; long and earnest discussions with the Chinese who tried
to understand the Mongol point of view. And most of all I remember with grati
tude the open-handed acceptance of a Westerner by the Mongols, even though he
could speak their language only haltingly.

THE ROLE OF THE SINO-MONGOLIM FRONTIER ZONE
IN THE RISE OF CINGGIS-QAN
Paul D. Buell
Seattle

Crucially important in the rise of Cinggis-gein seems to have been his close
and continued connection with the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.2 The connection
was significant for him in three ways. First of all, during his earliest years
as chieftain, the frontier zone and the frontier system, established by the
Chin
dynasty (1125-123U) to secure its outer limits and prevent nomadic in
cursion into China, provided a backdrop against which his Mongol tribal groupings3 took shape. Second, as Cinggis-qan*s influence expanded, the frontier
zone, which he conquered in the face of an eroding Chin 5>osition, provided a
ready-made power base of great potential, one strategically positioned, like a
dagger pointed at the heart of China. Finally, as Cinggis-qan laid the founda
tions for an empire during the period of rapid Mongol expansion after 1211, the
peoples of the frontier zone, mostly mixed societies with mixed cultures based
in both the pastoralism of the steppe and the sedentary world of China, provided
the experience and expertise needed to get the fledgling structure off the ground.
In particular, the peoples of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone were most im
portant vehicles of Chinese influence upon the Mongols. The form of this in
fluence was subsequently to have the most profound impact upon the shape and
development of the political system of the Mongol empire.

Frontier Zone and Frontier System
In East Asia the second half of the twelfth centiiry was marked by the apogee
of the powerful Chin dynasty, founded by the Tungus-speaking Jiirced of Manchiiria
after 1125.^ Under the Chin a level of development unattained in North China
since the heyday of Northern Sung (960-1125) was achieved. Population exceeded
fifty million,5 industry was well developed, and agriculture reached new plateaus
In particulax, the century of Chin rule witnessed the culmination of a period of
broad agricultural penetration of previously non-agricultural or mixed marginal
areas in and around China, including much of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.
As a result, steppe areas there seem to have been more agricultural in late Chin
times than in any period of Chinese history until the coming of the railroads
and the great migration of farmers in the late nineteenth century.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century, for example, the registered,
sedentary population alone of what is now the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
seems to have numbered more than one million persons.^ The non-sedentary pop
ulation of the area was generally not
not included in our sources either.^
probably much higher than one million
population of Inner Mongolia in 1957,
gration from the Chinese interior and

included on taxation rolls and therefore
The total population of the area was thus
at that time. By comparison, the total
after more than a century of massive mi
of industrialization, was only slightly
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greater at 4,200,000 persons, 0.6 percent of a total Chinese population at least
seven times larger than that in 1200.8
Evidence from available population data for laxge-scale penetration of the
marginal territories of Inner Mongolia by farmers and other non-pastoral people
during this period is fully supported by archeological findings. Inner Mon
golia is dotted with ruins from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Among them
are the remains of many small settlements, towns and even small cities, contained
within the area protected by the remnants of several lines of outer fortifica
tions constructed by the Chin government in the twelfth century to protect the
expanded agricultural areas of its subjects from nomads of the deep steppe (see
map).9
Perhaps the best example of the type of settlement found is provided by the
small city known until recently as Olon-siime but now identified with the QnggiitlO
capital of Tenduc (T'ien-te ^
Although no complete excavation has been
undertaken, preliminary surveys indicate that the site, which is a walled set
tlement about 1,000 by 600 meters containing houses, palaces and even a Catholic
church, flourished twice, once around 1200 and again around l600.12
other
words, the city flourished just when agricultural penetration of the steppe
reached its high point on the eve of the Mongol invasion and again in late Ming
(1368-1644) times as a new period of Chinese agricultural penetration reversed
the trend of a declining population loss in these marginal areas.13 Systematic
surveys of other sites in the area would most likely reveal much the same pat
tern. 1^
To secure this expanded agricultural pale the Chin government, as already
noted, undertook the construction of a series of fortification lines reaching
far out into the steppe, well beyond the traditional Great Wall line. In con
junction with these fortifications the Chin government set about organizing the
frontier zone into a frontier system. By the late twelfth century this frontier
system comprised three distinct layers, an inner layer made up by primarily
Chinese forces based along and behind the Great Wall line, an outer layer con
sisting of various groups of the steppe proper allied with the Chin, and a middle
layer formed by organizational units containing the various inhabitants of the
frontier zone itself.
The most important frontier zone inhabitants were what Owen Lattimore has
called the "auxiliary peoples of the inner frontier," who as
by-products of the total Impact on each other of China as a whole and the
frontier as a whole . . . were not genuinely rooted in either the economy
and society of China or those of the forested Manchurian mountains, the
steppes of Mongolia, or the Tibetan plateau.15
They were, however,
in spite of their limited absolute power . . . of the greatest relative
importance. In passive phases they represented the balance, at any
given time, between China and the frontier; but in active phases they
were the agents of ferment in frontier relations, causing new adjust
ments of the balance and preventing it from ever becoming static and
permanent.1°
In the late twelfth century there were four major ^groupings of these "auxiliary
peoples" in the frontier zone, the semi-pastoral Onggiit, the nomadic Khitan and
Tang’ut and the ethnically diverse bodies known collectively as Jiiyin people
{Juy-Ln irgen).!'(
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Cinggis-qan and the Frontier Zone
When Cinggis-qan first associated himself with the Chin frontier system is
unclear, but this association was certainly an established fact by the 1190s.
At that time the Mongol chieftain, then known as Temiijin, was a close confederate
of the Kereyid To'oril-qan, the most important Chin ally in the steppe. In II96
Temiijin and To'oril campaigned at the behest of the court against a group of re
calcitrant Tatars led by one Megiijin-se’ultu. As a reward for their successful
efforts To’oril was granted the title ong-qan {wang i -qan, "prince qan") and
Temujin was made a ja'ut (sive oa'ut)-quri,^^ a conferral probably expressive
of his formal recognition as an allied chieftain by the Chin government. Temujin
seems to have also requested but not been_ granted the powerful office of frontier
military commissioner [ahao-t'ao shih
on the same occasion.
Temiijin’s association with Chin frontier organization, in particular his
formal recognition as a chieftain by the court, could not have failed to give
form and definition to what must have been a rather amorphous following. As a
recognized component of the Chin frontier system, Temiijin’s following could take
on a definite political shape and a more formal "tribal" character just as the
institution of the razza, involving the organization of various border communi
ties to fight the enemies of the Faith, greatly helped in the formation of the
tribal" bands of the Seljuq Turkmen.21 This development recalls the fact that
in the view of many anthropologists tribes, as the distinct and self-conscious
bodies that we visualize them, were not the natural groupings of primitive so
cieties but came into being only when those primitive societies came into con
tact with more developed societies.
In this view, for example, the Germanic
tribes noted by Greek and Roman writers were not the natural political forma
tions of the Germanic world but products of contact between the society of the
Roman frontier and the Germanic peoples.22 Likewise, the American Indian tribes
were products of similar contact or even reservation realities.23 The apparent
role of Chin frontier organization in the definition of Temiijin’s following
would seem to support this view.'^^
The "tribalization," however, of Temiijin’s followers was of even greater im
portance than might be readily apparent since it took place at a critical juncture
in the history of steppe-sedentary relations. At the end of the twelfth century,
just as Temiijin’s followers and, for that matter, his superior, To’oril ong-qan,
and the many other steppe allies of the court gained new definition and solidity
as part of a well-organized frontier system, relationships within and without
China began to undergo rapid and extensive changes.
These changes, as well as their causes, differed from place to place. In
China itself the crucial factor seems to have been the traditional dynastic
cycle of prosperity and collapse which by 1200 saw the Chin regime past its
prime and beset by many difficulties. Rot the least of its problems were endemic
civil disturbances promoted by acrimonious and lengthy disputes over succession
to the throne.25 One result of Chin preoccupations with such internal matters
was a relaxation of its control in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. At the
same time, the frontier zone was the scene of increasing conflict^^ which may
have been generated, inter alia, by ecological competition between nomadic and
sedentary users of the same lands.2T in any case, unsettled conditions within
China went hand in hand with unsettled conditions in the Sino-Mongolian frontier
zone.
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In the deep steppe the weeikening of Chin influence soon touched off
power struggle among leaders formerly allied with and dominated by the
court. One great prize in this struggle was control over the frontier
which a nomadic power could use as a base for adventures in China just
China-based Chin regime had used it to meddle in the steppe.

a major
Chin
zone
as the

Temujin and his ally To'oril ong-qan, as major allies of the court with wellorganized followers, soon were primed for this great struggle and, as a resiilt,
their power and influence grew rapidly after their victory over the Tatars. In
1201 the two allies fought off a powerful league headed by Jamuqa, a former
associate of Temujin,28 and gained a momentary position of dominance.
Progressive elimination of rivals, however, soon strained relations between
Temujin and To'oril, and in 1203 a second league was formed against Temujin alone,
this time with the participation of To'oril ong-qan. Despite initial difficul
ties, however, which reduced the future Mongol conqueror's fortunes to their
lowest ebb, Temujin soon mastered the situation and in a series of decisive bat
tles eliminated his enemies or forced them to leave Mongolia.29 By 1206 none of
Temujin's former rivals remained in a position to influence events, and in that
year he gained formal recognition of his power and position through his election
as qan, with the reign title Cinggis-qan, by a great assembly iqwri.ltai) of his
family and supporters convened at the headwaters of the Onan river. With his
position in the steppe secure, the new Mongol ruler then set about acquiring
the prize for his labors, control over the strategic Sino-Mongolian frontier
zone.

The Crisis of 1207
The Mongol qan did not have to wait long for his reward for in 1207, only a
year after the formal establishment of his power, a large uprising broke out in
the frontier zone, ein uprising that was to sweep away the last vestiges of Chin
control in almost all the territory lying outside the Great Wall line. The
primary catalysts in this great uprising were the so-called Jiiyin peoples.
In the Ta Chin kuo-ahih
the role of Juyin peoples in the
revolt is related in the context of the campaigns mounted against Hsi-hsia and
Sung of the previous year:
Before this, in the sixth year of T'ai-ho
CI206I, the emperor made
a general levy of troops to invade the northwest. The various Jiiyin
lahiu
3^^ and uncivilized fan ^ 32
fact bordered on the north.
They were called the "martial riders" and numbered 30,000. They were
totally mobilized.
CThe emperor! invaded Chiang-nan^i$7 CSungi. Next
year the troops were demobilized and peace was reestablished. The
various Jiiyin were sent back. Because the rewards were not equitable
they all revolted and went over to the north. 33
But in the earlier and probably more reliable Meng-Ta pei-lu
the revolt is described in connection with the construction of a new line
of fortifications, a line most likely intended to cut off the Jiiyin peoples from
the deep steppe and to facilitate agricultural penetration of their pastures:
Chang-tsung ^
Hr.^1190-12083
then built a new long wall35
north of Ching-chou'H’l . He garrisoned it with Tang'ut Jiiyin
people.

Their chiefs, because the Tang'ut Juyin had revolted.
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^
36
established connections with the Yeh-la tu
Jiiyin,
the Mutien
Juyin, the Mien®-^ Jviyin, the Hou-tien
Jiiyin, and
others and all revolted. The Chin sent troops to pacify them. The
Jiiyin people scattered and went over to the Mongols C"Tatar"i.3T
Here it is specifically the Tang'ut Jiiyin, who apparently comprised a major por
tion of the Jiiyin peoples, who are made the leaders of the revolt. But whatever
its immediate causes, the uprising led to the Chin court's loss of control over
several pivotal and strategically located groupings on its frontiers.
It was apparently in response to the Juyin uprising that the Chin court at
tempted a coup against the Tenduc Onggiit, who had long maintained a good relation
ship with Cinggis-qan without, as far as can be determined, openly breaking with
their overlords in the capital of Chung-tu
In 1203, for example, the
Tenduc Onggiit prince Alaqus-digit-quri38 had sent his representative Asan 9 to
Cinggis with a gift of sables and squirrels,^® and later that same year he under
took to warn the Mongol ruler against the plans of his rival, Tayang-qan of the
Naiman, who had sought unsuccessfully to establish an alliance with Alaqus.
As a result Alaqus was recognized as one of the chiliarchs 2 of the Mongol em
pire, heading a chiliarchy of some 5,000 of his Onggiit, at the time of the g^eat
reorganization accompanying Cinggis-qan's election to supreme^power in 1206.^^
Moreover, in the list of chiliarchs contained in the Secret Htstory the Onggiit
prince is called son-in-law (guregen), indicating the first of a long series of
dynastic alliances between the Onggiit princes of Tenduc and the Mongol ruling
house.With the uprising of 1207 the Chin court could no longer afford to
tolerate such a close relationship between the Onggut and Cinggis-qan and under
took direct action to shape events in its interest.
The fullest account of the Chin coup against the Onggut is contained in the
Ta Chin kuo-ohih:
Also formerly there was those CTatarsI
neighboring Chin boundaries.
Their chief was established as prince of Pei-p'ing
-f- .He was
killed. His younger brother succeeded him and was established as prince.
The elder brother's son was Po-ssu-p'o
/iJ,
and was just two
years old. The Great Chin took him up and brought him to the capital.
He was brought up in the household of the chiliarch Hei-shui ^
• In
the spring of ting-mao J i)p
, the seventh year of T'ai-ho of Changtsung 11207:, the younger brother of the Cformeri prince of Pei-p'ing
presented tribute at Huan-chou
The Chin took advantage of his
carelessness and killed him while he was drunk. They reestablished
Po-ssu-p'o as prince and sent him back to his country. Before, when
Po-ssu-p'o was in the household of the chiliarch Hei-shui, he had seen
Hei-shui's daughter and liked her. At this point he wished to marry her.
The capital did not allow it. Po-ssu-p'o was grieved and angry and re
volted and went over to the Mongols C"Black Tatar":. ' They were all the
stronger because of this and gradually brought under their control the
lands of the various peoples. They consequently mobilized troops
at
tack Ho-hsi7^>^ :i.e., Hsi-hsiai. In not many years all the
'J'li
and chun %
of Ho-hsi were crushed by them. They got a false 9 impe
rial princess of the IHsil hsia ruling house and departed. The :Hsi:
hsia people, on the other hand, served them as tributaries.5
A textual note the,n adds that this account refers to the "White Tatars
or
Onggut.52
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The information in the Ta Chin kuo-ohih is supplemented by other sources.
From the Persian historian Rashid-ad-Din we learn that the younger brother of the
prince of Pei-p'ing killed by the Chin was Maqus-digit-quri:
The leader (moqaddam) and amir53 of the Onggiit during the time of Cinggisqan was a person whom they called Alaqus-dlgit-quri ... He secretly had
partiality and inclination towards Cinggis-qan . . . When Cinggis-qan made
an attempt upon China Alaqus-digit harbored a grudge against the Altan-qan
Cof ChinH5^ and therefore yielded Cinggis-qan entry Cthrough the frontier
walls]. 55 For this reason Cinggis-qan showed great favor to Alaqus and
ordered that a daughter be given him. Alaqus said: "l am old but I had
a brother, Binui by name, who was ruler {padsah)When he died the
Altan-qan of China took his son, Senkui by name, to China as a hostage.
Perhaps you should give this daughter to that one so that it may be that
he will come.
Cinggis-qan instructed that it would be possible. Alaqusdigit sent a message secretly to his nephew that he would come. He came
and when he had reached Kenduk Ci.e., Tenduc],5T which was near to that
place,5° the amirs of his uncle and father sent a message to him saying:
"It is not advisable for you to come since your uncle Alaqus would kill
you. You keep away until we have destroyed him. §enkui halted and the
amirs of Alaqus-digit killed him. Later Senkui arrived and entered into
the service of Cinggis-qan.59
In Rashid-ad-Din's account of the assassination of Alaqus the Po-ssu-p'o of the
Chinese sources is called Senkui, nothing more than a Persian transcription of
Po-ssu-p'o's Chinese title ohen-kuo, "fortifier of the dynasty,"^0 but

i

the description is clearly of the same events narrated in the Ta Chin kuo-ahih.
To summarize, in the spring of 1207 the Chin court, alarmed by the great
Jiiyin uprising that apparently took place during the earlier part of that same
spring^! and the rapid growth of Mongol power in the steppe and probably aware
of the Onggiit prince's duplicity, assassinated Alaqus-digit-quri with the active
collaboration and cooperation of a faction from within his own followers. But
this last-ditch effort on the part of the court in Chung-tu to regain control
of the situation on its northern frontiers soon foundered on the unwillingness
of Alaqus-digit-quri's nephew and successor Po-ssu-p'o, alias Senkui, to be the
tool of his Chin overlords. He, too, became an ally of Cingiss-qan in that
same year of 1207 when "Alaqa-beki Cdaughter of Cinggis-qan] was given to the
0nggut"^2 to be the wife of Po-ssu-p'o.53 Thus in this one crucial year of 1207
Cinggis-qan gained control over two pivotal groupings resident in the SinoMongolian frontier zone, the so-called Jiiyin peoples and the Tenduc Onggiit, and
with them dominance over almost the entire frontier zone.

The Frontier Zone as Base
After 1207 the whole relationship between the steppe and China changed since
it was now the Mongol qan who increasingly assumed a position of dominance and
pushed his own organizational system deeper and deeper into the sedentary world
just as the Chin court had formerly expanded its own influence and its frontier
system far into the steppe world.
The first expression of the changed relationship was the Mongol advance against
the Hsi-hsia capital in 1209-121o5*+ but the following year the great raids against
the Chin heartland began.

They ended in the first Mongol siege of Chung-tu in

/
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12lh and the subsequent removal of the Chin court south to K'ai-feng M#} and
the comparative safety of the Yellow river, an event marking the virtual abandon
ment of almost the entire northern portion of the Chin empire to the steppe con
querors. Most raids and campaigns of these years were mounted from or through
the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, and it was Mongol possession of this strategic
area, more than anything else, which forced the Chin to move their capital.65
By 12lh the conquerors felt strong enough not only to raid but also to begin
a piecemeal conquest of North China with the former Chin capital of Chung-tu it
self which fell in the spring of 1215 to a force comprised largely of local
allies of the Mongols.66 During the years of conquest the Sino-Mongolian fron
tier zone continued to play a most important role.
As I have shown elsewhere,6? throughout much of its existence the Mongol em
pire was structured and ruled as a gigantic tribal federation. Its various
provinces, including Mongol China, first emerged as little more than regional
outgrowths of this great tribal structure, as branch federations of the main
federation of the steppe.
To rule such branch federations certain chiliarchies of the Mongol levy were
associated with various reliable local elements to form a tanma, "nomadic gaxrison force,"6° and stationed in or as near to the territories of the branch
In the case of Mongol China, the tanma, organized in
centered in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone
which thereby became, and remained for almost the entire period of imperial rule,
the military and organizational center of Mongol domains in China.
federation as possible.

1217 or 12186^ under Muqali,'^0

But the frontier zone was more than Just a physical and logistical base for
Mongol power in China. Imposition of a tribal system of rule did not preclude
or prevent development of bureaucratic elements as well. As time passed the
utility and productiveness of local methods for governing and exploiting a given
local area became all too cleeLr for many influential Mongols. For China and
other more developed portions of Mongol domains, local methods were generally
local bureaucratic methods. This fact, coupled with the effects of changes
taking place within Mongol society itself, soon gave rise to a gradual but defi
nite "bureaucratization" of Mongol r\ile that ultimately culminated in the largely
bureaucratic administrative structures of the various successor qanates after
the breaJtup of empire."^2 The process of "bureaucratization," however, created
problems for the comparatively primitive Mongols who lacked adequate sources of
the new kind of administrative talent within their own ranks and were forced to
turn to the conquered peoples to provide the bureaucratic administrators neces
sary for ruling themselves. In China, the various nationalities of the SinoMongolian frontier zone, with their experience in both the pastoralism of the
steppe and the sedentary traditions of China, proved culturally and politically
a particularly acceptable and reliable source of talent for the conquerors. Con
sequently, as conquest continued inhabitants of the frontier zone performed an
increasingly important function in the day-to-day administration of the areas
brought under control.
Typical of the many administrators from the frontier zone in Mongol service
during the early years of the empire, although in his special case the associa
tion was by reason of ancestral culture rather than of actual residence, was the
Khitan Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai
(II89-I2U3) ."^3 Entering Mongol service in
the aftermath of the fall of Chung-tu and the virtual collapse of Chin authority
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in much of the Chin empire, he first held office as a court astrologer, in which
capacity he created a Chinese-style calendar for court use, then as state sec
retary {hvavkoi)'!'^ for Chinese affairs in the imperial chancellery and finally
under qan Ogodei (r. 1229-12^1), son and successor of Cinggis-qan, as head of
the imperial tax system for occupied China that was largely organized in accord
ance with the Khitan's own proposals to the qcm.1’
^
In all his various roles Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai was instrumental in introducing
Chinese administrative practices and Chinese institutions among the Mongols,
thereby considerably enhancing the overall effectiveness of Mongol government
at all levels. Clearly the Khitan was one of the most important cultural medi
ators between the Mongols and China and the early decades of Mongol rule there.
Significantly, however, the Chinese administrative practices and institutions
which Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai, and many others like him, transmitted were not passed
on unchanged. Rather they reflected the particular cultural environment peciiliar
to the transmitters themselves, namely the mixed, semi-Sinified environment of
the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.76
In conclusion the Slno-Mongolian frontier zone was very important for the
Mongols. It began as the backdrop against which the Mongol tribes of Cinggisqan took shape and it later became the springboard for the Mongols' conquest of
China. Finally, when the process of conquest itself was complete the people of
the frontier zone became important cultural intermediators guaranteeing rule just
as Mongol arms guaranteed conquest.
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28. On Jamuqa and his conflict with Cinggis-q.an see Sh. Natsagdorj, ed.,
Bugd Hayramdax Mongol Ard Ulsyn Tiiux, vol. I (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), pp. 203 ff.
29. On the history of this period see Sh. Natsagdorj, pp. 16T-21U.
30. The Ta Chin kuo-shih purports to be a private history written by the
Jurced scholar Yii-wen Mou-chao and presented to the Chin court shortly before
the fall of the dynasty. In its present form, however, the work is clearly a
product of the period after the fall of K’aifeng to the Mongols in 123^*. What
ever the history of the text, the Ta Chin kuo-ohih contains much useful material
on the rise of the Mongols and the last years of Chin rule, much of its infor
mation drawn from sources now lost.
31. On the equivalency of ahiu and the Jiiyin of the Secret History see the
discussion in Wang 1927.
32. Fan has two meanings in texts of the period. One is simple "barbarian
tribes" but the other is specifically "Tang'ut barbarian tribes." The word is
possibly used here in its second sense, probably in reference to Tang'ut allies
of the Chin not included among the Juyin.
33. TCKC, ohuan 21, pp. 22-23.
3U. The Meng-Ta pei-lu is an account of a Sung mission to the Mongols of
1220 composed the following year by one Chao Hung
, a member of the mis
sion.

35. On the Chin frontier walls see above and note 9.
36. The character tw which means, among other things, "chief," may be in
terpreted here to mean that this Jiiyin had a controlling role with respect to
the others. The Yeh-la, incidentally, were the former royal lineage of the
Khitan.
37. Chao Hung, Meng-Ta pei-lu, in Wang Kuo-wei, ed., Meng-ku shih-liao ssu
ahung, pp. UU8-9. For a complete list of the Jiiyin peoples allied with the
Chin see the CS, ohuan 2k, pp. 570-571.
38. For his biography see the Tuan shihy(j^^ (Peking: Chung-^a sh:^-chii,^^
1916), henceforth YS, ohuan II8, pp. 2923-U, and Su T'ien-chiieh
, Yi^n
wen-lei
j Tvnshu cha-chi ts'ung-k'an, henceforth 71®,
23, pp. 20-21.
39. This name possibly represents the Islamic Hasan.
ItO. Secret History, ohuan l82. All citations of the Secret History, henceforth
SH, are to the de Rachewiltz edition in de Rachewiltz, op. oit.
4l. SH, ohuan I90. See also the account of these events in the YWL, ohuan 23,
p. 20, and in Rashid-ad-Din's Jami’ al-Tavdrix, edited by A. A. Romaskevicha,
A. A. Khetagurova and A. A. Ali-zade (Moscow, 1968), henceforth JAT, p. 309.
i;2. On the significance of the chiliarchy and the chiliarch for the early
Mongol empire see the discussion in Buell 1977, loo. oit.
It3. SH, 202. Note the variable size of a "chiliarchy."
itU. The history of the marriage alliances between the house of Alaqus and
that of Cinggis-qan is complicated. See the detailed discussion in Buell 1977,
pp. 1*5 ff1*5, "Tatar" was used in texts of the period in reference to a variety of
Altaic-speaking peoples. These "Tatar," of course, were Onggiit.
1*6. For the Huan-chou of the text read Huan-chou
'I’l'l , the more common
form of this place name.
1*7. To distinguish between the various "Tatar" the Onggiit were sometimes
called "White Tatar" and the Mongols and their like "Black Tatar."
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^8. Chou and ohun were obsolete administrative units,
They are used here
simply in the srase of "territories."
k9. The
, "false," of the text implies the illegitimacy of the Hsihsia ruling house.
90. TCKC^ ^Tuan 22, pp. 27-28. An almost identical, account is found in Li
Hsin-ch uan
''<j' If
, Chien-yen i-lai ah'ao yeh
),Ts-ung-shuchi-ch"eng
TsSnT^U
1936), ahucm 19, pp. 591-592, except that there the younger brother is made the
murderer of the elder brother, whose name is given as She-shu..^^, and the
date of the murder is given as 1190. None of this additional information con
flicts directly with the testimony of the TCKC or that of other sources with
the exception of the name assigned the elder brother, given as Binui in the JAT^
p. 310. Quite likely, however, She-shu is not a name but a title since the younger
brother, whom we know to have been Alaqus, is also called She-shu in Li Hsinch'uan's version of the events.
51. See note hj.
52. TCKC, ahuccn 22, pp. 27-28.
^ 53. In Rashid-ad-Din's usage an amir was usually a chiliarch or some such
similar potentate.
5I*. This was the Mongolian name for the Chin ruler. On altan, "golden, im2r(S62)!^pp“^?57-37r'^^’
= ’imperial,'" Momanenta Sevlaa
Rashid-ad-Din the Onggut are made guardians of the frontier walls for
the Chin and their name is connected with a hypothetical 3n^, "frontier wall "
See the discussion in Doerfer, pp. 152-153. In fact, this conception is based
upon a misunderstanding of the nature of Chin frontier defenses at that time
which nowhere had the solidity or completeness of the Great Wall of Ming times
for example. Nonetheless the tradition does do justice to the strategic im
portance of the Onggut whose territories could be an important base for nomadic
assault or a first line of defense against nomadic incursions. The campaign
mentioned here, however, was not directed against the Altan-qan of Chin but
against Hsi-hsia, first raided by the Mongols on a large scale in 1205. For a
history of Mongol raids and wars against Hsi-hsia see Ye.I. Kychanov, "MongoloTa^gutskiye voiny i gibel* gosudarstva Si Sya," Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Europe
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1977), pp. h6-6l.
56. Note the careful distinction made between Alaqus' position among the
Onggut and that of his elder brother Binui. Quite probably Rashid-ad-Din's
informant did not recognize Alaqus as legitimate ruler of the Qnggiit.
57. The manuscript tradition favors "Kenduk" but this is clearly an error for
Tenduc.
58. Something has fallen out of the text at this point since the "place" in
question is not named. Reference is probably to some other Onggut city where
Alaqus had his (seasonal?) residence at that time.
59. JAT, pp. 308-310.
60. This is the title under which Po-ssu-p'o occurs in the YS {ahuan II8,
p. 292i*) and the YWL, ahuan 23, p. 21.
61 The date of the Juyin uprising is not given exactly and our sources only
record that it was in the year after 1206. Most Jiiyln elements, if not all,
however, were exclusively pastoral and it was easiest for pastoralists to go on
campaign during the slack season of late autumn and winter when work was light
and reserves of food readily available.
The spring, on the other hand, was
lambing time, demanded intensive labor and was a period of tight food supplies
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and frequent famine. If the Juyin people were mobilized in 1206 it was most
likely during the autumn and their demobilization probably took place during
the early spring of the following year, in time for lambing. Their revolt must
have taken place at about the same time, when environmental pressures were
greatest.
62, SE, p. 239.
63. See the discussion in Buell 1977, toe. ait.
6U. On the Mongol campaign of 1209-1210 against Hsi-hsia see Kychanov, op.
ait.
65. On the Mongol wars against the Chin during the time of Cinggis see H.
Desmond Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of Northern China
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, ].950).
i. jta
66. See the account in the Sheng~wu oh’in aheng Zm ^ ^
,
in Wang Kuo-wei, ed., Meng-ku shih-liao ssu ohung, pp. 170-17^.
67. See Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people: Thoughts on the mechanics
and Impact of Mongol expansion," Mongolian Studies 6 (1979)> forthcoming,
henceforth Buell 1979.
68. See the detailed discussion of the tarona as an institution in Buell 1979.
69. There are two dating traditions, a Mongolian and a Chinese. It is un
certain which is correct.
70. On Muqali see his YS biography in 15, ahuan 119j PP. 2929-2936.
71. On the organization and history of the China tanma see Buell 1979.
72. See the detailed discussion of this thesis in Buell 1977.
73. On Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts’ai see his biography in the YWL, ahuan 57, PP. 9-2U,
and in the YS, ahuan IU6, pp. 3^55-6^. On his role in early Mongol China see
N.Ts. Munkuyev, Kitaiskii Istoahnik o Pervykh Mongol'skikh Khanakh (Moscow,
1965), pp. 3-129, and Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai (II89-I2U3): Bud
dhist idealist and Confucian statesman," in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett,
eds., Confuoian Personalities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962),
pp. 189-216.
7^. For a full discussion of the office of the bieikei see Sechin Jagehid,
"Shuo Yiian-shih chung ti ’pi-she-ch'ih' ping chien-lun Yuan ch’u ti' ohung-shuPien-aher^
yen-ahiu so nien-pao
2 (1971), pp. 19-113.
75. For a discussion of this tax system and the role of the Khitan minister
in its creation and administration see Buell 1977, PP. 82 ff.
76. See the detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Buell 1977.
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TIBET AMD MONGOLIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY;
THE NATURE OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Alicia J. Campi
Indiana University

When examining the panorama of Central Asian history after 1000 A.D., it
quickly becomes evident that the histories of Mongolia and Tibet are signifi
cantly intertwined. Both nations have been faced with the unending task of
preserving their unique cultures in the shadow of the Chinese giant, and both
have been remarkably successful up until the modern era.^ Sharing a common
problem with a common protagonist, Mongolia and Tibet have often joined forces
usually in the form of Mongol political and military might interlocked with
Tibetan cultural and religious dynamism—for their mutual as well as particular
self-interests.
This examination of the "Mongol protectorate" in Tibet during the mid
seventeenth century is an effort to place this experience within the repeated
pattern of Mongolian-Tibetan relations. Always on the horizon is China, so
this study must also concern Itself with the catalytic role played by concur
rent events in the Middle Kingdom. This does not mean, however, that Mongolia
and Tibet created their foreign policies solely in reaction to Chinese stimuli.
On the contrary, much of the evidence reveals that Mongolian and Tibetan inter
nal politics determined the ultimate direction of their special relationship.
To understand the nature of the special relationship forged between Mongolia
and Tibet during the seventeenth centuiy, one must look first at alliances es
tablished by Qubilai Qan and the ’Phags-pa Lama and by Altan Qan and the Third
Dalai Lama. In additiaii, examining the unique example of Mongol-Tibetan co
operation in the person of the Fourth Dalai Lama is vital to comprehend the
subsequent events of the seventeenth century in Central Asia. After briefly
discussing these three historical precedents, we can then turn in more detail
to the establishment and functioning of Gushi Qan's Mongol protectorate in Tibet
and partnership with the Fifth Dalai Lama in the l600s.

Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama
Although hit by the shock wave of the Tanguts’ defeat at the hands of Chingis
Qan in 120T, the Tibetans themselves did not have to contend with the Mongol
armies until 12U0 when Prince Koden sent a military force from his Kokonor base
into Tibet proper as part of the Mongol strategy to outflank the Sung armies.
Faced with the sacking and burning of monasteries north of Lhasa, the Tibetans
sent the abbot of the Sa-skya sect tq negotiate with the Mongol prince. The^
parties agreed that Tibet would acknowledge Mongolian suzerainty and pay a fixed
tribute, and that the Sa-skya leader should become the Mongol representative in
Tibet. The Mongols sent tax collectors to supervise the payment of tribute,
while the Sa-skya Pandita remained in Koden's camp as a well-treated hostage.
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An insurrection by the Tibetan nobility in 1251 was suppressed by Mongol troops,
thus ending effective Tibetan armed resistance to Mongol arms.2 The Sa-skya
Pandita's nephew, 'Phags-pa Blo-gros (l235-8o), grew up as a hostage and was
educated at Prince Koden's Kokonor court, assuming his uncle's place as abbot
of Sa-skya in 1251.3 The newly enthroned Mongol emperor Qubilai, who had met
'Phags-pa ^o-gros in the Koden court years before, made the 'Phags-pa T.aTnn his
kuo-shih
"g-p , "national mentor," in 1260. At the Mongol imperial co\irt
the Phags-pa Lama devised a Tibetan—derived script for the Mongol language and
propagated Buddhism airong the Mongol nobility. Qubilai bestowed upon him an
ther title, ti-shih
"imperial mentor," and patronized the Sa-skya sect
in its power struggles with other Buddhist schools in Tibet.
The Sa-skya sect needed Mongol military assistance to maintain its dominance
over rival sects contending for power in Tibet. Like the protectorate of Korea,
Tibet proper was never occupied by Mongol troops. Rather, the Mongol army woiad
come in to aid the Sa-skya in specific crises, such as the rebellion at the 'Brigung monastery in 1290. The Mongols set up a native government in Tibet to
watch out for their interests and to maintain control of internal affairs—a
policy the Mongols were to use in many places throughout their empire.
Significantly, the Sa-skya school customarily divided power between the spir
itual leader or abbot, e.g. 'Phags-pa, and the secular authority or regent known
as the Dpon-aheriy e.g. the 'Phags-pa's brother.
In theory these two were equal
in rank with two distinct functions. The Tibetans took this theory and applied
it to the relationship they had Just formed with the Mongols. Thus the 'Phagspa Lama was the spiritual leader of the Mongol empire, and Qubilai or any Mongol
emperor was the temporal regent, sharing power equally. In reality, Qubilai and
the Mongols saw themselves firmly in control over the entire empire. Neverthe
less, the fiction of the spiritual equality of the Sa-skya abbot fit their pur
poses as rulers over vast populations in East Asia which adhered to one school
or another of Buddhism. To be sure, members of the Mongol nobility were com
mitted converts to the Buddhist faith, but the shamanistic Mongols throughout
the Yuan court saw significant political gains in maintaining the theory of a
Tibetan Buddhist sharing power and thus lending legitimacy to the non—native
Yuan government in China. The Mongols did appoint their own Mongol dopugaahi
with nominal authority over the Sa-skya Dpon-ahen to supervise Tibetan govern
mental affairs. However, the Tibetan Dpon-ohen in point of fact governed Tibet
for the Mongols instead of his theoretical superior, the Mongol dwmgaohi.

Alton Qan and the Third Dalai Lama
With the weakening of Mongol control in China and Inner Asia, reaction set
in against foreign domination and the Mongol-allied Sa-skya sect. Rival sects
assumed power in Tibet and the Sa-skya, without strong Mongol military support
available, lost their position of control. However, the relationship between
Qubilai's court and the Sa-skya was to be the model for Altan Qan of the Tiimed
and Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho, the Third Dalai Lama, at their famous meeting in 1578.
The participants in this new drama were quite different from those of two
centuries earlier. The Mongols had lost their empire and been replaced in China
by a native dynasty, the Ming. The tribes on the Mongolian steppe, while still
an effective military power, were disunited and at war with each other more than
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with the Ming enemy. In Tibet, the Sa-skya had declined in political power and
was no longer an important force in national politics. Power now lay with the
in-spungs-pa of Gtsang, who patronized the Karma-pa sect. In the early fif
teenth century the reformed Dge-lugs-pa sect, often referred to as the Yellow
Hats, was foi^ded by Btsong-kha-pa. By the time of Altan Qan this sect, imbued
with evangelistic and political spirit, was competing with the Karma-pa and the
many other sects in Tibet for religious and political supremacy. There were
military clashes between Dge-lugs-pa and Karma-pa adherents, until with the rise
of Gtsang, Dge-lugs-pa lamas were circumscribed in their activ
ities. 5
The Tibetan sects of the late sixteenth century were different, yet the antagonism and competition found then was very reminiscent of the situation in
Tibet prior to the first Mongol intervention in IPUo, and the fundamental probems encountered by Tibet and Mongolia were remarkably similar. In Tibet
religious factions struggled for political power, but no sect was sufficiently
strong to vanquish its opponents. Concurrently, on the Mongolian steppe various
claimants for power still faced the key question of legitimacy. Altan Qan in
e latter part of the l600s sought to reassert the supremacy of the Eastern
Mongols over the Oirad or Western Mongols, claiming that he was the legitimate
successor of the Chingissids. He, with his grand-nephew Qutugtai Secen
Qungtaiji of the Ordos, had extended their power over most of Mongolia. Still
contentious rivals threatened the establishment of a unified state.
Tobahi that Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji invaded
iibet in 1566, sending messengers to the heads of various monasteries "offering
to accept their religion if they submitted and threatening to treat them as
enemies if they did not."D This incident can be interpreted as a raid for
empire-building or perhaps a scouting expedition at Altan Qan's behest.
Why Altan Qan invited the Dge-lugs-pa leader, Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho, to Mon
golia IS not clearly understood. Traditional Buddhist histories credit this
event to Altan Qan’s conversion to that religion in 1571. The qan's first in
vitation to the Dge-lugs-pa head in 157^* was declined.( Two years later Sagang
Secen indicates that Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji visited Altan Qan and reminded
him that for the well-being of this and the future life," religion was neces
sary, g Mention was made of following the example of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa
Lama.
Therefore a second embassy was sent to the Dge-lugs-pa
which he
accepted. At the meeting between these two men in Mongolia in the summer of
1576 titles were exchanged, l.e. Altan Qan conferred the title Dalai Lama on
Bsod nams Rgya-mtsho, and the conscious emulation of the Qubilai-'Phags-pa Tama
precedent was emphasized. Zahiruddin Ahmad has compared the account of Sagang
Secen with that of the Third Dalai Lama.9 The Third Dalai Lama's Rnam-thar
^Biography) says that Altan Qan identified himself as Qubilai. Sagang Secen
states that Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho claimed that Altan Qan and he were reincarnations of Qubilai and the ’Phags-pa Lama,
These sources appear to reveal Altan Qan's motivations for the invitation to
the Third Dalai Lama. Altan Qan and his grand nephew, Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji,
were seeking to prove their right to re-establish the Mongol empire, for if the
Phags-pa Lama had been reborn in the Third Dalai Lama, Altan Qan then was the
reincarnation of^QuMlaii. As for Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho's motivations for ac
cepting the invitation, surely missionary zeal was a factor, but the political
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realities of the Tihetan scene lead me to conclude that he wanted to attract a
Mongol patron to guarantee his own success at home.
The "alliance" created by Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama drew the Mon
gols directly into the religious politics of Tibet and likewise expanded the
religious struggle between the Dge-lugs-pa and the Karma-pa sects into the new
arena of Mongolia.10 Because his patron, Altan Qan, had died in 1582, the Third
Dalai Lama visited Mongolia a second time to strengthen his ties with other mem
bers of the nobility as well as to propagate the faith. Upon the death of the
Third Dalai Lama in 1588, the Chahar princes, who had been converted to the Dgelugs-pa sect and retained their Tibetan contacts,H foiind it politically expe
dient to have the Dalai Lama line reincarnated in the family of Altan Qan.

The Poicpth Dalai Lama
The Fourth Dalai Lama, Yon-tan Rgya-mtsho, was Altan Qan's great-grandson.
Born February 15, 1589 in Kokonor, he was confirmed in his selection by a large
Tibetan contingent of Dge-lugs-pa monks who traveled to Mongolia and met with
the Chahar Mongol princes to strike a blatantly political deal. The Fourth
Dalai Lama remained in Mongolia until he was about twelve years old. During
his brief reign (d. l6l7), he traveled around central Tibet to gain support for
the Dge-lugs-pa. However, warfare again broke out in the Dbus region in l6l2
and by l6l6 Gtsang forces had occupied the whole territory of Skyid-sod and
large sections of Dbus in central Tibet.
The brief and rather unsuccessful reign of the Fourth Dalai Lama was especially
important as a political model, because it represented the ultimate mesh of the
'Phags-pa Lama-Qubilai relationship. The Mongol representative or regent, if
you will, was in the person of an individual who at the same time was the head
of Tibetan and Mongol spiritual and political power. Nevertheless, the Fourth
Dalai Lama never claimed temporal authority over Mongolia, even though as a
member of the Altan Qan family he could theoretically do so.
We already noted the gap between reality and theory during imperial times.
Then theory held that the Tibetan 'Phags-pa Lama was the spiritual leader of the
empire, but in practice the Mongols never shared any power, not even spiritual
power. During the reign of the Fourth Dalai Lama, theory presupposed Mongol
predominance in the new alliance. But there was no empire left and Mongol dis
unity on the steppe precluded any temporal power for the Fourth Dalai Lama in
Mongolia. Furthermore, in Tibet the Dge-lugs-pa sect and its Mongol patrons
did not have the power to ensure the Fourth Dalai Lama's spiritual, let alone
temporal, ascendancy.
The failure of the Chahars to successfully support militarily the Dge-lugspa was evidenced by the king of Gtsang, a Karma-pa supporter, attacking Lhasa
and expelling the Mongols in l605. The failure of the Tibetan-Chahar alliance
was due in large measure to the strategic problems of military support from
Chahar to Lhasa in the face of less than effective control of the Intervening
Mongolian steppe. For both Mongolia and Tibet, the fusion of their powers in
the person of one ruler with temporal and spiritual authority in both nations
just did not prove workable in the temporal realm, and they could see that the
alliance was mutually unprofitable. Notwithstanding, because of the continued
ascendancy of rival Western Mongol tribes, the Chahars, now led by Ligdan Qan,
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To Gushi Qan:
"We hear that some have heen guilty of disobedience and rebellion against
the religion (of the Buddha), but you have already re-established order.
We reflect that from the time when the ancient Holy Kings established
government, the religion of the Buddha has endured without interruption.
Now We wish to show Our great respect for the Eminent Sages among the
Tibetans, so We are sending envoys with the Ilakviksan Hutuketu to all
alike, regardless of the colour of their robes, whether they be red or
yellow, seeking everywhere for the religion of the Buddha for the protec
tion of the Empire. This you should know. We are sending you with this
letter a complete suit of armour."29
The two letters quite obviously differ in tone. The letter and large gifts to
the king of Gtsang indicate Mukden's support.30 The Manchus indicate they are
up-to-date on the military situation in Tibet. The pro-Gtsang attitude is per
haps best explained as a divisive strategem and an anti-Oirat measure. Gushi
Qan and his Dzungar ally Baatur Qung Taiji rivaled the Manchus for the loyalties
of the Eastern Mongols. It is natural, therefore, that the Manchus should not
sanction their rivals' increasing domination over Tibet.
In 1639 Gushi Qan gained further temporal power in Tibet with his successful
eighteen-month campaign against the king of Beri in Khams. The Fifth Dalai Lama
in his autobiography writes that he sent a message to Gushi Qan to subdue Beri
and then return to his own country.31 When Gushi Qan approached central Tibet
in I6U1, the Fifth Dalai Lama maneuvered unsuccessfully for him to return to
Kokonor.
Gushi Qan fought a major battle with the son of the king of Gtsang,
and the victorious Mongols proceeded to take over all of Gtsang, capture its
king and sew him up in leather to die. The Fifth Dalai Lama further relates
that he attempted to stop the fighting through negotiation via the Panchen Lama,
because he was afraid the ruler of Gtsang could perhaps defeat Gushi Qan and
thus destroy the Dge-lugs-pa.32 But the Dalai Lama's chief attendant Bsod-nams
Chos-'phel worked to thwart any possible negotiations and actually Joined Gushi
Qan's forces, providing them with food and supplies. In a final great battle
in early I6U2 the Gtsang capital Shigatse and the Karma-pa monastery Tashizilnon
were captured together with the entire royal family of Gtsang.
Gushi Qan thereupon invited the Dalai Lama to Shigatse where, with the lat
ter's sanction, he "ascended the throne of Tibet with dignity and grandeur" in
an elaborate ceremony on April 13, 16U2.33 in a hall with three thrones Gushi
Qan and Bsod-nams Chos-'phel sat a little lower than the Dge-liigs-pa hierarch.
Gushi Qan presented a series of offerings to the Dalai Lama, one invoking
Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama.
The Mongol-Tibetan relationship thus created harked back to the model of
Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama, the same model which had inspired Altan Qan and
the Third Dalai Lama. The alternative model exemplified by the Fourth Dalai
Lama was rejected. Also during this time Bsod-nams Chos-'phel was installed as
regent, sde-srid, to handle civil administration, with functions similar to the
Dpon-ohen of Mongol imperial days. This regent was the Mongol-supported admin
istrator for the still young Fifth Dalai Lama. It was not the custom of the
Dge-lugs-pa school to divide authority between a spiritual leader or abbot and
secular regent, as was the Sa-skya practice. However, Gushi Qan in 1642 created
such a division of power by invoking the precedent employed by the Sa-skya.
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In l6k2 not only did Gushi Qan control the Fifth Dalai Lama, hut even the
"Great Fifth's" chief minister Bsod-nams Chos-'phel had actual temporal authority
over him. Nevertheless, the Fifth Dalai Lama's spiritual supremacy over the two
others was never questioned. From the political point of view, this relation
ship favored the Qoshod Mongols. Gushi Qan, while in fact holding the reins of
political power in Tibet, did not govern Tibet as part of his empire. This is
why Tucci has correctly called Gushi Qan "une sorte de protecteur du Tibet."3^
Following the example of Qubilai Qan, Gushi Qan had in effect enfeoffed the
Dalai Lama and his sde-srid to rule Tibet as they pleased, so long as their ac
tions did not conflict with Gushi' s interests. Until his death in iS’jh, Gushi
spent most of his time not in Lhasa but on the steppe north of Lake Tengri or
in Kokonor, wrapped up in Mongol Internal politics. It is incorrect to maintain
that Gushi Qan gave Tibet to the Dalai Lama. Rather this formal act must be
viewed from the traditional Mongol practice of enfeoffment which is a quid pro
quo relationship subject to revocation.
This approach to the relationship between the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushi Qan
underlines the difficult position the Tibetan leader faced in 1642. The Fifth
Dalai Lama's greatness lay not in the fact that he re-established a strong tie
with the Mongols—because he actually had little to do with delineating the
nature of this relationship and was himself controlled by his own regent—but
rather in the manner in which he used the theory of his spiritual superiority
to gain real political power after Gushi Qan's death.

Conclusion
This has been a study of the special relationship between Mongolia and Tibet
during the seventeenth century. The nature of the relationship created in 1642
by Gushi Qan and the Fifth Dalai Lama ultimately resulted in a Dge-lugs-pa gov
ernment in Tibet with temporal and spiritual authority that remained in power
until the Commiuiist Chinese conquest. This relationship can, however, only be
understood by examining the two models for alliance known to both nations—the
first established by Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama and the second established
by the Fourth Dalai Lama and the Chahars. The first model proved successful
for both parties but collapsed with the waning of Mongol imperial power. This
fact in itself speaks for the predominance of the Mongols in the relationship.
The second model, which attempted to fuse a spiritual and temporal leader into
one Mongol person—the Fourth Dalai Lama—was neither very successful nor endur
ing. This was because the Mongols could not sustain the military obligations
of the relationship and force Tibet to accept their agents, the Dge-lugs-pa.
Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama had sought to revive the first model, but
Altan's death brought a quick end to that attempt. When Gushi Qan and the Fifth
Dalai Lama again reached back to the example of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama,
they consciously were rejecting the experiment attempted via the Fourth Dalai
Lama.
Throughout its history, the Mongol-Tibetan relationship was always much more
profitable politically for Tibet, even though the Mongols held military superi
ority. In striking contrast to the fate of the Sa-skya sect is the Dge-lugs-pa
school's success in acquiring temporal power in Tibet in the face of the dis
solution of Mongol military might. When Mongol power ebbed during the imperial
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period, the Sa-skya in turn lost control over the Tibetan political scene. The
Dge-lugs-pa sect, on the other hand, masterfully entrenched itself so well in
Tibet that when a power vacuum was created, it could step in. Thus the Dgelugs-pa school, led by the Fifth Dalai Lama, used the Mongol-Tibetan connection
to create a strong theocracy modeled on the precedent of the Fourth Dalai Lama
but personified this time by a leader of Tibetan blood. This theocracy survived
not only the breakup of the special relationship developed with the Mongols,
but even withstood later political crises with the Chinese, Indians, and British.
Meanwhile in Mongolia the institution of the Jebtsundamba Qutughtu grew to fill
the spiritual loss incurred by the breakup of the seventeenth-century MongolTibetan alliance while still exhibiting spiritual obeisance to the Dalai Lamas.

Notes
1. In October 1950 Tibet was invaded by Chinese Communist troops and the na
tion subsequently was Incorporated into the People's Republic of China. Mon
golia has fared somewhat better. Although "inner Mongolia" has been broken up
into three provinces within the PRC, "Outer Mongolia" has maintained its inde
pendence since 1911, although securely within the Soviet Union's sphere of
influence since 1921..
2. During the Yuan period there were other uprisings in Tibet against the
Sa-skya and their Mongol patrons, such as the 1290 'Bri—gung uprising. This
and other skirmishes were, however, easily controlled.
3. His pro-Mongol attitude was very irritating to the Tibetan nobility which
in that same year (l25l) had unsuccessfully revolted against the Mongols and
the Sa-skya school.
h. See Paul Buell, "Some Aspects of the Origin and Development of the Religious
Institutions of the Early Yiian Period," unpublished thesis. University of Washing
ton, Seattle, 1968.
5. Helmut Hoffmann, Tibet: A Handbook (Bloomington, 1975), p. 56.
6. Zahiruddin Ahmad, Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Centuny (Rome:
Istituto Itaiiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, I970), p. 87.
7. Op- oit., p. 88. However, Ahmad cites no sources to justify his opinion.
He suggests that the Dalai Lama did not go to the Mongols on the first invitation
because he feared them. Since we do not know enough about the political situa
tion in Tibet, perhaps the Dge-lugs-pa leader was not able to travel to Mongolia
safely.
8. Loo. oit. , citing the Third Dalai Lama's Rnam-thar, p. 90a.
9. Op. oit., pp. 89-91.
10. Supposedly the Third Dalai Lama established a diplomatic outpost at
Tongkhor, also known as Lusar, where representatives of both the Lama and Altan
Qan would remain to channel intercourse. Tongkhor was about halfway between
Lhasa and the outpost area of Chahar. The Fourth Dalai Lama on his trip to
Tibet also stopped at this place. See Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet, A Politioal
History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 96-97.
11. Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century,
Part 1 (London: Longman's, Green, and Co., I876), p. 512. He indicates that
Sagang Secen spoke of Abitai Ghalsagho Taiji of the Khalkhas in 1587 paying a
visit to the Dalai Lama and bringing gifts. Also mentioned is Amutai Qung
Taiji of the Chahars who visited the Dalai Lama.
12. Sum-pa mkhan-po Ye-shes dpal-'byor. The Annals of Kokonor, tr. by Yang
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Ho-chin (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic
Series, I969), p. 32.
13. In 1615 the Fourth Dalai Lama refused the invitation from the Shentsung Emperor of Ming China.
"Because of his responsibilities at the Drepung
and Sera monasteries, the Dalai Lama had to decline the invitation; however,
he agreed to bless the temple from his monastery in Tibet, which he did by
praying with his face towards China and scattering barley grain into the wind."
Shakabpa, p. 99.
lit. There is a certain amount of controversy in the sources about how Ligdan
Qan died. Mongolian sotorces indicate he died of smallpox, but Tibetan accovuits
usually record his death as a just one at the hands of a Dge-lugs-pa champion,
Gushi Qan of the Qoshod. Perhaps Tibetan accounts reflect the bitterness the
Dge-lugs-pa felt over what seems to be a sudden anti-Dge-lugs-pa attitude on
the part of Ligdan. However, it must be noted that there is speculation that
the anti-Buddhist accusation leveled against Ligdan during his final days may
have been a Ming Chinese smear against his reputation. Perhaps this issue can
be better understood if Ligdan Qan's change of religious affiliation is viewed
from the standpoint of political motives, since Tsoghtu Taiji, his one remain
ing ally, was strongly allied with Gtsang.
15- The Annals of Kokonor, p. 3^.
16. Baatur Qung Taiji was the title given to him by Gushi Qan in 1637• The
Chinese name is Bogatlr Kontaisha
;
Qaraqula was also
known as Khotokhotsin
^
i see Ahmad, ibid., "Genealogical Table
II: The Jungar," and Arthur W. Hximmel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period
(1644-1912) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19^3), pp. 265-266.
17.j_Tibetan sources use the name Gu-shri. His Chinese name was Ku-shih Han
. This Gushi is a title derived from the Chinese t'ai-kuo-shih
1^ l| ^ . Gushi Qan's given name was Toru Baiqu (Bariqu?) Guosi, in the
Shara Tudzhi, ed. N. P. Shastina, 1957, pp. 99-10018. Shakabpa, p. 103, writes Urluk.
19. Ar-sa-lang in the Tibetan sources. T'ai-chi is
o
in Chinese.
The Chinese term is a Mongolian title taiji derived from t'ai-tzu A.

20. Annals of Kokonor, p. 35.
21. Loo. ait.
Yang identifies this place as the upper branch of the Yangtze
River (note 86). For the Fifth Dalai Lama's account see Ahmad, pp. llit-115.
22. Loa. ait.
The text of a similar story in the Fifth Dalai Lama's auto
biography is given in Ahmad, p. 115.
23. The Annals and the Fifth Dalai Lama's autobiography differ on the order
given by Tsoghtu Taiji. The Dalai Lama's account (Ahmad, p. 115) says: "Kill
him by alluring him (into a trap)," while in the Annals of Kokonor, p. 36, it
reads "Kill him by (all) means."
2h. Annals of Kokonor, p. 37: "Because two mountain spurs became reddened
by blood, they are now known as the great and small U-lan Hosho Lulaan qosuu,
'the red promontory']."
25. Dayan Ochir Qan in Chinese is
^ ® p'f' •
26. Shakabpa, p. lOU.
27. Gushi Qan received the title Bstan-'dzin Chos-kyi-rgyal-po (The Upholder
of the Teaching, the King according to the Faith; Dharmaraja in Sanskrit). In
the Annals of Kokonor, p. 37 there is an alternate form of the same title:
Bstan-'dzin Chos-rgyal (Religious-King-Who-Maintains-the-Teachings). Gushi
bestowed upon the Dalai Lama's ministers various titles. At this time Baatur
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Qung Taiji acquired this title from Gushi Qan.
28. A certain Gushi Secen Chos-rje of the Oirad tribes (sometimes mistaken
for Gushi Qan—see Ahmad, p. 121 for a long discussion on this individual) was
sent or he in turn sent an envoy (our sources conflict) to the Mukden court of
the Ch'ung-te emperor (1636-^^1) in late November l63T. Problems arise because
Chinese records indicate the presence of Ilaghughsan Qutughtu, who was this
same Gushi Secen Chos-rje, in October
(Ahmad, p. 121 quoting from the
Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu Tv ^There may in fact have been
two missions. Tibetan records cited by Li Tieh-tseng show that in l63T three
Khalkha ans suggested to the Manchu emperor that he send envoys to Gushi Qan,
as temporal ruler of Tibet, inviting him to the Mukden Court. Later in 1639
these sources speak of such an invitation being sent to Gushi Qan and a second
to the Dalai Lama. It is thus in l6h2 that the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, Gushi
Qan, and the king of Gtsang send their responses with tribute via Ilaghughsan
Qutughtu to Mukden. See Li Tieh-tseng, Tibet Today and Yesterday (New York:
Bookman Associates, 196o),p. 3I*. See also his notes h-6 on pp. 23^-35. The
Tibetan sources Li cited may have doctored the record to make it appear that
the Manchus hizmbled themselves to the Fifth Dalai Lama and sent an invitation
first. However, the accounts of Sagang Secen and the First Panchen Lama's
autobiography place the diplomatic initiative in I6U0. There is still no reso
lution to the problem over the l6h2 date in the Chinese records.
29. From T'ung-hua ch'uan-lu Ch'ung-te in W. W. Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas
of Lhasa and their relations with the Manchu emperors of China l6i+U-1908,"
T’oung Pao 11 (19IO), pp. 12-13.
30. The tone of the letter to Gushi Qan and the relatively simple gift be
stowed on him compared to that given the king of Gtsang appear to refute
Tibetan sources which detail an elaborate welcoming reception for the Ilaghughsan
Qutughtu as proof of Manchu support.
31. Shakabpa, pp. IO6-IOT.
32. Op. ait., pp. 109-110, quoting from the Fifth Dalai Lama's autobiography.
33. Ahmad, p. 13^. He indicates this is from the Annals of Kokonor, but
this is not in Yang's translation, see p. 39.
3^. Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls (Rome: Libreria dello stato,
19^9)> vol. 1, p. 70, says of Gushi Qan's successors: "Greatly inferior to
him in political wisdom and personal prestige, suspicious of one another and
interested, over and beyond Tibet, in the events which were beginning to take
shape in Mongolia."

THE ROLE OF INNER MONGOLIA IN THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, 1911-191 i*
Paul Hyer
Brigham Young University

In 1911 the Mongols declared their Independence from China under the ManchuCh ing dynasty and were thus one of the first non—Western nations in modern
times to escape alien subjection. They strengthened their nation through the
following decades, were admitted to the United Nations and recently celebrated
their fiftieth anniversary with broad recognition in the world community. But
the independence movement fell short of success for more Mongolian territory
remained part of China and more people were eventually left under Chinese dom
ination than successfully escaped.
This especially important aspect of Mongolian history has been obscured.
Most historians have concentrated on the event's international aspects, empha
sizing the fate of the new Mongol state as it was subordinated to Russia and
China, or they have concentrated on the complex developments within Outer Mon
golia, the focal point of the independence movement. The role of Inner Mongolia
has been ignored almost as an irrelevancy.
^The Mongols originally intended to create a new empire, a Greater Mongolia
[BugUde Mongghot) under a new holy emperor, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu who, by
the way, was actually a Tibetan. The new state was to encompass the huge areas
of Inner Mongolia extending from Hulun-buir (Buteha and Barga) on the Siberian
border to Ordos in the southwest on the border of Chinese Turkistan.
Specialists at least are familiar with the general reasons for the failure
of Inner Mongolia as a whole to become unified in an independent Mongolian state
after I9II. But the story has still never been told in all its detail and com
plexities, nor will this narrative entirely clear up this obscured event.^
The factors working for independence are quite clear. A common language and
culture, a consciousness of past empire and glory, vague desires for a broader
Mongolian political association and antipathy to Chinese exploitation were in
tegrating elements for the Mongols. These factors prompted a widespread, spon
taneous, favorable response for independence from the Manchu empire or from any
revolutionary Chinese regime that might replace it. But this response was not
unanimous or without hesitation on the part of many important leaders, a circum
stance which requires further explanation.
To begin with, there was virtually no effective cohesion between the various
Inner Mongolian regions—administratively, economically or in general. While
certain broad generalizations may be made regarding them as a whole, one must
penetrate beyond the superficial and analyze the situation and response of each
region individually to gain a true perspective. Although Mongolia was more than
a decade into the twentieth century, national consciousness was weak. A gmai 1
group of the elite had begun to think of the fate of their country and people
but the old cohesion of the empire, limited as it had been, was long gone and
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the new cohesion of modern nationalism was just beginning. One was soon to hear
of pan-Mongolian sentiments, but from the beginning these were but romantic no
tions, impossible of realization within the geopolitical context of Northeast
Asia. There were no mass media, no modern transportation, nor other cohesive
factors to coordinate groups in an integrated movement and offset the strong
regionalism which fragmented the Mongols and which was characterized by divisive
stereotypes and prejudices.'^
To understand Inner Mongolia's role in the Mongolian independence movement,
one must see the great difference in the various regions collectively referred
to as Inner Mongolia.3 The Hulun-buir region had a historical experience and
geographical situation very much different from the Kharachin and East Turned
region (Josoto league) in the southeast near the Great Wall, and different again
were the western regions of Shilin-ghol, Ulanchab and Ordos.
If an understanding of the final settlement for Inner Mongolia in the inde
pendence movement requires a region-by-region analysis, then also within each
region the reaction of key leaders was an important factor. The matter was not
decided by a plebiscite or a public opinion poll in each banner. Needless to
say, these leaders made their decisions on the basis of their perception of such
OTerriding factors as geography and military power, political and economic ties.
Examples will be given here of a variety of responses of particular leaders to
the momentous event of Mongolian separation from China. The response and motivations of certain other leaders is unclear. The Inner Mongolian hero, Togtokh
for example, fled to Khalkha and was valiant in the fight, but one wonders
what his true, most basic motivation may have been.^
In sorting out the complex responses of people in the various regions to the
announcement of independence, first to be noted was the strong emotional support
for the movement. But intellectually the response was more complex. While
there was a momentary joy and excitement on the part of most people throughout
Inner Mongolia , there was not a simple reaction to this momentous event. Among
the leaders there was soon a general consternation and ambivalence as the various
areas each received communications and official documents from Urga setting forth
the reasons for Mongolia breaking its ties with Peking and calling for broad sup
port and imity throiighout Mongolia.
A tentative assessment points to the conclusion that the majority of the
leadership of the ten regions of Inner Mongolia—six leagues with forty-nine
banners plus four related regions (the aimaghs of Chakhar, Hulun-buir, Alashan
^d Echina, and the Kokonor Torghuds)—initially showed spontaneous support for
independence. Most banners apparently sent word confirming their approval of
the movement.
According to the scholar Sh. Sandag of Ulaanbaatar, there is
evidence that thirty-five of the forty-nine banners sent communications of sup
port for the Jebtsundamba's new government. The thirty-five Sandag lists include
all banners of Shilin-ghol league (lO), seven of Jerim (lO), six of Juu-uda (ll),
five of Ulanchab (6), two of Josotu (5), and five of Yeke-juu league (T).
The real problem comes in weighing the actual substance of this support, for
even a cursory examination of this list immediately points up problems. Shilinghol, for one, was certainly not united, as will be seen. Moreover, the list
does not include Barga (Hulun-buir), where possibly the greatest sustained sup
port arose, nor does it include Echina and Alashan, led by Prince Tawangburijala,
which seem to have been greatly influenced by the independence movement. The
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list also omits the Torghud banners of Kokonor whose Prince Palta reportedly
saved the day during the siege of Khohdo by warning Urga's forces of Chinese
reinforcements being sent from Shara-sume in Sinkiang to augment their forces
in the city.®
Some banners openly favored the movement while others were more cautious and
secretly sent representatives to check on the new development. Most leaders
were pleased and hopeful for the move but at the same time were reserved and
adopted a wait-and-see policy. Wise and farsighted leaders saw the threat of
Chinese colonization of Mongolia, but they also saw the dangers inherent in an
attempt to break away from their Chinese overlords. Emphasis here will focus
on the two most crucial areas of Shilin-ghol and Kharachin; the first because
the key military campaigns were decided here, the second because of its decisive
role in the political settlements with Peking.

Situation in Shilin-ghoZ
The situation of Shilin-ghol league (region) in the trauma of the independence
movement was one of the most critical. Of all the regions, Shilin-ghol, along
with Jerim, seems to have been the most divided internally as to what course to
take. It did not move decisively for independence like Barga nor was it so re
luctant as the Ordos, Chakhar or Western Tumet (Kueihua). Shilin-ghol was caught
in a true dilemma. It was special because, like Ulanchab, it was the most ex
posed of the ten subregions (leagues and aimagh), having the longest border with
Outer Mongolia. Traversed by the main trade routes, Shilin-ghol was the cross
roads between China and Outer Mongolia. It was also the largest region, the
most nomadic in life style and, in this respect, the most similar to Outer Mon
golia.
The split in Shilin-ghol is confirmed in a unique oral history account of the
situation from the Kanjurwa khutughtu (Living Buddha), who lived most of his life
in Shilin-ghol.
He reports that there was a complex situation in his region
with a great many debates among the princes and banner leaders and, to some de
gree, among the lamas about what should be done regarding the independence and
the appearance of a new government in Urga. The Kanjurwa says that there was
no consensus in the banner.
Some leaders strongly opposed any support to the
new government in Urga while others fled north with many of their people to join
the movement. It would seem that support among the common people surpassed that
among the elite.
The Kanjurwa notes that after a period of chaos the Chinese were soon able to
again take full control of Inner Mongolia. He says that "in those days the lamas
had no objection to developing a Greater Mongolia and supporting the Jebtstindamba
as Bogdo khan (holy emperor)." He continues, "l heard many stories of how the
lamas felt that the new Mongolia would be a Buddhist nation, a thing they all
greatly desired," particularly in view of the fact that the rising Chinese geming
(radical revolutionaries) were determined to tear down their Buddhist religion
and destroy the faith.°
An example of a simple positive response for Independence was the case of the
two Khauchld (Hochlt) banners of Shilin-ghol league. The Prince of East Khauchid
gathered about half of the banner population and migrated to Outer Mongolia, fol
lowed by a large part of the population of the neighboring banner. West Khauchid.^
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fere the break was definite and permanent and the refugees made a new life in
Khalkha territory. Moving the Khauchid population en masse was traumatic but
was easier than the problem facing the Barga Mongols whose case is better known
ut less successful. The tension was compounded in central Shilin-ghol when
p^t of the two Khauchid banners fled north, because neighboring banners were
a so affected due to the lack of a clear-cut boundary separating the two eastern
most Abagha and Abaghanar banners.
An important factor in the tension or trauma of the split was caused by the
conservative opposition—some would say realism—of Prince Yangsanjab against
independence and the new Urga regime. Yangsanjab was the hereditary ruling
prince {jasagh) of the Abagha left banner, neighboring the Khauchid groups that
split off. He was also head of the entire Shilin-ghol league. He was capable,
in luential and Inclined to be more loyal to the Manchu-Ch'ing dynasty. While
most other Shilin-ghol leaders were for unification with Khalkha, he was skepti
cal about the Greater Mongolia movement and accordingly argued for neutrality or
maintaining connections with Peking. He had a rather strong mental fixation on
of it fo
continuity of the Middle Kingdom with Inner Mongolia as part
Since Shilin-ghol was the mainline of confrontation, Yangsanjab was captured
y invading Outer Mongolian forces in 1913, imprisoned in Urga but later freed.H
Yangsanjab remained conservative throughout his life. He boycotted the important
autonomous movement launched in 1933 at Batu-khalagha (Pailingmiao) by Prince
Demchugdungrub, and he remained aloof from the Japanese all during their long
occupation until 19^5.12
^
1913 was a critical year in Shilin-ghol and most of western Mongolia when
Outer Mongolian troops invaded Inner Mongolia. This was known locally as the
ukher g^l^^n mmeen disturbance of the year of the cow." According to popular
slogans and folklore the disturbance was for the "unification of the Mongolian
people and the protection of the faith." One important leader of the invading
ongolian troops was Jalkhantsa gegen, a powerful lama and intimate friend of
the famous Dilowa khutughtu. There were stories abroad in those days of great
miracles performed by Jalkhantsa and other powerful lama generals of the inde
pendence movement. It is of interest that the previous incarnation of the late
Kanjurwa khutughtu met this famous Jalkhantsa gegen in Shilin-ghol during one of
the incursions of Khalkha troops.
But the independence movement was a personal tragedy for the fourth incarnation of the Kanjurwa Living Buddha for it directly caused his death. He was an
influential and powerful ecclesiastical figure and rather inclined to be involved
in politics. He was sympathetic to the independence movement and welcomed the
troops from Outer Mongolia. However, the Jangjiya khutughtu, a famous incarna
tion and rival of the Kanjurwa, together with his advisors and staff were tied
to Peking and exploited the situation to gain advantage in the religious compe
tition between the two men. The disciples of the Jangjiya and his pro-Peking
supporters made secret accusations to Peking that the Kanjurwa was disloyal and
sympathetic to the rebels. As a consequence, when the tide turned and Chinese
troops arose to force out the invading Mongol troops, the Kanjurwa was killed,
his temple center at Dolonor on the border of Shilin-ghol and Chakhar was burned,
and many other lamas were killed or mistreated. One of the reasons motivating
the Kanjurwa's support of Urga was the fact that he had many patrons and con
siderable wealth including thousands of horses in Khalkha and Barga, particularly
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concentrated in San-Beise banner in Sechen-khan aimagh (province). lit

The Battle for Shilin-ghol
The battle for Inner Mongolia in the independence movement was very largely
determined in the frontier area of Shilin-ghol, and it is fitting here to give
the essentials of the struggle.The main leader was Damdinsuren of the Barga
area in eastern Inner Mongolia. He was early recognized as a hero of the inde
pendence movement for his valor in the successful Khobdo campaign of 1912. In
deed, after a half century he is still viewed as one of the most outstanding
political and military leaders of the entire period. He has been eulogized by
his biographers as being a "true son of Hulun-buir CBargal," who had the "most
advanced ideas of his time." He was regarded as one of the best educated among
the nobility of his period and wrote his own official letters in excellent Mongolian or Manchu. Those who knew him said he was close to the common people,
had their respect and love and was comparatively democratic in his manner. Not
least, he is praised as having "revived once more the old glory of the Mongols’
superiority in military arts."l6
Daminsiiren was appointed by Urga as the commander-in-chief of the great cam
paign into Inner Mongolia. The climax came in 1913. Comparatively well-trained
and equipped Chinese troops had earlier looted much of Shilin-ghol, burning
temples and generally creating havoc. By the autumn of 1913 Damdinsuren, com
manding some 1,000 men Including an estimated 300 from Barga and an additional
700 drawn variously from the Inner Mongolian areas of Sunid, Kliauchid, Abagha,
Ujumchin, and Chakhar, had cleared the Chinese troops from most of Shilin-ghol.
The Chinese were making sorties from their main base at Dolon-nor into the Mon
golian hinterland, and the first big battle came at Khoshmog, Chagaan-nor, a
sandy steppe area northwest of Dolon-nor.
Until then the Chinese had been defeated in virtually every encounter. The
important Inner Mongolian leader Babujab from the Mongoljin-Tumed banner was
involved in this crucial campaign and was later to gain considerable notoriety
for a major uprising which he led in 1915-16. Another important compatriot of
Damdinsuren in the battle for Inner Mongolia was Magsarjab. He occupied Dolonnor for a time, destroyed the Chinese garrison at Darkhan-uul and led an attack
on Chinese troops stationed at Byaruu (Chin. Ching-peng).

I
I

The last great contest between the Mongols and the Chinese came at Dolon-nor
in September and October. Damdinsuren and his troops fought valiantly but were
forced to withdraw after nine major battles, the last of which came at Junnaiman Temple not far from Dolon-nor. From the beginning Mongol supplies, guns
and ammunition were low and Urga had found it impossible to replenish them. The
end came in October 1913 when supplies were gone and heavy snow and bitter cold
set in. The protracted nature of the war wore the Mongols down, and they became
a heavy burden on the local population in Shilin-ghol where they were quartered.
It was impossible to continue the struggle to regain or hold Inner Mongolian

!

territory as the ammunition and supplies ran out and as the troops were unfed
and suffering.
Apparently the problems of the Mongolian patriots increased when Nasanarbijikh
(Na Wang) "turned traitor." According to Mongolian accounts, his defection to
the Chinese induced other Mongolian troops to flee or to submit as Chinese
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spontaneous response in Ulanchab was an enthusiastic support of the movement.
The league's head at the time was Prince Lhawangnorhu, ruling gasagh of Durbed
banner, and his lead was followed by neighboring banners. The three Urad ban
ners did not have distinct borders and tended to be united in sending emissaries
and messages of support to the new regime in Urga. In western Inner Mongolia,
one cause of Mongolian alienation was the activity of I-ku, a Manchu governorgeneral who actively promoted the Chinese colonization of Mongolian land, killed
a Mongol noble who opposed him, and generally distressed the people and leaders
of the Ulanchab and Yeke-juu leagues. After I-ku was removed in 1905, his suc
cessor, the governor-general of Suiyiian,. Chang Shao-tseng, continued to seize
land for Chinese settlement.
As initial enthusiasm subsided, the leaders of Ulanchab realized that they
had to reckon with certain confrontation with the Chinese. The main figure of
concern was Governor-General Chang, stationed in Suiyiian with security forces.
During the transitional period following the proclamation, of independence, the
Ulanchab princes drew up a document that was critical of Chang's rule of the
Mongol-China border region, particularly his continuation of the land grabbing
policy of I-ku who had been dismissed and even imprisoned for his exploitation
of the Mongols in Ulanchab and Ordos. Finally, on orders from Yuan Shlh-k'ai
in Peking, Governor-General Chang called a conference of the various leaders in
western Mongolia in an attempt to resolve the problems.
The meeting was a sobering occasion for the princes as it was made clear to
them that Chang's strategy was a steel hand in a velvet glove. They soon
learned that if they remained within the Chinese sphere, they would be rewarded
by a promotion in princely rank and an annual salary {feng-tu) or financial grant.
But if they chose to leave they would inevitably meet the determined militaxy
power of General Chang and the Chinese troops at his disposal. In view of the
overwhelming forces against them, the main result of the conference was the
"pacification" of the Mongols or rather an intimidation of their leaders, ef
fectively neutralizing their move to independence.

Settlements in Western Mongolia
For most of western Inner Mongolia, the areas of Shilln-ghol, Ulanchab, Chakhar
and Ordos, the crucial time was not 1911 when independence was declared but rath
er 1912-13 when the real political and military contest came between the Mongols
and Chinese forces for a final settlement to determine control over the border
areas. Most banners with their sparse population were not prepared to defend
themselves when set upon by military forces from both Outer Mongolia and China.
The Ujumuchin banner of Shilin-ghol league may be taken as an example. It
was one invasion route of Outer Mongolian forces, and the particular threat here
was the proposed stationing of Chinese military forces to guard against further
incursions of Khalkha troops, but also to intimidate the Mongols and neutralize
continuing sentiment for a separation and alliance with a Greater Mongolia.
Such an occupation by a large number of undisciplined Chinese troops would in
deed have been a great plague to the area, but it was avoided through the media
tion of Kharachin leaders in Peking who were able to obtain a special ordinance
from President Yuan Shih-k'ai. This document confirmed that the Mongol leaders
and their people were not involved in any political movement and that Chinese
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This measure avoided certain suffer

The neighboring banner of East Khauchid (Hochit), whose ruling prince had
migrated with many of his people into Outer Mongolia to join the independence
movement, was left without any administration. The most pressing problem in
this banner, after Shilin-ghol's failure to break away from China, was to restore
order and to create a new administrative structure recognized by Peking, since
the area was to remain within the sphere of Chinese power. The task fell to
Sungjinpangchugh, younger brother of the jasagh who had fled. Again through
the mediation of the Kharachin, Lobsangchoijur, the young prince Sungjingwangchugh
was recognized by the Peking government and confirmed as the new jasagh of the
banner.

The Key Role of Kharachin Banner and Prince Gungsangnorbu
In any assessment of Inner Mongolia's response to the Mongolian independence
movement, a key role is played by the ICharachin banner of Josotu league. Its
leaders were among the most experienced and sophisticated. They had the longest
contact with the Chinese and had good connections in Peking. These factors which
made the Kharachin prominent were resented by other Mongols but were important in
each crisis when the necessity arose of dealing with the Chinese. In this quarter
of Mongolia the situation was particularly complex. And primary focus is best
given to Gungsangnorbu, prince of Kharachin, head of the Josotu league and the
most progressive prince in Inner Mongolia. He was the first to establish modern
schools, visited Japan in 19C3 and was generally a pioneer in the modernization
of Inner Mongolia.
In the crisis which was mounting in the fall of 1911 with Cuter Mongolia
moving toward independence and with increased Chinese revolutionary activity,
Gungsangnorbu was caught in a dilemma. He was concerned with Mongolia's fate,
but he was naturally even more concerned for the people of his own banner and
the surrounding region of southeastern Mongolia—Josotu, Juu-uda, and Jerim.
Here the image of the Chinese revolutionaries was most radical, and he was de
cidedly opposed to any new regime in China dominated by revolutionaries.
The Wuhan mutiny on Cctober 1C, 1911, which sparked the revolution, was fol
lowed by discussions at court regarding the fate of the Manchu dynasty. The
Mongol princes, mainly Ghonchoghsurung of Bintu, Palta of Torghud and Bodisu of
Khorchin, Gungsangnorbu, Nayantu of Khalkha, representing the sentiment of many
Mongols, strenuously opposed a Manchu abdication. Gungsangnorbu made it known
that if the Manchus surrendered to the revolutionaries, he would seriously con
sider proclaiming the independence of eastern Inner Mongolia. When the Manchu
abdication and Cuter Mongolian independence became a reality. Prince Gung real
ized that foreign assistance was absolutely necessary for the Mongols to resist
Chinese forces. There were but two possibilities, Russia or Japan.
Before seeking Japanese aid. Prince Gung, together with Prince Ghonchogsurung
of Bintu banner (Khorchin league), visited with the Russian deputy minister
resident in Peking and discussed the possibility of Russian assistance for Inner
Mongolian unity in a Greater Mongolia. This diplomat explained that Russia was
sympathetic to Inner Mongolian independence but that Russian assistance was out
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of the question—hecause of geopolitical factors Russian assistance would be
limited to Outer Mongolia. Prince Gung immediately contacted the Japanese to
gain their support. His liaison was Naniwa Kawashima, advisor to his Manchu
brother-in-law. Prince Su.22
Kawashima was a special agent of the Japanese military, and through him
Gungsangnorbu was successful in gaining the support of the Japanese foreign min
ister Yasuya Uchida and General Yasumasa Fukushima of the Japanese general staff,
whose contact with the Mongols extended back at least to 1900. Prince Gung ar
ranged to borrow 200,000 yen from Japan, secured on the development of the
mineral resources of Josotu league. Following Gungsangnorbu's lead. Prince
Jaghar of Baarin right banner (Juu-uda league) and Prince Ghongchoghsurung of
Bintu sought similar agreements with the Japanese.23
While it is not possible to follow the day-to-day actions and decisions of
Gungsangnorbu, it is clear that he had two major priorities. First, he wanted
to develop a new unity integrating the banners and leagues of southeastern Mon
golia (josotu, Juu-uda, and Jerim) preliminary to some greater alliance, and
second, to negotiate the support of Japan.
Immediately following the Manchu abdication on February 12, 1912 Prince Gung
returned to Kharachin and convened a conference at Ulaan-khada (Ch'ih-feng) with
leaders and delegates from the various banners of the three leagues of south
eastern Mongolia. As a key leader and spokesman in the discussions he made it
clear that he favored separation from China and unification in a Greater Mon
golia. 2^ Another strong leader at the conference was Yao-shan, a commoner from
Keshigten banner (Juu-uda league), who also supported a move for independence.25
Fragmentary reports of the conference confirm that most of the Inner Mongolian
princes were ambivalent about independence, more precisely that they were appre
hensive about separation from China. If such a move were successful and all
lived happily ever after there would be virtually no objection. But if a Greater
Mongolia {Biigude Mongghol) was to be a romantic dream crushed by Chinese armies
all would be lost, including their official rank, personal wealth and the luxuri
ous life most had gained from their economic contacts with the Chinese world,
mainly from the lease or sale of land. They were emotionally attracted to a
united Mongolia but restrained by rational considerations which were usually
overriding. Their natural impulse was to pursue independence as proposed by
Prince Gung. At the same time they realized that such a move was dangerous be
cause their territories were in southern Inner Mongolia, close to the political
seat of Chinese power and such military garrisons as Mukden and Cheng-te.
They favored establishing close relations with the Urga government. A unifica
tion of all Mongolia on the cultural basis of language, religion and tradition
appealed to them but their national consciousness was weak. The independence
movement predated the real rise of a Mongolian nationalism, and narrow, regional
loyalties exhibited themselves. The concept of a unified nation state was for
eign to them. The Naiman prince, among others, voiced the opinion that Prince
Gung or he himself should become khan (emperor) of Mongolia and not a Tibetan
monk like the Jebtsundamba Living Buddha. The Ulaan-khada conference failed to
produce any definitive agreements, and action was suspended until it was clear
as to what support was forthcoming from Japan.
Prince Gimg was disappointed at the indecisive action of the Ulaan-khada

Inner and Outer Mongotia, 1911-1914

97

conference; nevertheless he dispatched a personal emissary, Lohsangchoijur, to
Outer Mongolia to establish contact with the new government.
Meanwhile Altanochir (Chin-yiin-ch'ang) was sent to the Japanese base at Dairen
to obtain weapons according to agreements made in January 1912. Altanochir was
successful in obtaining military supplies which were transported by railroad to
Cheng-chia-t*un. From here the materiel was to be further transported by oxcarts,
but the operation was almost immediately attacked by Chinese forces, several men
were killed and Altanochir barely escaped after a harrowing experience.2° This
was but one of a series of events that scuttled further attempts to effectively
unite and arm the Josotu, Juu-uda and Jerim leagues for the crisis and to take
them out of China's orbit and into a new Mongolian state.
A most serious problem was the loss of Japanese support that was crucial for
the success of any movement. The Japanese were initially skeptical of Yiian
Shih-k'ai and the new Republic of China but soon moved to support his plan for a
new imperial dynasty. At the same time, the Japanese were also involved with
Chang Tso-lin, soon to emerge as the strongman over eastern Inner Mongolia and
all Manchuria. A course of action supporting either Yuan Shih-k'ai or Chang
Tso-lin was inconsistent with a policy of supporting Mongolian separatist move
ments. Ambitious lower-level Japanese like Kawashima continued to support the
Mongols, but that was not enough to tip the scales in favor of Mongolian inde
pendence.
Meanwhile, Gungsangnorbu was indirectly associated with the Tsung-she-tang,
the Manchu restoration movement of his brother-in-law. Prince Su, but this was
a peripheral movement which needs no detailed description here. It is reported
that even Prince Gung's relations with his wife were strained because he was
interested in Mongolian independence while she was more interested in a Manchu
restoration.
As Yuan Shih-k'ai consolidated his control in China, it soon became unavoid
able or expedient for Gungsangnorbu to respond to Yuan's summons to go to Peking.
With this move and Prince Gung's immediate involvement in Peking political life
although continuing his efforts for the welfare of the Mongols, the chances of
the three southern leagues of eastern Mongolia to join with Khalkha and the
Jebtsundamba's new government virtually evaporated. First Japanese support was
lost and then the major leader of the Inner Mongolian movement.
One key was that the mainline of Japanese policy was still controlled by
cautious elder statesmen and senior officers; the yoiing officer expansionists
had not yet come on the scene. Actually Japan's relations with Gungsangnorbu
and the Mongols in 1911-12 foreshadowed their policy in the 1930s and 19^0s.
But in both situations Mongolia was subordinated to Japan's interests in China
and Manchuria.

Other Kharaohin Leaders Involved in the Movement
At least three prominent Kharachin Mongols were directly or indirectly in
volved in the Outer Mongolian movement. The first to leave Kharachin and even
tually become a sojourner in Urga was Sodnam, who had broken with the banner head
over problems arising from Chinese settlement of Mongolian land. He then became
involved as a reporter and editor of a Mongolian newspaper in Hailar.2T Sodnam
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was followed dy Khaisan, a strong promoter of Mongolian independence, and then
by Lobsangchoijur, representative of Prince Gungsangnorbu.
Khaisan's departure for Outer Mongolia was symptomatic of the problem of
several Inner Mongolian leaders. He held an official position in Kharachin
{meiren?) and became involved in the confrontation between the Mongols and the
Chinese settlers over land problems. It must be borne in mind that as recently
as 1891 there had occurred a major uprising of the Chinese Chin-tan-tao, result
ing in the massacre of tens of thousands of people in Kharachin, Tumet and neigh
boring areas of the Josotu and Juu-uda leagues. In this conflict the influential
Chinese leader Chang Lien-sheng was arrested and apparently quite brutally inter
rogated by Khaisan. Subsequently Chang committed suicide, and officials in the
neighboring Chinese districts brought charges against the Mongols. Khaisan,
fearing for his safety, fled to Urga.
While in Urga Khaisan became an active promoter of Mongolian independence and
later deputy war minister under Prince Khandadorji, the real spirit behind the
move for independence. Because of his excellent command of the Chinese language
Khaisan, assisted by a fellow Kharachin, Sodnam, drafted many official memoranda
for the new government's correspondence with the Chinese.^8
Later, as factions and problems arose in the politics of Urga, Khandadorji
was poisoned and Khaisan returned to his native Kharachin and eventually took up
residence in Peking. Here Yiian Shih-k'ai, new president of the Republic of China,
awarded him the rank of beise, one grade higher than the rank of hung conferred
upon him in Outer Mongolia. In his later years in Peking he was noted for his
scholarly work, particularly a Chinese-Mongol dictionary published under the title
Wu-fang yuan-yin, a rather complex dictionary that classified Chinese characters
according to their soiind and tone pattern.
Lobsangahoijur's Mission to Urga^^
Prince Gung's envoy to the new Urga government and the story of the mission
itself are both worthy of note. Lobsangchoijur was no ordinary figure when he
was welcomed in Urga by the new khan. His family had served the Kharachin ban
ner as an administrator (jakiraghohi) for eight generations. Lobsangchoijur
himself had been a lama leading a monastic life until he was in his forties, and
he was the temple abbot (da-Zama) when he left the monastery to take up a secular
career. He soon became well known through his negotiations with the Li-fan yuan,
as an interpreter and advisor to the prominent Manchu Prince Su, and as an ad
visor and representative of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet. He also became
prominent in Peking in later years as an appointed member of various parliamen
tary assemblies.
After the Ulaan-khada conference, in order to keep open various options and
courses of action. Prince Gung dispatched Lobsangchoijur as his personal repre
sentative to establish ties with the new Urga government and to officially offer
his regards to the Jebtsundamda as the new chief of state. Traveling through
Harbin and Siberia he arrived in Urga and immediately contacted an intimate
friend and fellow bannerman, Duke Khaisan who, as already mentioned, then served
as deputy war minister to the famous Khandadorji.
Lobsangchoijur was welcomed by the Jebtsundamba and other officials in a
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series of important talks and ceremonies. The most significant outcome of the
meetings was a proposal hy the Urga government to appoint Gungsangnorhu of
Kharachin as governor of the six leagues and forty-nine banners of Inner Mon
golia. Lohsangchoijur was requested to transmit the official seal of appoint
ment and office back to Prince Gung, but he hesitated. His observations of the
situation during his stay in Urga had left him with very negative impressions
and a pessimistic view of the future of the new regime. He was also certainly
aware of the dilemma of the Inner Mongolian banners and the unpromising outcome
of the Ulaan-khada conference.
Consequently, while it would be an honor for^
his banner head to have a prominent position in a new Greater Mongolia, he dip
lomatically declined the delicate responsibility. He informed the Boghdo Khan's
government that he would convey their wishes to Gungsangnorhu and persuade him
to come personally to accept the seal or to make some other arrangement.
While in Urga Logsangchoijur lost hope that a new day was really dawning for
the Mongols after having witnessed the disunity among the leaders and the general
political and economic chaos in the capital. An added factor in his particular
case was his impressions of the Lamaist chvirch. Having spent much of his life
as a lama, he felt a strong commitment to Buddhism. But he was disillusioned
and critical of the Boghdo Khan who was supposed to be a holy lama, but who had
a wife, was too political and generally had a bad reputation for being involved
in scandalous activities.
His friend Khaisan, who was much more committed to the cause
and the new government, was very eager for Inner Mongolia to be
movement, and it was apparently on his recommendations that the
proposed to give official seals to Prince Gungsangnorhu as head

of independence
involved in the
new government
of Inner Mon

golia.
Thus while Khaisan and some other Inner Mongolian patriots stayed on in Outer
Mongolia, Lohsangchoijur returned to his native area. In time he became involved
in the life of the comm\inity of Mongol officials and leaders in Peking while
maintaining his strong concern for the welfare of the Mongols. He realized that
it was necessary for those Mongols close to China to accommodate to the economic
and political realities in their relationship to China. In a sense he person
ified the problem of most of Inner Mongolia, attracted to a new hope but even
tually forced to accommodate to China.
The international context of the Mongolian independence movement was decisive,
as Russia and China blocked the legitimate interests of the Mongols and as Japan
failed to be supportive, but the internal military, political and economic factors
noted above were also crucial though less well known.
With Inner Mongolia's failiire to join a new independent Mongolia, settlement
with the Chinese was negotiated mainly through Kharachin leadership. It was
these Mongols who tended to be most important in many key institutions and move
ments concerned with Inner Mongolia in this century. While they have been crit
icized at times, it was this group of Mongol leaders who won many Important con
cessions from the Chinese and continued to speak for the Mongols under overwhelm
ing difficulties.
Kharachin Mongols became the leaders of the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry in
Peking, set up soon after the revolution of 1911 to administer affairs in China s
border areas. They were also successful in organizing the Mongolian-Tibetan
Academy in Peking which trained h\indreds of leaders for all of Mongolia. Much
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of Kharachin lobbying was done through the Mongolian Association of Allied
Princes and Nobles {Meng-ku wang-kung lien-ho-hui), a quasi-political organiza
tion in Peking.
In the mid-twenties a Kharachin Mongol, Pai-yiin-ti, was the
head of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party {Nei-Meng-ku kuo-mintang), and a capable representative of this group, Wu-ho-ling, led the Mongolian
delegation in 1928 to negotiate a new policy or settlement for Inner Mongolia
with the new Nanking government and the leaders of the ruling Kuomintang. In
the 1930s and 19^0s men from this same group were strong supporters of the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Movement led by the Shilin-ghol prince Demchugdungrub, and
they held important positions in the Kalgan Mongolian government until its de
mise in 19^5.
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THE INNER MONGOLIAN RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE REPUBLIC, 1911-1917
Sechin Jagchid
Brigham Young University

After the outbreak of the Opium War, and especially during the latter half of
the nineteenth century, the political environment of continental East Asia
changed considerably. The power of the Western imperialists and Tsarist Russia
expanded to both China and Mongolia. The Manchu defeat in that war created hard
ships for Chinese peasants, and the Ch'ing dynasty replaced its ban on Chinese
migration into Mongolian pasture lands with a positive policy of encouraging
such migration in order to fortify against the Russian threat and ease the sit
uation inside China. In doing so, however, the Ch'ing violated the Mongolian
people's right to a livelihood in their own homeland. The dynasty placed the
better grazing areas under Chinese occupation while undermining the Mongolian
"feudalistic" league and banner organizations through establishing Chinese-style
local governments under the pretext of administering the affairs of the Chinese
settlers. The ensuing resentment and growing sense of instability gave rise to
anti-Manchu movements among the Mongol nobility. A Mongolian volunteer force
under Prince Senggerinchin did assist the Manchus against the T'aip'ing rebel
lion {I85O-I86U), but thereafter Mongolian rebels, recorded in Chinese materials
as "Mongolian bandits," became a continuous phenomenon.
Also during this period, the Ch'ing court witnessed a gradual but steady de
cline in the number and frequency of visits by Mongolian nobles coming to render
personal homage to the Manchu emperor. This was especially marked after the
Boxer Rebellion in 1900.
The Ch'ing's "self-strengthening movement" to modernize the country generally
had little influence on the Mongol nobility. Yet it did serve as a stimulus to
some ambitious leaders, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin, who sought
knowledge and assistance outside Mongolia.
In 1903 he visited Japan to observe
the effects of the Meiji Restoration, and after his return he established his
own modern schools for both boys and girls and a military academy. He also ad
vocated changes in the Manchu administration in Mongolia, but his proposals
were rejected by the court. On the contrary, court policy toward Mongolia
changed for the worse, increasing Manchu-Chinese domination of decision-making
as to Mongolian affairs which, of course, only fueled Mongolian ire against the
Manchus. For example, even in Prince Gungsangnorbu's Kharachin Right Banner
several leaders had already left for Urga where they joined the independence
movement within a short time.
In 1911, the independence movement was about to be inaugurated in Outer Mon
golia, while in China the revolution headed by Sun Yat-sen began to make some

''This paper is a draft of research in progress, a collaborative work of the
author with Paul Hyer, Brigham Young University. Accordingly, revision and
documentation is yet to be finished.
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progress. During this period, the Ch’ing court was nominally ruled by a threeyear old emperor, P'u-yi, and the Empress Dowager Lung-yii who had neither politic^ experience nor ambition. The real power was I-k'uang, or Prince Ch'ing,
but he gradually transferred power to the shrewd Chinese minister Yuan Shih-k’ai
who eventually betrayed his Manchu lords and made himself the first president
ot the Republic of China in 1912.
The slopn of the Chinese national revolution was "expel the barbarians,
restore China, build the republic, and divide the farm lands equally." Because
Chinese revolutionary proclamations lumped the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Ch’ing
pasties together, Mongols who were literate in Chinese realized that the rev
olution portended disaster for the Mongols as well as for the Manchus. In addition, the word_ revolution," which in Chinese is ko-ming and which should have
been translated into Mongolian as khub'Lsghnl, was transliterated into ghaminq
or gem-ing in Mongolian. These latter terms are defined as a group of people un
lawfully attempting to overthrow proper institutions, to implement an illegiti+
destroy all established values and morality, aiming especially
at the destruction of the orthodox religion. Buddhism. A fear of revolutionary
hinese attacks on their lifestyle and religion generated among the Mongols fear
ana hatred of the so-called ghaming movement. Even during the 1930s, after the
rise of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement, the herdsmen of Inner Mongolia
were still fearful of the pernicious influence of ghaming and of Chinese pene
tration into Inner Mongolian pastures. Many publications in the present-day
ngoian People s Republic continue to use the word ghaming or geming to repre-

LTgoS\n SirainS!
On October 10, I911 the Chinese declared an end to the Ch'ing dynasty and a
Eichtw''^+ °
Wu-ch'ang. Shortly thereafter, the
Eighth Jebtsmdamba Khutughtu, the Living Buddha of Urga, supported by Outer
Mongolia nobles and people, declared Mongolian independence. Sun Yat-sen,
just retm-ned from abroad, was elected provisional president on January 1, 1912
and on that same day in Nanking he declared the founding of the Republic of
China.
In the midst of these drastic changes, the empress-dowager Lung-yii ap
pointed Yuan Shih-k ai to negotiate peace with Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary
gover^ent. Delegates of the two sides met at Shanghai in mid-December I9II to
consider terms. The talks focused of course on the terms for abdication and
treatment of the Manchu imperial household after the establishment of the
republic. The delegates from the South demanded that Mongolia be made the equiv
alent of a province, but this was vetoed by the Northern delegates. After a
finally concluded that all Manchus, Mongols, Moslems,
and Tibetans should be treated as equal to the Chinese so as to protect their
private property and preserve ranks among the nobility.
movement in Outer Mongolia and the anti-Chinese movement in
Tibet drew the attention of the newly established provisional government in
Nanking to the problems created by early revolutionary declarations and persuaded
It to consider some concessions. In Sun Yat-sen's declaration at his inauguraprovisional president, he proclaimed that "to unify China, Manchuria,
Mongolia, Moslem lands, and Tibet into one nation and to imify the Chinese
Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans as one man, this should be regarded as
true unification of the nation.”
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In Inner Mongolia, the independence movement in Urga had great influence on
the people and their leaders, especially since it had the prestigious personal
support of the Eighth debtsundamba, who had been proclaimed the Boghoda Khan
(Holy Emperor) of Mongolia. After the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty, many
Inner Mongols looked to the North. At the same time, Mongolian nobles in Peking
organized the Meng-ku wang-kung lien-ho-hui (Association of Mongolian Princes
and Dukes) in an attempt to influence the Shanghai talks. Prince Nayantu, who
was originally from Outer Mongolia, acted as spokesman for the twenty-four Ban
ners (eight Manchu banners, eight Mongolian banners and eight Chinese banners)
by conveying their collective decision to support the Manchu emperor. This
same sort of anti-republicanism characterized the attitudes of Mongolian leaders
in Peking, which also influenced the talks in Shanghai. These factors eventually
prompted the southern delegates to explain that the revolution was not limited
to achieving narrowly defined Han-Chinese aims; rather, its purpose was to es
tablish a commonwealth of Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans.
They also made it clear that the newly established Chinese government would
honor the ranks and positions of the Mongolian nobility.
At the same time a group of Mongolian princes in Peking allied Itself
with the Manchu Prince Su (Shan-dh’i) and others in an attempt to sustain the
court by force of arms. But, soon realizing that the dynasty was doomed, they
turned to the Japanese for assistance.
On January 17, 1912 a conference was held in the presence of the empress
dowager and Manchu and Mongolian princes and nobles, such as Prince Nayantu of
Khalkha, Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin, Prince Palta of Torghud, Prince
Ghonchungsurung of Bintu, and Duke Bodisu of Khorchin. At that time, the Mon
golian nobles all voiced their strong opposition to the abdication.
On January 28, Sun Yat-sen, as provisional president of the newly-established
republic, sent a telegram to the Mongolian nobles in Peking explaining the value
of the commonwealth of the five peoples, pointing out the importance of a com
mon defense against Russia, and inviting the Mongols to send a delegate to Nan
king to participate in the newly established government. On February 3 the
empress dowager had the young emperor P'u-yi declare his abdication which took
place on the 12th. On February 5 the Senate in Nanking passed a measure, advo
cated by Sun Yat-sen, which (l) placed the Chinese and all other nationalities
on an equal basis, (2) allowed for succession of rank and title among the
princes and dukes, and (3) provided for maintenance of religious prerogatives
among the Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans. On February 11 Sun Yat-sen
as president promulgated the provisional constitution of China. Article 3 de
clared that "the territory of the Republic of China includes twenty-two provinces.
Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Kokonor (Ch'inghai)." On February 13 Sim Yatsen resigned as provisional president, and the Senate elected Yiian Shih-k'ai as
his successor.
In his oath of office Yuan used the words "the five great peoples
(Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans) all enjoy happiness and priv
ilege. "
As these events unfolded in Peking and Nanking, Prince Gungsangnorbu returned
to his own banner, Kharachin, and soon gathered the leaders of the three eastern
leagues of Inner Mongolia, Jerim, Juu-uda, and Josuto, at Ulaan-khada (Ch’ih-feng),
where he tried to persuade them to organize an independence movement in Inner
Mongolia. Before this conference. Prince Gungsangnorbu had contacted the Japanese
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and had already received a positive response from the Japanese military author
ities. His own banner, however, was located too close to Peking for it to act,
and after the two and one-half centuries of enforced fragmentation under the
Manchu, it proved too difficult to organize the other banners into an effective
alliance. Nevertheless, the prince himself still wanted to pursue his plans
for independence.
He sent envoys to Dairen to obtain weapons with which to
equip his own troops and simultaneously dispatched his delegate, Lobsangchoijur
(the author's father), to visit Urga and contact leaders there to learn whether
Inner and Outer Mongolia could really be unified. Meanwhile, the group sent to
Dairen for equipment was attacked at Cheng-chia-tixn and the weapons were con
fiscated by the Chinese army. Before his delegate to Urga could return. Prince
Gungsangnorbu was convinced or forced by Yuan Shih-k'ai to proceed to Peking,
and his independence movement came to an end.

At about the same time the Manchu noble Shan-ch'i, or Prince Su, also escaped
from Peking under Japanese protection and arrived in Dairen where he established
the Tsung-she tang, the Loyalist Party, in an attempt to restore the Ch'ing
dynasty. The movement enjoyed support from conservative Mongols in Inner Mongolia
as well as from conservative Manchus and Chinese. Among Mongol supporters was
the famous "Mongolian bandit" Babujab. Although Gungsangnorbu was related by
marriage to the Manchu prince he did not, at least not openly, participate in
this loyalist movement. His own movement was aimed at securing independence
for Inner Mongolia or for a Greater Mongolia including the Outer Mongols. Prince
Ghonchungsurung of Bintu was also well known for his progressive policies, partic
ularly his establishment of schools but, convinced that the cause of Inner Mon
golian independence was hopeless, he left his own banner for Outer Mongolia.
This was a very frustrating and crucial period in Inner Mongolian history.
Those who had tired of Manchu domination and possessed no faith in the Chinese
revolutionaries all looked northward, and some of them journeyed to Urga to join
the great movement. This group included the Prince of Khauchid of Shilinghol
League, the anti-Chinese guerrilla leader Toghto Taiji of Jerim League, Khaisan
of Kharachin and others. In addition, the entire Hulun-buir district of north
east Inner Mongolia declared independence and joined the Urga government. The
nobles of Ulanchab League under the leadership of Prince Lhawangnorbu of Dorbed
were also antagonized by the ghaming and showed strong interest in membership
in the Urga movement.
In Peking, Yuan Shih-k'ai invested his resources shrewdly in the Mongolian
situation and, of course, used Mongolian nobles as political capital. Being
forced to deal with the problem of Outer Mongolian independence, he moderated
his attitude toward the Inner Mongols in order to draw Outer Mongolia into his
camp. It was for this reason that he regularly instructed the delegate from
the Ch'ing court to discuss better future treatment of Mongolian nobles in talks
with the delegate of the revolutionary government. At the same time he used
proclamations by the Association of Mongolian Princes and Dukes in Peking to
illustrate their trust in him and their demands for special treatment. In this
way he was able to win over several Mongol leaders in Peking such as Prince
Nayantu, who was originally very hostile toward Yuan and strongly opposed to
abdication. Prince Amurlingghui, the grandson of Senggerinchin of the Jerim
League, and other minor Mongol nobles. These shifts caused the Association of
Mongolian Princes and Dukes to issue a public telegram on February 10 to
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Chinese authorities in both Nanking and Peking recommending Yuan Shih-k'ai for
president. On April 1* Yuan Shih-k'ai appointed Amurlingghui director of the Office
of Mongolian Affairs. On the tenth of that month the Association of the Alliance
of the Five Great Peoples was established in Nanking, and three days later Yuan
issued his statement accepting and promoting intermarriage of the five great
peoples. On February 22 he declared that the republic would treat all citizens
equally, tolerating no distinctions between the Chinese and the so-called sub
ordinates. Accordingly, the Li-fan Yuan was formally abolished. On May 13 the
Peking Government declared the creation of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Bureau
to function iinder the prime minister's office. By July 2k Yuan Shih-k'ai again
declared that this bureau should report to the prime minister directly, and Yuan
soon appointed Yao Hsi-kuang deputy director to oversee the affairs of the bureau.
At the end of the Ch'ing dynasty Yao had been involved in Mongolian matters, but
he was decidedly chauvinistic. He had sought cultivation of Mongolian lands and
Chinese migration into those lands and to weaken and replace the Mongolian
feudalistic-autonomous administrations by placing Mongolia directly under the
Manchu-Chinese administration, similar to other provinces and prefectures. As
a consequence, the Mongols hated him. Unfortunately, his doctrines have served
as the blueprint for China's Mongolia policy up to the present time.
On August 10 the Peking government promulgated the Organization Law of the
Parliament of the Republic of China which provided for twenty-seven Mongolian
members in the senate and the same number in the lower house.
Candidates could,
however, qualify for membership only if they were at least twenty-five years
old and could speak Chinese, which eliminated most Mongols from membership in
the Chinese parliament. It was not long before Yuan Shih-k'ai realized that
these provisions, coupled with his appointment of Yao Hsi-kuang, would not be
welcomed by the Mongols. At the same time, though, he realized that the situa
tion in Outer Mongolia was subversive to Chinese interests, so he ordered his
foreign ministry to declare that Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet were integral
parts of China and would not be permitted to conclude treaties or borrow money
from any foreign countries. This pronouncement set forth not only a defensive
policy against the subversive influence of Urga but was aimed as well at pre
venting future potentially subversive contacts between Inner Mongolian leaders
and foreign nations, such as those between Gungsangnorbu and Japan earlier. In
addition, on August 19 Yuan Shih-k'ai promulgated the Regulations for the Treat
ment of Mongols, which recognized the governing power of the Mongolian princes
over the political administration of their banners, as had been the case for
over two centuries, and furthermore recognized the ranks, titles and special
privileges of the Mongolian nobility.
It was about this time or earlier that Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin
arrived in Peking and was soon involved with the officialdom of the new republic.
On August 2k Sun Yat-sen, the former provisional president of the Nanking govern
ment, arrived in Peking. The next day the party headed by Sun Yat-sen, the
Tung-meng-hui, joined several other parties in a special conference and reorgan
ized as the Kuomintang. Gungsangnorbu attended this political gathering and was
elected a member of the executive board, along with Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing,
Sung Chiao-Jen, Wang Ch'ung-hui, and several others. On November 3 Gungsangnorbu,
Huang Hsing, Sung Chlao-Jen, Wang Ch'ung-hui and others composed a letter to Sun
Yat-sen formally electing him chairman of this newly organized party. The inti
macy of the relationship between this progressive Mongolian noble and the leader
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of the Chinese revolution of course prodded the politically astute Yuan Shihk'ai into action. On September 10 Yuan appointed Gungsangnorhu director of the
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Bureau in order to draw him away from Sun and to at
tract the support of the Mongolian nobility.
Prince Utai of Khorchin Right Flank Front Banner of Jerim League was a rebel
lious pro—Russian Mongolian leader even before the end of the Ch'ing dynasty.
After the republic was established, his suspicion of any new revolution and
government caused him to organize militant independence activities directed
against the Chinese. He joined with Duke Rashiminjur of the Khorchin Right
Flank Rear Banner to "evacuate" all the Chinese settlers who migrated into these
two banners under pressure from the viceroy of Manchuria at the end of Ch'ing.
They then attacked two Chinese prefectures, Tao-nan and K'ai-lu, that had been
organized in the lands of the Mongolian leagues and banners. They occupied the
towns and destroyed them but were soon engaged in battles with Manchu-Chinese
forces from Mukden, Kirin, and Heilungchlang provinces at whose hands they were
defeated. Both Utai and Rashiminjur escaped to Urga to join the Outer Mon
golian government. During the same time, the two Chinese cities Hu-lun and Lu
pin in the Hulun-buir area were also attacked and occupied by the Mongols.
Later, on October 7, demonstrating the Chinese government's intransigence in
refusing to compromise with anti-republican Mongol movements, Yiian Shih-k'ai
stripped Utai of all ranks and titles and appointed another noble as head of
the banner. On October 28 Yuan Shih-k'ai, to placate angry Mongols, removed
Yao Hsl-kuang from the deputy director's position in the Mongolian-Tibetan Bu
reau. He also appointed Prince Amurlingghul to proceed to the Jerim League to
discuss problems in that region, persuade Mongolian leaders to support the
Peking government, and in particular to encourage them to accept the new fivecolor national flag (five peoples) and obey the new republic's law forbidding
Mongols to buy weapons from other countries.
Although this sort of proselytizing might have somewhat expanded the Peking
government's influence among the Mongols, its general thrust was still negative.
On November 17 Ghombujab, the tusalaghohi (the head official under the prince)
of Jarud Left Banner of Juu-uda League, joined officials and people of the Jarud
Right Banner in killing the prince and his followers who were for the republic
and protective of the Chinese settlers. They occupied Chinese centers, includ
ing the city of K'ai-lu, and destroyed them, but within a short time a Chinese
army arrived from Jehol and routed the Mongols who escaped to Outer Mongolia.
As a former imperial official. Yuan Shih-k'ai was thoroughly familiar with
the Ch'ing court's Mongol policies and thus able to adopt and implement the same
shrewd ploys. His first move was to promote in rank and title all Mongol nobles
who supported him, while his second maneuver was to take full advantage of the
Mongols' devotion to Buddhism. Near the end of September he invited two Mon
golian high lamas, Jangjia Khutughtu and Kanjurwa Khutughtu, to come to Peking
where he treated them with great respect in order to pacify recalcitrant Mongols.
The problem, however, was that these two revered lamas held differing opinions.
At that time Jangjia Khutughtu was still quite young and strongly influenced by
his pro-Chinese disciples. On the other hand, Kanjurwa Khutughtu was possessed
of strongly nationalistic feelings and was decidedly pro-Urga. Until his death,
Jangjia Khutughtu acted as a loyal instrument for the Chinese in their attempts
to mollify the Mongols, while Kanjurwa Khutughtu was eventually assassinated
because of his pro-Outer Mongolian attitude.
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In western Inner Mongolia the leaders of Ulanchab League sided quite clearly
with Urga. When on orders from the Peking government the Chinese general of
Suiyuan, Chang Shao-tseng, contacted the Ulanchab leaders, they openly informed
him of their belief that the new ghaming republic would destroy Mongolian tra
ditions and their pastoral lifestyle and force them to abandon Buddhism. In
response, the Peking government again promulgated the new principles for the
treatment of Mongols, giving special emphasis to the government's willingness
to honor the Mongols' devotion to Buddhism. Finally, by the end of 1912, princes
of the Ulanchab League became convinced of the hopelessness of unifying Inner
and Outer Mongolia and reluctantly turned to the Chinese. Greatly encouraged
by this. Yuan Shih-k'ai promptly elevated all nobles in rank. As a special ges
ture designed to encourage Mongol acceptance of the new government. Yuan ap
pointed most of the Mongolian leaders in Peking to the position of Yu-wei shih,
or officers in the president's special guards. Even this was a restoration or
continuation of the old Manchu policy of assigning Mongolian princes to positions
of imperial service before the emperor himself. By the end of the year. Yuan
Shih-k'ai had authorized special promotions for Prince Nayantu and Prince Gungsangnorbu to reward their help in establishing the republic.
On November 3, 1912 the Russo-Mongolian Treaty was signed in Urga, evidence
of the fact not only that the Russians wished to reinforce the Outer Mongolian
separation from China, but also that they refused to allow the Outer Mongolian
government -to make further moves toward merger or unification with Inner Mongolia
This treaty represented a turning point for the Inner Mongols who had been look
ing toward Urga with increasing anxiety. It may also have been the reason why
the Ulanchab leaders abandoned their pro-Urga attitude in favor of a compromise
with Peking.

1913, known in the lunar calendar as "the year of black ox," was another very
crucial year for the Inner Mongols. It saw numerous skirmishes and intrusions
by both Chinese forces into remote districts of Inner Mongolia and by forces
from Outer Mongolia. Among Mongols that chaotic period became known as "the
t\umioil of the year of the ox." The area first disturbed was in Shilin-ghol
League. As mentioned earlier, after independence was declared in Urga many
Shilin-ghol leaders joined the movement; some even migrated to Urga in 1911,
and the influence of the independence movement persisted in the area through
1912. In 1913 the head of the league. Prince Yangsangjab of Abagha Left Ban
ner, was arrested by Outer Mongolian forces because of his anti-Urga attitude.
Yangsangjab was a conservative individual always loyal to the Manchu emperor.
Even after the abdication he was convinced that the Peking regime would govern
the Middle Kingdom of which Mongolia was a part, and he refused to join the
Outer Mongolian government. Moreover, he was convinced that there was no hope
for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. He reasoned, therefore, that
it would be better for Shilin-ghol to remain neutral or somewhat pro-Peking.
After he was taken to Urga he was questioned and imprisoned although, of course,
the Urga government later freed him. At the same time Outer Mongolian troops
passed through the eastern part of the league from (Jjumuchin to the Dolonor area,
which was located between the Shilin-ghol League and the Chakhar aimagh. Be
sides being an economic center, Dolonor was also the Holy Land of Mongolian Bud
dhism where the Kanjurwa Khutughtu and his temple were located.
In Chakhar Jodbajab, the canban of the Mingghan and the Darighanghai pastures,
the latter now known as the Suke-baator aimagh of the Mongolian People's Republic
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shared Yangsangjah’s conservative hent. When at the beginning of the independ
ence movement Darighanghai leaned toward Urga, Jodbajab made attempts to restore
it to his own administration by marching into Darighanghai, where he was captured
by Outer Mongolian authorities and imprisoned in Urga. Later he, too, was set
free, and in appreciation of his efforts the Peking government promoted him to
lieutenant-general. The efforts of those leaders who opposed Outer Mongolian
independence generally failed to alter the pro-Urga sympathies of the Inner Mon
golian people who found the turmoil generated by the gnaming particularly dis
gusting.
In Peking the situation was somewhat different. The government had been rec
ognized by many world powers and smaller nations because of the creation of an
elected parliament. Yet several of Yiian’s appointees among the Mongolian sen
ators and representatives were not even Mongols. Yiian naturally found it bene
ficial to have his own people occupy parliamentary seats, but the conspiracy
angered the Mongols and damaged their confidence in the new government.
Gungsangnorbu, with the support of Mongolian senators and delegates, intro
duced and engineered the passage of a resolution creating the Mongolian-Tibetan
Academy in Peking, his great dream since his return from Japan in 1903. He con
sidered education for Mongols to be of primary importance and believed that the
alternative would condemn them to backwardness and inferiority in the modern
world. While this first step toward modernization signaled progress for Inner
Mongolia, it became a personal stumbling block in his political life. Most
conservative Mongol leaders considered this a substantial step toward a revolu
tion that would damage or destroy the prerogatives of the Mongolian feudalistic
and religious hierarchy, and they were openly hostile to this farsighted prince.
Students at the academy were gradually introduced to democratic ideas and insti
tutions, and their new awareness encouraged them to struggle for the elimination
of Mongolian feudalistic institutions. They began to doubt whether this en- ^
lightened prince, Gungsangnorbu, would actually be willing to join them in t eir
struggle. As a result, a wedge was driven between Mongolian liberals and con
servatives with Gungsongnorbu in between, and the gap continued to grow.
The Peking government promulgated and rendered lip service to the Regulations
for the Treatment of Mongols and proclaimed its intent to protect traditional
Mongolian administrative institutions and power. However, it soon organized
Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan into three special administrative districts and
strengthened its administrative apparatus in those areas. The governors-general
of these three areas were generally personal supporters of Yuan Shih-k ai, and
they enjoyed a free hand in bringing more Chinese settlers and in widening the
reach of their Chinese administrations. Eastern Inner Mongolia fell under the
shadow of the three eastern provinces of Manchuria and their non-Mongolian ad
ministrative power and suffered even more. While the governors of the three
new special administrative districts were military or civilian holdovers from
the Ch'ing period, the leaders of the three Manchurian provinces were newly
emerged "heroes" who had been Chinese bandits whose attitudes toward the Mongols
were exceedingly harsh.
Because of this harshness a well-known "Mongolian bandit," Babujab, joined
the Tsung-she-tang, the Manchu loyalist party of Prince Su. He received Japanese
weapons and carried out a guerrilla campaign in eastern Inner Mongolia (eastern
Chakhar, northeastern Jehol, and parts of Kirin and Mukden provinces) and became
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one of the most outstanding "Mongolian bandits" during the early republican
period. Along with him there appeared many so-called Mongolian bandits in Man
churia and eastern Inner Mongolia who, though known as Mongols, were generally
Chinese. Babujab soon became famous throughout eastern Inner Mongolia. Those
who were suspicious of the republic or the infamous ghanttng and those who were
angered by Chinese settlement in Inner Mongolia rebelled around him. His po
litical goals were never clear. It is still not known whether he fought for
the restoration of the Ch'ing dynasty or against the Chinese settlers, or
whether he planned to Join Outer Mongolia. But his supporters grew in number
in the wake of his successful guerrilla engagements in the above-mentioned
districts. Finally, in 1916, as he approached the walls of the city of Lin-hsi,
a stronghold of the Chinese army and administration in northern Jehol, he was
unexpectedly killed. After his death his followers gradually dissolved until
only a group headed by his oldest son went to Outer Mongolia.
After the Year of the Ox, 1913, both Shilin-ghol and Chakhar became the site
of skirmishes between Chinese and Outer Mongolian troops. However, these en
gagements never gave rise to any events of great political significance. In
1917 in the Mingghan pasture of Chakhar a young official, Mukdenbu, unexpectedly
gathered several thousand Chakhar youths and declared independence. His group
soon took action and attacked Chinese forces in Kalgan, but this movement was
seemingly an isolated incident with little impact on Mongolian leaders in other
areas. The group was soon overwhelmed by superior Chinese forces from Kalgan,
and Mukdenbu was executed. This was the last ripple of the anti-republican
: military movements that had swept through Inner Mongolia.
■'

Just prior to this event, in Peking Yuan Shih-k'ai had defeated his major
political opponent. Sun Yat-sen, and had begun to establish himself as emperor
of the Middle Kingdom. Before taking any action, however, he had instructed
his supporters to generate public opinion favorable to him throughout Peking
and North China, and the Association of the Mongolian Princes and Dukes in
Peking became one of his prime tools. Through this association he encouraged
many Mongol leaders to express their desire for a restoration of the monarchy
with Yuan Shih-k’ai as emperor. Prince Nayantu, the leader of the group, be
came the movement’s leading proponent. Prince Gungsangnorbu, however, was
hesitant to become active in the campaign. His reluctance to participate en
thusiastically may have been due either to his personal association with Sun
Yat-sen or to his relatively liberal view of matters in general. Although he
concealed any forceful opposition he may have felt, neither did he actively
support the movement.
Aware of Yiian Shih-k’ai’s ambition, the Japanese government issued an ulti
matum to the Peking government known as the Twenty-One Demands. In accordance
with its secret treaty with Tsarist Russia, Japan forced China to recognize
eastern Inner Mongolia and southern Manchuria as special spheres of Japanese
privilege. This new diplomatic ingredient won the support of many Mongols, who
hoped to see greater Japanese intervention in eastern Inner Mongolia as a counter
weight to Chinese power. Of course,this expectation also met with disappoint-

j ment.
On December 12, 1915 Yuan Shih-k’ai proclaimed that he would accept the
people’s request and ascend the throne, but revolt soon erupted in southern
China, and most governors and military leaders in other provinces responded to
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the revolutionary party. Yuan Shih-k'ai was forced to abdicate, and he died
on June 5, 1916. During this short restoration of Chinese monarchism, Yuan
again manipulated Mongolian conservatives in Peking and tried to retain their
loyalty hy promoting them, hut his reign was so short that nothing of political
significance occurred in Inner Mongolia during that period.
After the death of Yiian Shih-k'ai China entered a new era, an era of warlordism. Until 1928 China had no unified government.
In North China warlords
appeared one after another. The warlord in Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, was es
pecially anxious to cultivate more Mongolian land for Chinese settlers and his
own followers, and the situation among the Mongols worsened considerably. Chi
nese warlords ignored Gungsangnorbu and his ideas, though he was retained as a
figurehead in Peking. The outbreak of World War I in Europe and the fall of
Tsarist Russia forced the Urga government to alter its policies. The agreement
between China, Russia and Mongolia, signed in Khyakhta on June 7, 1915, forced
the Urga government to renounce independence, but it was recognized by both
China and Russia as an autonomous territory under Chinese suzerainty. These
changes also forced the Inner Mongols to acknowledge Chinese domination of Mon
gol affairs. The Implications of this new political alignment and increasing
oppression by Chinese warlords were the major factors that stimulated organiza
tion of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, also known as the
Inner Mongolian Kuoraintang.
It tried to forge an alliance with the Outer Mon
golian People's Revolutionary Party to achieve full independence for Inner
Mongolia with the assistance of the Outer Mongolian party and government, the
Comintern and the Kuomlntang under Sun Yat-sen's leadership. All of these or
ganizations and events were influential to various degrees in the rise of the
autonomy movement of Inner Mongolia in 1933.

THE PREHISTORY OF MONGOLIA AND THE ROOTS OF MAN IN NORTH AMERICA
Georgeanne Lewis Reynolds
University of Connecticut

The contribution of Mongolia to the peopling of the New World is substantial..
Prehistoric cultural events, reflected in cultural remains, indicate Mongolia's
early, direct impact on Siberia and later, indirect impact on New World popula
tions. Prehistoric cultural remains in Mongolia share characteristics with
Siberia to the north and China to the south, yet their nature is distinctive,
reflecting man's adjustment to a harsh environment and his prehistoric contact
with neighboring ethnic groups.
The role of the environment cannot be underestimated in any study of Mongolian
history or prehistory.1 Climatic conditions, especially climatic changes, may
have been responsible in part for prehistoric fluctuations2 as well as historic
nomadic expansions and contractions.3 Man's relationship with the environment
was recognized by N. C. Nelson, archeologist for the American Museum of Natural
History's Central Asiatic Expedition during the 1920s. He noted that the quantity
and quality of cultural remains varied with the local environmental conditions.
The distribution of artifacts illustrated that "the relation between Nature and
primitive man is almost as close as is the relation between any other organism
and its environment."^
The Gobi desert and surrounding areas are not the most habitable regions of
the earth, yet they have been occupied more or less continuously since the Late,
and probably. Middle Pleistocene. Northern Mongolia aboriginally was less in
hospitable than it is today. It lay south of the ice sheets which covered Siberia.
During glacial maxima, Mongolia was probably too cold and dry to support human
occupation. It is therefore likely that it was first inhabited during a humid
phase, corresponding to the pluvials of glacial interstadials in Siberia.5
An early, widespread Paleolithic horizon is present in Mongolia. It consists
of a group of sites containing the Levallois-Mousterian technique of stone work
ing, a characteristic usually associated with the Middle Pleistocene. At Ottson—
Han't on the Chinese frontier, Okladnikov found Levallois disc-shaped cores as
well as the more specialized prismatic cores and the long, wide blades struck
from them.D On the basis of typology, he dated the site to between 50,000 and
Ho,000 years ago. The inhabitants may have been transitional between H,

neandei’tlvxZsnsis and H. sapiens.

Another Paleolithic location in this group,
Moil'tyn-am, near Karakorum, is one of the few stratified sites in Mongolia. The
combination of Levallois cores with prismatic cores was again found. Skreblos—
scrapers characteristic of the Siberian Paleolithic—indicate northern influence
in the assemblage, while choppers and chopping tools indicate Chinese and South
east Asian affinities. Kuitan-Bulak, near Choibalsan, may also belong to this
group.T

I

In the area between Ulan Nor and the Artza Bogdo mountains Nelson found a
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quarry-workshop belonging to a later phase of the Paleolithic. The surface scat
ter was incredibly widespread and dense. Nelson remarked that "the artifacts lay
scattered in such abundance that one could scarcely avoid stepping on them."®
The workshop artifacts consisted of scrapers, choppers and Mousteroid points.
The assemblage as a whole most closely resembles the Classic Mousterian tradition
0 the Middle Pleistocene. This stage also includes similar finds in the Orok
Nor region.y
It has been argued by Derevianko that the Levallois technique is probably in
digenous due to its wide distribution in Mongolia.10 Others favor a western
origin for this component.il Powers suggests that Mongolia was a contact zone
between western Mousterian technologies and the North Chinese pebble tool tradi
tion and that early stimulus from the west did occur.12 Because Mongolian Paleo
lithic sites include artifacts characteristic of western and southern cultures,
1 believe Powers' interpretation to be the most plausible.
The nature of the Mongolian Mesolithic is not fully understood. Chang notes
that assemblages are microlithic in nature,13 but Larichev sees nothing microlithic in sites of this age.l^ Okladnikov observes that the raw material avail
able in the Gobi consists in large part of small pebbles, which would lend a
microlithic aspect to assemblages but would not necessarily imply a microlithic
nature. 1-5
This controversy extends into the Neolithic. It is partly on the basis of this
criterion that the nature of and the distinction between the Mesolithic and the
Neolithic is blurred. One factor adding to the confusion is apparent regional
specialization.1° Assemblages in interior Mongolia are simple; along the Chinese
and Siberian borders, they display a greater range of artifact types. Regional
PJ^ol'a-bly reflect adaptations to local environments and do not neces
sarily imply different periods of time.
Archeological remains unfortunately do not clarify the problem. This is il
lustrated by the principal site of this period, Shabarakh-usu in the central Gobi.
Whether this stratified site is entirely Neolithic or contains a non-ceramic
Mesolithic layer has yet to be determined. Nelson and Maringer saw both com
ponents,^ but Soviet researchers, in an unpublished report, have apparently found
pottery in both levels.
As far as I know, the problem remains unresolved.
What can definitely be said about the Mongolian Neolithic? Nelson defined it
by the appearance of pottery, certain agricultural implements and arrow points,
reflecting a continuing dependence on hunting in combination with incipient agri
culture in northern Mongolia.19 The Neolithic is closely associated with con
temporary cultures in the Soviet Far East and the Baikal area—dwelling and
settlement patterns are similar, hearth arrangements are Identical, and distinct
similarities are present in prismatic cores and pottery.20 Furthermore, the
combination of tools made from large and small blades, as well as tools from
flakes, and the persistence of the Levadlois-Mousterian technique in Siberian
assemblages suggest ties to the south.21 a later Neolithic stage brought red
painted pottery, querns and pestles from China,but Siberian influence remained
dominant.
How can the overall prehistoric sequence be assessed? I suggest that Mongolia
was first inhabited during a humid interval during the Middle Pleistocene. Espe
cially arid areas were occupied only intermittently. Consequent periodic disper
sion of the inhabitants, as well as intrusions by outsiders, permitted cultural
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exchange. Mongolia seems to have come under the increasing influence of Siberia,
and there seems to be more communication between these two areas than with China.
The Mesolithic should not be defined in terms of microliths. Large blades are
found as well. Of the Neolithic, I would say that the stone tool inventory re
mains conservative and that it developed from local Mesolithic cultures. Agri
culture may be a product of stimulus diffusion from the south. Finally, I would
suggest several migrations during the Late Pleistocene and Early Holocene between
Siberia and Mongolia. These movements had Impact on the steppe and forest tribes
and this Impact was eventually felt in the New World.
The initial peopling of the New World is an intricate problem, involving many
points of origin, ethnic groups and time periods. Mongolian hunters did not
consciously migrate north and east to populate the New World. There were several
"haphazard" movements by people in response to changing environmental conditions
and to the migratory patterns of the fauna they depended on. I should like to
emphasize the point that there was no mass exodus from Asia to the New World at
any time. It would be better stated that at various times different people from
many areas of East Asia found their way to America.
Several migration routes can be distinguished. Miiller-Beck dates a movement
from the west at about 28,000 years ago.23 I suggest that the date of this mi
gration, which probably originated in Central Asia, might well be pushed back due
to the discovery of increasingly older sites in Siberia. I would further postulate
at least two such movements. The first probably occurred anywhere from 50,000 to
30,000 years ago and brought with it the Mousterian tradition and the Levallois
technique. A second movement took place, around the time Miiller-Beck suggests,
of people bearing Upper Paleolithic traditions—the Aurignacian, Solutrean and
Gravettian among them. This is not to say that Siberia was a "technological
extension of subarctic Europe during the Late Pleistocene," as Miiller-Beck sug
gests. 2^ No sites in East Asia exactly duplicate European sites, just as no sites
in the New World duplicate sites in Asia.
There were at least two routes of northward migration. The first was an inland
route, beginning in Southeast Asia and continuing through China and Mongolia, to
Siberia. This movement of people brought with it a flake tool technology and the
chopper/chopping tool tradition. Perhaps the widespread wedge-shaped core was
dispersed in one of these migrations. Ramifications of this movement were felt in
interior Siberia where many sites exhibit these archaic components. These sites
include Mal'ta near Irkutsk,25 Afontova Gora on the Yenesei2° and Ust’ Kanskaia in
the Altai mountains. 2'?^
A second, later movement involved northward expansion along the Pacific Coast,
with some inciarsions inland. It consisted of people from the Amur River, Japan,
Manchuria, Korea, North China and, in all likelihood, Mongolia. Luring glacial
maxima, Japan was joined to the mainland and a coastal shelf 20 to 30 miles wide
existed, facilitating movement from the mouth of the Amur and along the shores
of the Sea of Okhotsk. From here these groups may have traversed the coastal
ranges until they reached the Anadyr Gulf.28 This group of people might well
have introduced certain innovations such as the Araya diagonal burin from Japan,
a trait found at Verkholenskaia Gora near Lake BaikaJ.29 and also along the Pacific
Rim at Ushki Lake on the Kamchatka Peninsula30 and at Anangula Island in the
Aleutians.31
The Bering Land Bridge during times of glaciation was approximately 1300
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kilometers wide32—atout the same distance from the southern shores of Lake Baikal
to the northern reaches of the Ordos desert.23 Therefore, it was vast enough to
accommodate several groups at once without their being aware of each other. It
has been postulated by Laughlin that the interior of the Land Bridge was crossed
by tundra-adapted big game hunters, ancestral to the Paleo-Indians and that the
southern coastal route was taken by the ancestors of the Eskimos and Aleuts who
had a marine-focused economy.3^ Along similar lines, Dikov postulates a movement
of Paleo-Indians during the main Wisconsin glaciation which traveled down through
Alaska and was responsible for such sites as the Marmes Rock Shelter in Washington
State.35 A later, post-Wisconsin movement by Paleo-Eskimos and Paleo-Aleuts
brought with it the wedge-shaped core and populated early Alaskan localities,
such as portions of central Alaska (the Denali Comple) and Anangula Island.
This may account for some earlier dates in interior North America and later dates
in the Arctic.
Mochanov distinguishes two cultural groups in Siberia during the terminal
Pleistocene—the unifacial "Mai’ta-Afontova" cultural tradition and the bifacial
"Diijktai" tradition.36 TI10 people of this second tradition, who are named after
the Diuktai cave site on the Aldan River, made pebble cores, Levallois cores,
wedge-shaped (or Gobi) cores and skreblo—in other words, artifacts similar to
those found in prehistoric Mongolia. It is suggested by Mochanov that elements
of the Diuktai people migrated to North America between 18,000 and 11,000 years
ago, bringing bifacial technology with them. However, independent invention in
Alaska of this technological advance is quite probable. It is quite likely that
elements of both the Mai'ta-Afontova and Diuktai populations founded the early
core and blade technologies in Alaska. It must be pointed out in a discussion
on possible dates of entry of man into the New World that the Bering Strait, only
56 miles wide between Cape Dezhnev and Cape Prince of Wales, freezes each winter
so that contact between eastern Siberia and western Alaska has always been pos
sible, even when the Land Bridge was submerged during interstadials, and during
the Holocene as well.
Certain Alaskan assemblages retain a configuration of Asian traits and there
fore merit discussion. The four I will discuss are all early—between 11,000 and
7,000 years ago—and are defined as core and blade technologies.38 The first of
these is the Akmak Complex of Onion Portage on the Kobuk River.39 The assemblage
in this basal stratum includes large, wide blades struck from polyhedral cores,
microblades, burins, and crude bifaces used as scrapers and knives. Gallagher
Flint Station, locality one, on the North Slope contains a wide variety of cores
and unifacially retouched blades, but no burin or bifaces. The Denali Complex
in central Alaska^O includes the famous Campus Site near Fairbanks .^1 This group
of sites is composed of wedge-shaped and polyhedral cores, microblades, burins,
end scrapers, a chopping tool or scraper, a number of biface blanks and knives or
spearpoints. Anangula Island in the Aleutians^2 is a completely unifacial in
dustry.
It consists of a wide variety of core types (including wedge-shaped cores),
burins, and prismatic blades.
Anderson sees several similarities in the Akmak Complex to Siberian assemblages.^
Core bifaces, blades, burins and bifacial knives are reminiscent of Mal'ta,
Afontova Gora and Verkholenskaia Gora. He sees only one connection with Ushki
Lake—the wedge-shaped microcores.
In Alaska, Akmak has more correspondences with
the Denali Complex than with Anangula. I suggest that part of the explanation
involves the different environmental foci of each site.
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Gallagher Flint Station, locality one, is most like Anangula in Alaska because
both lack bifaces. On the other hand, there are no burins in the assemblage,
while Anangula exhibits a dependency on this artifact. Dixon has suggested that
the two sites are remotely linked to a common ancestor, perhaps Tadusha in the
Maritime Territory of the Soviet Union.
It was N. C. Nelson who first recognized the close correspondences between the
end-scrapers, wedge-shaped cores and prismatic blades of the Campus Site to those
of the pre-Neollthic Gobi.^5 Rainey also noted similarities to the Baikal area.^o
More recently. West has identified components of the Denali Comple as being re
lated to Afontova Gora, Verkholenskaia Gora, Ushkl Lake and certain localities in
Japan.Cores of the Kobuk Complex, which overlies the Akmak Comple of Onion
Portage, resemble Campus cores, but the overall context of Akmak separates it
from the Denali finds. Anangula and Gallagher Flint Station contain elements in
common with the Denali Complex, but the assemblages, taken as a whole, are quite
distinct from each other.

48
Okladnikov has identified seven Asian traits in the Anangula assemblage.
They are the Levallois technique, Gobi cores, pebble tools, Mousteroid points,
skreblos, diagonal burins and transverse burins. The burins are most like those
of the Araya Complex of Preceramic Japan. The assemblage is just as reminiscent
of Japan as it is of Siberia.^9 This suggests direct influence of the Pacific
Coastal migration route. Okladnikov and Laughlin examined Nelson's Gobi material
and found that "the identity of artifacts is in some cases remarkable."50 The
Denali Complex and Akmak share similarities with Anangula, but close correspond
ences are rare. As noted above, the principal trait shared with Gallagher Flint
Station is that of a completely unifacial technology. Beyond this, the two sites
are quite different.
Despite the significant differences apparent in these assemblages, certain
components link them together and point to a common ancestor in East Asia. The
presence of wedge-shaped cores and prismatic blades, both common in prehistoric
Mongolia, reflect this. Differentiation has occurred due to the several routes
taken by the Paleo-Eskimos and Paleo-Aleuts as they approached the Land Bridge
and moved across it. Regional variation, different subsistence strategies
various ecological adaptations also explain the distinct nature of each site.
The exact nature and extent of influence of Mongolia on the New World is hard
to put into concrete, quantifiable terms. At this point only general statements
can be made. There are several cultural attributes which occur early in Mongolia,
are found later in Siberia and reappear in the New World. Entire duplication of
assemblages will not be found and direct correspondences of individual artifacts
are rare. The basic fact that a Gobi core was fashioned in the desert-steppe
about 20,000 years ago and that a Campus core was manufactured in a forested zone
about 8,000 years ago is crucial in the interpretation of man's ability to adjust
to new situations through time and space. Human beings evolve and adapt to dif
ferent surroundings and this is reflected in their material culture.
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SLIDES PRESENTED

Left: Large Mongolian blade of red Jasper
from the general vicinity of Shabarakh-Usu.
Right: Large blade of metamorphosed argellite
from Anangula Island.
Length of both approximately 12 cm.

Left: "Pencil-shaped" conical core of chert
from the general vicinity of Shabarakh-Usu.
Maximum height: 5.5 cm.
Right: "Pencil-shaped” conical core of chert
from Sagan-Saba, Lake Baikal area.
Maximum height: 6.75 cm.

Anangula wedge-shaped core of brown chert,
frontal view. Maximum height: 4.5 cm.

Two conical cores of obsidian from Anangula
Island. Maximum heights: 3.5 cm. and 2.75 cm

Mongolian and Siberian specimens courtesy of A.P. Okladnikov. Anangula specimens courtesy of W.S. Laughlin.

The Prehistory of Mongolia

119

Magazine 63 (1933), p. 688; C. S. Chard, Northwest Asia in Prehistory (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 197^), p. 15.
3. Ellsworth Huntington, Civilization and Climate (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1915), p. 391.
4. N. C. Nelson, "Notes on the archaeology of the Gobi," American Anthropolo
gist 28 (1926), p. 305.
5. Chard, Northeast Asia in Prehistory, p. 12.
6. In C. S. Chard, "Northeast Asia," Asian Perspectives 6 (1963), pp. 10-11.
7. W. R. Powers, "Paleolithic man in North East Asia," Arctic Anthropology
10:2 (1973), p. 94.
8. N. C. Nelson, "The dune dwellers of the Gobi," Natural History 26 (1926),
p. 247.
9. Nelson, "Notes," p. 308.
10. In Powers, p. 94.
11. Okladnikov in Chard, Northeast Asia, p. l4.
12. Powers, p. 94.
13. Kwang-chih Chang, The Archeology of China (New Haven: Yale University Press
1963), pp. 66-67.
14. V. E. Larichev, "The microlithic character of Neolithic cultures in Central
Asia, Trans-Baikal and Manchuria," American Antiquity 27 (1962), p. 318.
15. A. P. Okladnikov, "The Shilka Cave: Remains of an ancient culture of the
Upper Amur River," in The Archaeology and Geomorphology of Northern Asia, edited
by H. N. Michael (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 171.
16. J. Maringer, Contribution to the Prehistory of Mongolia (Stockholm: SinoSwedish Expedition Publication no. 34, VII: Archaeology, 1950), p. 5.
17. Nelson, "Dvine dwellers," p. 248; J. Maringer, "Mongolia before the Mongols,
Arctic Anthropology 1:2 (1963), p. 78.
18. C. S. Chard, "New World origins: A reappraisal, "Antiquity 33 (1959), p. 47
19. Nelson, "Notes on the archeology of the Gobi," pp. 306-307.
20. Okladnikov, "Shilka Cave," pp. I67-I68.
21. A. P. Okladnikov, "The Paleolithic of Trans-Baikal," American Antiquity 26
(1961), p. 486.
22. Chard, "Northeast Asia," p. 13.
23. H. J. Miiller-Beck, "On migrations of hunters across the Bering Land Bridge
in the Upper Pleistocene," in The Bering Land Bridge, edited by D. M. Hopkins
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, I967), p. 374.
24. Miiller-Beck, p. 391.
25. M. M. Gerasimov, "The Paleolithic site Mal'ta: Excavations of 1956-1957,"
in The Archaeology and Geomorphology of Northern Asia, p. l4.
26. J. B. Griffin, "Some prehistoric connections between Siberia and America,"
Science 131 (i960), p. 802.
27. S. I. Rudenko, "The Ust'Kanstkaia Paleolithic core site, Siberia," American
Antiquity 27 (1961), p. 206.
28. C. S. Chard, "New World migration routes," Anthropological Papers of the
University of Alaska 7:1 (1958), p. 24.
29. Chard, Northeast Asia, p. 61.
30. N. N. Dikov, "The discovery of the Paleolithic in Kamchatka and the problem
of the initial occupation of America," Arctic Anthropology 5:1 (1968), p. 194.
31. W. S. Laughlin, "Aleuts: Ecosystem, Holocene history and Siberian origin,"
Science I89 (1975), p. 513.
32. W. S. Laughlin, "Eskimos and Aleuts: Their origins and evolution," Science
142 (1963), p. 644.

120

Georgeanne Lewis Reynolds

33. G. Bushnell and C. McBurney, "New World origins seen from the Old World,"
Antiquity 33 (1959), p. 100.
3^. Laughlin, "Human migration and permanent occupation in the Bering Sea
area," in The Bering Land Bridge, p. 1+21.
35. N. N. Dikov, "Ancestors of Paleo-Indians and Proto-Eskimo-Aleuts in the
Paleolithic of Kamchatka," in Early Man in America from a Ciroum-Pacifia Per
spective, edited by A. L. Bryan (Calgary: Archaeological Researches International,
Ltd., 1978), p. 68.
36. Yu. A. Mochanov, "The Paleolithic of Northeast Asia and the problems of
the first peopling of America," in Early Man, p. 67.
37. I. Rouse, "Peopling the Americas," Quaternary Research 6 (1976), p. 6ol+.
38. F. H. West, "The alignment of Late Paleolithic chronologies in Beringia,"
paper presented at the All-Union Symposium on the Correlation of Ancient Cultures
of Siberia and Adjoining Territories of the Pacific Coast, Novosibirsk, October

20-22, 1975.
39. D. D. Anderson, "A Stone Age campsite at the gateway to America," Sci
entific American 2l8:6 (1968), pp. 21+-33, and Ahmk: An Early Archaeological
Assemblage from Onion Portage, Northwest Alasha. Acta Arctica, no. 16, 1970.
1+0. F. H. West, "The Donnelly Ridge site and the definition of an early core
and blade complex in Central Alaska," American Antiquity 32:3 (1967), pp. 360-382.
1+1. Nelson, "Early migration," p. 356, and "Notes on cultural relations between
Asia and America," American Antiquity 1+ (1937), 267-272.
1+2. Laughlin, "Eskimos and Aleuts," pp. 633-61+5, and "Aleuts," pp. 507-515.
1+3. Anderson, Ahmk, pp. 62-69.
1+1+. E. J. Dixon, "The Gallagher Flint Station, an Early Man site on the North
Slope, Arctic Alaska," Arctic Anthropology 12:1 (1975), p. 72.
1+5. Nelson, "Notes on cultural relations," p. 268.
1+6. F. Rainey, "Archaeological investigations in Central Alaska," American
Antiquity 'j-.h (19I+O), p. 302.
1+7. West, "The Donnally Ridge site," pp. 375-377.
1+8. In Laughlin, "Aleuts," p. 513.
1+9. Yoshizaki, in Laughlin, "Eskimos and Aleuts," p. 63I+.
50. Laughlin, "Aleuts," p. 5ll+.
51. D. C. Plaskett and E. J. Dixon, "Men out of Southeast Asia: An alternative
hypothesis for the early peopling of the Americas," paper presented at the fifth
annual Alaska Anthropological Association conference. Anchorage, March 17-18,
1978, p. 8.

THE OYROT UNDER MANCHU RULE:
SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
Keith Scott
University of Saskatchewan

In this paper I propose to examine quite briefly some of the circumstances
surrounding the transfer to Manchu sovereignty in the mid-eighteenth century of
those areas of steppeland to the west of the Altay which had formed the pastures,
or were under the control, of Zuiingar or Oyrot clans. Under what kind of social
and administrative arrangements did the Manchus envisage accommodating their new
subjects, once the "pacification" of these areas had been completed?
It must appear that, by choosing such a topic, I have laid myself open to
the serious charge which every responsible historian seeks to avoid: that of
dealing with the irrelevant, of indulging in vain speculation about "what might
have happened if . . ." For it is well known that after the 1755-59 pacification,
campaign only a small remnant of the Oyrot peoples survived, and though this
remnant became subject to the Manchu emperor, its allegiance was a mere for
mality, a minor item of business for the attention of the hastily constituted
military administration of the Western Regions.

My intention, however, is not to speculate about a non-existent Oyrot settle
ment and its equally hypothetical consequences, but to suggest that there is
some profit to be gained from going further back in time and retracing the his
torical byway that leads to this particular dead end. The conventional wisdom
has it that the annexation of Zuiingar lands by the Manchus was the realization
of a long-range strategy, an objective kept constantly in view, despite periodic
changes in short-term tactics, throughout the first century of Manchu rule from
Peking, and consistently pursued from the time of the war against Galdan in
1690-96. This position, implicit in much Western historiography, has found no
less favor with Soviet historians who, in discussing the 1755-59 campaigns, use
such phrases as "the fulfillment of their Csc. the Manchus'i expansionist plans,
and with contemporary Chinese apologists who see the campaigns merely in terms
of the "suppression of rebellion" and the "restoration of national unity."2
My own reading of early eighteenth-century Chinese materials has impressed me
rather with the indecision attendant upon so much Manchu policymaking in this
area, and has persuaded me that at no time—not even when the campaigns referred
to had already gotten under way—was their eventual outcome intended or fore
seen. I have elsewhere propounded this view on the basis of an examination of
the debate at the Manchu court, conducted throughout the reign of the Ch'ien-lung
emperor, on economic policies and military attitudes toward the Zuiingar.3 Per
haps some further light might be shed if a brief attempt were made to trace the
evolution of Manchu attitudes towards Zuiingar society in the pre-conquest period.
Hence the present Inquiry, an inquiry that must be inconclusive but is not, I
would hope, entirely futile.
The Ch'ien-lung {Tengeriyn tetegsen) reign period began in 1736, the new
121

122

Keith Soott

emperor having succeeded to the throne late in the preceding year. At this
time the interest of the Peking government in Ziiungar affairs was centered
upon the negotiations aimed, at least from the Manchu standpoint, at achieving
a military disengagement and some form of peace settlement along the Altay
frontier between Ziiiingar and Khalkha lands. The negotiation process had al
ready been initiated in 173^ with the dispatch of a Manchu mission to Hi,
residence of the Chores khan Galdantseren whose envoys in turn reached Peking
early in 1736.^ Certain elements emerge from imperial edicts and official re
ports Issued during the course of negotiations that shed an instructive light
on the Manchus' understanding of Ziiungar social dynamics, and on their per
ception of actual and possible future Manchu-Zuiingar relations. To start with,
there was apparently no disposition to regard the tribes known to them at that
time under the collective designation Zuiingar as anything other than a unified
people under the leadership of Galdantseren; no distant memory remained, for
example, of the discrepancy acidly noted by Nurhachi in l6l9 between Ligdan's
claim to hegemony over forty tiunen and the polycentric reality of post-Yuan
society.5 Instead, the Choros khan is repeatedly enjoined to act as the ben
evolent patriarch of all the people (sc. the Oyrot) and to conclude the peace
which would serve their long-term interests better than war.6
The general approach adopted by the Manchus in their direct dealings with
the Ziiungar during the negotiations of 1736-Uo is well represented by such
paternalistic tenders of advice.
On more than one occasion in the course of
his correspondence with Galdantseren, the Ch'ien-lung emperor emphasized the
common interests shared by the Ziiiingar and the Manchus rather than the issues
that currently divided them. His expressed willingness to treat them on the
same basis as the KhalkhaT or the people of ChinaS may be interpreted, if one
so chooses, as an invitation to move into a closer formal relationship. On the
other hand, the model which the Manchus favored as the basis for a settlement
was the treaty concluded with the Russians at Kyakhta in 1727 rather than the
Doloonnuur convention of I69I which made the Khalkha princes vassals of the
imperial throne. I submit that the Manchus chose the Kyakhta model for three
reasons. First, its emphasis on frontier delineation accorded best with the
immediate geopolitical concern, that of keeping the Khalkha and the Ziiiingar
physically apart.9 Second, the Manchus harbored the illusion that one man,
Galdantseren, spoke (like the Russian tsar) for all his people, and that it
would be pointless to conclude individual agreements, as at Doloonnuur, with
all who could be identified as tribal leaders and clan heads. Third and per
haps most importantly, the Manchus thought that the Ziiungar were profoundly
unwilling at this time to make the requisite sacrifice of autonomy and that
they could not be pressured into making such a sacrifice, even had the Manchus
wished to do so.
In actuality the 17^0 agreement does not stand comparison with Kyakhta.
Even after its conclusion, it remained apparent that the Ziiiingar had little
interest in, or appreciation of, the concept of a precisely delineated border
line,10 and the most that could be expected was that unilateral observance by
the Khalkha of the line theoretically determined through the negotiating proc
ess might by itself contribute to a lessening of tensions in the frontier zone.H
The distinction between fChalkha and Ziiungar is emphasized more than once in
Manchu government statements after 17^+0. Officials are chided for confusing
the Mongols in allegiance to the Manchu throne, who are to be referred to as

J!he Oyrot Under Manahu Rule

123

Meng-ku, with the Zuiingar who are i ("barbarians") and thus outside the emperor's
dispensation.
The first sign that this attitude was about to undergo some modification may
e detected in an edict of 17h3 in which Galdantseren is described as wai-fan
rather than 'V,
This change in terminology does not seem to me too significant
in itself. I am not convinced that the Ch'ing regarded all those whom they
called hm-fan as being in at least a nominally feudatory relationship with the
imperial throne, as Fairbank and others have suggested.!^ The term seems, on
occasion, to be used in a much looser geographical sense.
Later in the same decade, however, a Zuiingar envoy was received at court and
a dressed in te:ms which would not have been inappropriately directed towards
he representative of a vassal prince. The emperor declared his satisfaction
with the tone and content of the letter sent by Tseveendorzh Namzhil,
Galdantseren's successor. He commended the new khan for his efforts to keep
the peace among his subjects, though by now he must already have felt consider
able uncertainty concerning the extent of the latter's authority, both titular
and actual, over the Oyrot twmen.15 Manchu and Khalkha officials had increasingy to deal with refugees—one of them a defector from the very mission that
rought Tseveendorzh Namzhil's letter—16 refugees whose reports furnished a
detailed picture of rivalries and dissensions within the Ziiungar steppe. We
may reasonably infer that voices were now beginning to be raised in Peking in
favor of bringing every identifiable Oyrot group into vassalage, although I
ave no evidence from this date explicitly supporting such an inference. But
some indirect indications may be found in the official reaction to Ziiungar moves
towards renewing their links with Tibet.
Tseveendorzh Namzhil wisely decided to allay Manchu fears by involving the
imperial government in his plans and by presenting his interest in Tibetan affairs as arising from purely religious motives. This indeed had been the burden
ol the letter just mentioned which so pleased the emperor. Since a constant
low of Zuiingar subjects to and from Tibet could not be permitted for security
reasons, an alternative offer was made to Tseveendorzh Namzhil; young men might
be selected and sent to Peking for three or four years to be trained as lamas,
presumably at the Yung-ho kung.l'
khan did not respond, and the offer was
almost certainly never taken up, but the Manchu government must have been aware
that the mere act of making it carried at least two implications of moment.
First, the Manchus now accepted, and would be recognized as accepting, some
responsibility for the Internal evolution of Zuiingar society inasmuch as they
sought to impose a particular direction upon the development of its religious
institutions. Secondly, the extended presence of the young trainees in the
capital woind bring to an irreversible end the previous isolation of the Ziiiingar
from the Sino-Manchu cultiiral milieu, and would in all probability lead to the
creation of an influential body of opinion within the Oyrot community advocating
formalization of the Manchus’ role as protecting power.
This summary of contacts between the Manchu court and Tseveendorzh Namzhil
has entailed some telescoping of events; the latter's first mission to Peking
arrived there early in 17^6, but the offer to undertake the training of lamas
was not put forw^d until some four years later. Tseveendorzh Namzhil died
soon afterwards in a coup engineered by his half-brother Lamdarzh, who then
found himself embroiled in a struggle for supremacy with Davaazha, a distant
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cousin whose main support came from non-Choros taizh and zaysan (most notably
the Khoyd Amarsanaa). This intensification of internal feuding among the Oyrot
clans, while rendering the Manchu offer inoperative and irrelevant,1° neverthe
less strengthened the hands of those Manchu officials who advocated implementing
a more active and constructive policy. The illusion of Zuungar ixnity, and the
trust in one man’s capacity as overall khan to enforce that unity,19 could no
longer be sustained. By early 175^, Peking had broadly accepted that some
format for relations with individual Oyrot groups must now be established, and
the only questions that remained to be settled concerned the precise timing and
the specific modalities of the approved course of action. The idea of military
intervention, either in support of Davaazha or to impose a general settlement,
was still firmly rejected,20 but the recent surrender of heads of leading Dorvod
clans^l appeared to offer a practical alternative. After a substantial segment
of each Oyrot twnen had come over to place itself under Manchu protection, the
emperor should Invite the khan of that twnen to become his vassal, and any logis
tical support required to enable the Oyrot of the twnen in question to recover
and consolidate their position in their traditional pastures should be made
available.
It soon became evident that an effective settlement would, after all, involve
some commitment of Manchu military forces; by J-une 175^ preparations were al
ready under way for an expedition to Hi in the following summer.22 Yet the
objectives remained the same, and it is to these that we ought in the present
instance to devote our attention, rather than to the methods used to attain them.
The historical concept of the four Oyrot tianen was adopted, but as the Manchus
themselves recognized to a certain extent, this was a very general and illdefined concept—it still remains a fruitful source of scholarly controversy—
and an unsuitable basis for a framework of feudal relationships which would be
recognized by all the Oyrot peoples. Four ttbnen had to be selected arbitrarily
from several contenders with good historical claims. Even these four differed
from one another in their degrees of social cohesion, with the Choros (at least
until latterly) displaying a more clearly defined feudal structure than the
loosely federated Dorvod for instance. Besides, there were the twenty-four
otog which had formed part of the appanage of the Choros khans but were not of
the same lineage. One assumes that the Manchus expected the four khans, chosen
by themselves since none (with the possible exception of Amarsanaa) was selfevident, to play a role in the imperial system similar to that of the four
Khalkha khans, but conditions in the two Mongol groups, eastern and western,
were by no means analogous. By the time the Khalkha khans were accepted into
vassalage, their ascendancy over their subjects had long been established through
diplomacy and force of arms, and made permanent through the system of subin
feudation they themselves had created.2^
Despite these difficulties and differences of circumstances, the Manchus
went ahead with designating four twnen on the basis of their own interests and
incomplete information: the Choros, chosen in recognition of their historical
leadership of the Zuungar empire; the Dorvod who had already surrendered in sub
stantial numbers and were thought to exhibit a touching loyalty to the imperial
throne—though some were already hurrying back to the northwest to take part in
the struggle for land and power;25 the Khoyd, since Amarsanaa was clearly a
force to be reckoned with; and the Khoshuud, presvunably because the Manchus
relied on their kinsfolk in the Tibetan borderlands to help maintain the
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stability of that sensitive frontier region.
At first the pieces of this tidy scheme seemed to be falling neatly into
place. Amarsanaa, the unchallenged leader of the Khoyd, gave allegiance in
September 175^.^
Tseren was thought to he the most distinguished and most
compliant of the Dorvod taizh^ and his colleagues Tserenubash and Tserenmonkh
seemed unlikely to dispute his confirmation as khan of this timen. There were
strong indications that Tserenmonkh, far from having ambitions in the Dorvod
political arena, was in fact casting covetous eyes upon the pastiires of the
Khoyd.
This was understandable, the Dorvod having been most seriously af
flicted by the land shortage that had latterly developed in the Zuiingar steppe.
BMzhil, grandson by primogeniture of the renowned Lazhan Khaan who had ruled
Tibet for more than a decade earlier in the century, was the natural choice for
the leadership of the Khoshuud. Only the Chores khanate was left vacant, pend
ing the removal of Davaazh ^ho represented the old order and was, on that account,
unacceptable to the Manchus.28 jjj any event, upon proclamation of these new
administrative arrangements in February 1755, his status became by definition
that of rebel, since he had not previously come forward to tender his alle
giance. 29
Throughout 1755 the Manchu government stuck doggedly to the basic concept of
the four khanates; only the list of nominees changed from time to time as one
taizh after another incurred their disapproval on account of actions that showed
little respect for the symmetry of Peking's grand design.30 g^t as more precise
information was received about the diverse character of Oyrot internal relation
ships, the authorities grudgingly but realistically admitted certain modifica
tions to the original plan.
The first important innovation was the creation of ohuulgan (councils),
theoretically to advise the khan, but in practice to provide some recognition
of other interests within the timen. As early as November 175k the Dorvod
chuulgan had been constituted, and the appointment of Tserenubash as head of
one of its two wings helped to clarify his status, previously undefined and
therefore potentially threatening, in relation to Tseren.31
By the end of the following year, the structural diversity and variety of
interests within each timen had been further recognized by the designation of
the ahuulgan as the central timen Institution.
The khan would not, after all,
be a hereditary chieftain or the emperor's nominee, but would be elected by the
members of his timen and would serve as ahuulgany darga "chairman of the coun
cil."
A similar system had been introduced into Khalkha in 1728. There,
however, the positions of khan and ahuulgany darga were often kept separate,
presumably as a means of encouraging a creative tension between traditional and
elective authority, one that could be expected to serve Manchu interests.33
The merging of the two positions in the Oyrot situation may, I think, be taken
to reflect an appreciation of the need to weld the Oyrot into fewer, more co
hesive units, and to discourage any growth of the practice of subinfeudation
endemic among the Khalkha. Nevertheless, since it was predicated on the sur
vival of the Oyrot and the need to support their efforts to manage their own
affairs, it is hard to accept that the long-range intentions of the government
which took such a socially constructive step, even at this late stage, included
the establishment of direct administrative control over Oyrot territory and (as
some have suggested, arguing retrogressively from subsequent events) the virtual
elimination of its occupants.
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The Manchus were also made aware of, and addressed themselves to, the question
of the twenty-four otog which had formed a part of the Zuiingar empire as direct
dependencies of the Chores khan.3^ The original assumption that these, like all
other groups falling under the general rubric of "Oyrot," would be neatly ab
sorbed into one or another of the four designated tumen was now seen to be un
realistic and, indeed, \indesirable since it was a much simpler matter to preserve
them as separate administrative units, and for the Manchu emperor to assume the
seignorial rights. At the same time, it came to be appreciated that these rights
were accompanied by certain special responsibilities, particularly with respect
to the boundaries of the otog pastures. It was the enforcement of these boiindaries that had formed the basis of the otog's relationship with the Chores khan,
since the otog was characteristically a small, economically defined unit, its
member households linked one to another by the bond of copasturage rather than
kinship. Only strong, effective Chores leadership of the Zuiingar empire had,
while it lasted, prevented serious encroachments on the otog pastures by numer
ically stronger and more powerful Oyrot groups such as the Dorvod and Khoyd.35
Yet a third indication of the growing sophistication in the Manchus' knowl
edge of Oyrot affairs is seen in the elaboration of special administrative
arrangements for the zhas or monastic institutions.36 one integral and note
worthy feature of these arrangements was the decision taken in September 1755
to proceed with the appointment of a head lama,37 even though a few years earlier,
before the evident disintegration of Zuiingar power, the prospect of a second
khutagt west of the Altay had been one which the Manchus scarcely dared to con
template. 38
Even as the policymakers and bureaucrats in Peking were busily refining their
administrative proposals, the irrelevance of these proposals to what was actually
taking place on the Central Asian frontier became increasingly clear. Amarsanaa,
of course, had his own ideas about the future of the region, predicated upon the
elimination of every vestige of traditional Choros power. His eventual goal
being a restored Zuiingar empire under Khoyd leadership, he was nevertheless
willing to accept the establishment of four separate khanates as an interim
measure. But a fear that this arrangement might become inconveniently permanent
was apparently aroused in his mind when a taizh of the Choros, Galsandorzh, came
forward as a willing candidate for the vacant position of khan and was eagerly
embraced by the Manchu court. This was before Peking had adopted the concept of
an elective ahuuZgany darga, but Amarsanaa himself proposed that a ahuulgcm of
Choros zaysan and demah (administrative officers) should be convened to elect
as khan someone of the lineage of Galdantseren, an operation over which he un
doubtedly felt capable of exerting some influence. At the same time, however,
he put forward as an alternative plan his own desire to see a unitary Oyrot
state, suggesting that the Oyrot, unlike the Khalkha, were incapable of managing
their own affairs peaceably and, in particular, of defending the frontiers of
the empire against external threats without strong leadership—leadership which
he, of course, stood ready to provide.39
The emperor firmly rejected Amarsanaa's propositions; the Manchus were quite
satisfied to see the Khalkha system extended to the Zuiingar steppe, with the
sole difference, already mentioned, that the positions of khan and ckuutgany
darga would be merged. Partly to allay Amarsanaa's alleged anxieties, but also
to keep a watchful eye on the very type of ambitious Oyrot that he himself repre
sented, it was decided that assistant military commanders (fu-ohiang-chun) and
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resident liaison officers (chu-ta ta-oh'en) would be appointed by Peking to
each of the tumen.^^
The parallel with the Khalkha situation was formally and publicly enunciated
in the premature 'Victory proclamation" of November 21, 1755.^1 This official
declaration is of interest,
transformation which Manchu
twenty years, away from the
Oyrot and Khalkha which was
Galdantseren.

if only because it draws attention to the complete
policy had progressively undergone in less than
determination to differentiate at all costs between
paramount at the time of the negotiations with

In fact, at the moment when the victory proclamation was issued, the pacifica
tion of the Northwest remained a distant dream. Amarsanaa was in open revolt,
and instead of helping to create a stable framework for the new social and ad
ministrative order, what remained of the Manchu expeditionary force was desper
ately fighting for its own survival. After its senior commanders were ambushed
and killed by partisans of Amarsanaa,^2 the Manchu authorities devoted their
entire attention to the exigencies of the military situation. No new administra
tive proposals were forthcoming,' though we need not conclude that a firm decision
had yet been taken to dismantle completely the old social system. But by the
spring of 1756 a note of bitterness and betrayal is already detectable in of
ficial statements on the Ziiungar situation. Amarsanaa had shown gross ingratitude,
of course, but it was implied that even loyal and cooperative Oyrots such as the
Dorvod taizh Tseren and Tserenubash shared some of the blame for their weakness
and inability to provide effective leadership.^3
Then, in August of the same year, it becomes evident that a new policy had
begun to take shape. The concept of the four tumen had been tacitly abandoned—
though this is not confirmed in official documents until a year later^^— and
attention had shifted to the lower level angi as the effective unit of social
administration, with executive authority entrusted to clerks {tushmel) and mag
istrates (zargaoh)It seemed likely, too, that Manchu garrisons would now
have to be maintained in the Northwest on a regular basis.^6
A particularly interesting commentary on the entire process of policymaking
during the first twenty years or so of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's reign was an
edict which he issued in January 1757 in response to court criticism of the
Manchu military involvement in Oyrot affairs.
In it he pointed out that, though
his hopes for peace and stability had unfortunately not been realized, he had
taken all decisions as part of a carefully considered and relatively modest
plan. He had to resettle the four tumen in their original pastures if the
Khalkha were to be left undisturbed and the burden of supporting refugees de
prived of their traditional livelihood lifted from the shoulders of the imperial
treasury. Though post hoc apologetics are not uncommon in the Ch'ing annals,
this statement is consistent with the course of events which we have been examin
ing and thus has an unusual ring of honesty about it.
"in sum," said the emperor,
"our attitude has not been one of seeking glory; it has been entirely dictated
by the exigencies of the situation."^?
We may fittingly terminate our inquiry at this point, for we have reached the
end of the byway we set out to explore. Subsequent events are too well known
to warrant repetition here, and the context in which they took place is that of
warfare, geopolitics and diplomacy. At this stage no worthwhile social policies
could have been devised for the Oyrot as a whole, though an edict declaring them
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to be an endangered species and imposing a closed season on hunting them might
not have been inappropriate.
By way of summary, I suggest that the following stages may be identified in
the development of Manchu policies concerned with Oyrot social organization.
1. Up to 17^0 the only concern of the government in Peking was to disengage
itself, and its Khalkha vassals, from unnecessary involvement in Ziiungar affairs.
2. Between 17^3 and 1750, i.e., during the reign of the khan Tseveendorzh
Namzhil, the Manchu court decided that the Ziiiingar khanate should be treated as
if it were an outlying vassal state, though this relationship was never formal
ized.
3. After 1750, with the intensification of internal feuding among the Oyrot
and the increasing flow of refugees, the Manchus moved towards establishing
relations with individual Oyrot groups.
By 175^ four Oyrot tumen had been identified; these were to become vassals
of the Manchu emperor in a similar fashion to the Khalkha khanates.
5. In 1755 the Khalkha model was modified to take account of features pecul
iar to the Oyrot situation, i.e., the diversity of status and interest within
the tumen, the traditional relationship between the Choros khan and the twentyfour otog, and the semi-independent status of the monastic lands.
6. In 1756 the Manchus abandoned the tumen system in favor of direct control
over the otog and angi, and finally:
7. Sometime during the following year, all previous plans were jettisoned as
the traditional Oyrot social structure broke down completely and the Oyrot them
selves faced extermination. The Ziiungar steppes became a military territory of
the Manchu empire, and the new masters of this territory were faced with a major
problem of an entirely different order from those of the preceding hundred years
of Manchu-Oyrot relations. Instead of concerning themselves with trying to
understand and to regulate a complex social system, they were suddenly forced to
find ways of filling up huge tracts of empty pasture land from which it appeared
that man, the "social animal," had altogether disappeared.
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ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS OF
THE MONGOLIA SOCIETY (1978)
John R. Krueger
Indiana University

The Mongolia Society, founded in I96I as a non-profit, non-political organ
ization devoted to all aspects of Mongolia, has given much of its energy over
the years to publications. Beginning with a Newsletter (vols. 1-3, 1962-i^),^
then a Bulletin (vols. U-12, 1965-73), the Society now issues Mongolian Studies:
Journal of the Mongolia Society, a periodical containing scholarly research
articles, embracing a cross-disciplinary approach to Mongolia past and present.
Volume 5 for 1978 will appear presently. A series of Occasional Papers treated
the Mongolian economy, literature, religion, travel and history; and the series.
Special Papers, gives works originally written in Mongolian. The Society also
sponsored some other publications, like a set of maps and the popular reprinting
of F. D. Lessing's large Mongolian-English Dictionary.
In 1978 the society issued as Occasional Paper 9, Ramstedt's memoirs of his
travels in Mongolia and Asia, Seven Journeys Eastward, 1898-1912 (277 pages in
cluding fifty-two photographs), an adventure-filled account of his studies and
research, including valuable political information about the period of Mongolian
autonomy. Occasional Paper 10 is A. M. Pozdneyev's account of life in a Mon
golian Buddhist (Lamaist) monastery 100 years ago, now titled Religion and
Ritual in Society: Lamaist Buddhism in Late 19th-Century Mongolia (69^ PP-)*
It treats the divine services, the ritual, the clergy, the temple furnishings,
and the relation of the church to the people.
Early in 1978 the Society issued Part One of John R. Krueger's projected
large Oirat-Mongolian citation dictionary (20U pages covering the first seven
letters, the vowels). The additional parts, to a total of 900 pages, will be
issued later. This unique work gives the entire vocabulary of the Western
Mongolian literary language for the period of about I6U8 to 192^, drawing on
all known edited and transcribed dictionaries and texts, plus numerous unedited
documents.
Special Paper 6 is devoted to L. Dindub's Brief History of Mongolia, in the
Autonomous Period (2lU pages in Mongolian); the editor. Dr. Hangin, gives an
English introduction about the work and an index of persons treated. It is a
valuable primary soxirce scarcely available even in Mongolia any more. Special
Paper 7 deals with the famous Bewitched Corpse Cycle of folktales from Indian
sources. Thirteen Kalmyk-Oirat Tales, with script text, keyed glossary and lit
erary translation into English by J. R. Krueger. It serves as a convenient
handbook and introduction to Oirat (West Mongolian) Studies (120 pp.).
Occasional Paper 11 will be a new English edition of Prof. Nicholas Poppe's
Russian work. Heroic Epic of the Khalkha Mongols.
It is translated and edited
and, after a retyping, will probably appear in mid-1979 (210 pp. typescript).
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The Society hopes to issue another reprinting of Lessing's Dictionary, an
important and standard reference work indispensihle for English-speakers. The
pressure of other duties and the cost of printing have thus far combined to
delay this much-needed publication. Volume 6 of Mongolian Studies for 1979 is
already organized and will go into preparation presently.
Admission to the Society is open to all persons and institutions having
interest in any aspect of Mongolia; dues are $15 annually (students $7.50).
The Mongolia Society, Inc.
P.O. Drawer 606
Bloomington, Indiana k'Jk02

MONGOLISTIC ACTIVITIES AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY
The Mongolia Society is housed in facilities of Indiana University at Bloom
ington, though it remains a distinct and independent institution.
Since several important projects in Mongolian studies are now under way at
Indiana University, I take this liberty to mention them in the thought that some
readers may thus seciire information about them.
The National Endowment for the Humanities is supporting a three-year project
for a new major Mongolian-English dictionary, directed by Hangin and Krueger,
with research staff. The project is about half-complete, and letters A-M (about
350 typed pages) are finished in draft. The total may run to about 900 pages;
after revision and limited circulation the dictionary will be printed, but it
will certainly be at least two full years before it is available. This is a
Cyrillic-order modern dictionary with definitions and examples in English,
stressing social sciences, literature, history, etc.
The same institution, NEH, is also supporting a Mongolian folklore project
which will produce an annotated volume of translated Mongolian folklore in dif
ferent genres (eight to ten chapters to cover epic, tales, riddles, invocations,
proverbs, etc.). A supplement will give the Mongolian texts. This will be
finished in 1979 and probably published at a later time.
The Mongolian Studies Hiimanities Curriculum is sponsored by the Office of
Education and will present a one-or two-volume introduction to Mongolian history,
civilization and area studies suitable for college courses in Asia. The com
pletion of this project, delayed by many factors, is soon expected, and one
would hope it might also soon be published for general use.
John R. Krueger

THE BIBLIOTHECA MONGOLICA
Henry G. Schwarz, Man-kam Leung, and Michael Underdown

General Remarks and Part I:

Works in English, French, and German

The project got its start in 1975 as a result of Henry Schwarz's conclusion,
arrived at after some careful thought on the matter, that the field of Mongolian
Studies needed to he strengthened, certainly in the United States and perhaps
elsewhere too, and that one important way of going about this was to create a
comprehensive bibliography that in a single set of volumes encompasses most if
not all that has been written in various languages about most aspects of Mon
golia. Whereas such comprehensive bibliographies have been published for China,
Japan, and Korea, nothing quite like this has ever been published for Mongolia.
The Bibliotheca Mongolica, as originally planned, will eventually consist of
four parts. Part I, edited by Henry G. Schwarz, includes works written in Eng
lish, French, and German. Part II, edited by Man-kam Leung of the University
of Saskatchewan, includes works written in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. Part
III, edited by Mr. Michael Underdown of the University of Melbourne, contains
works in Mongolian, Russian, and East European languages. Finally, Part IV,
edited by Henry G. Schwarz, will contain works written in all other languages,
additions and corrections to the first three parts, and a combined index.
This bibliography includes all subjects that have a bearing on that contig
uous area which was inhabited by appreciable numbers of Mongols around l800.
In contemporary terms, this area is roughly coterminous with the Mongolian
People's Republic and adjoining areas in Siberia, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and
the northwestern provinces of China. Thus the bibliography includes studies of
pre-Mongolian and non-Mongolian subjects, such as linguistic, historical, and
archeological investigations of all the peoples who inhabited Mongolia before
the Mongols. It also includes studies of foreigners on Mongolian soil during
Mongol times, such as missionaries, traders, and armies.
In addition, the bibliography includes any subject placed exclusively out
side the area just described and that has a substantial and specifically Mongol
content, like studies of Mongol conquests, Mongol languages and dialects, and
Mongol emigre communities. The bibliography, however, does not include studies
of individuals and groups who, despite their own claims, cannot be considered
Mongol, such as Timior and his successors. Nor does the bibliography include
studies of any of the non-Mongol parts of the Mongol world empire that make
little or no mention of the Mongols. Thus most of the considerable body of lit
erature on Yuan China is excluded here because most of these studies are on
purely Chinese matters with only scant reference to the Mongol overlords.
The Bibliotheca Mongolica includes most forms of publication with the excep
tion of reviews, short notices, cookbooks, annual surveys in periodical publica
tions such as Asian Perspectives, Asian Survey, and Far Eastern Economic Review,

132

The Bihliotheoa MongoUoa

133

and most political tracts. Only some entries in handbooks, encyclopedias and
conference compendia are included. Because we hope that non-Mongolists will
use this bibliography, we also include works of popular literature. The bib
liography includes all publications just described and published during the
century ending in December 19T5* Only occasionally are older works included.
Each of the several parts of the Bibliotheaa MongoHaa consists of five
major sections on general works, culture, history, society, and science and
technology, comprising a total of thirty-four chapters, each of which consti
tutes a particular category. The overall arrangement is similar to that used
by the Library of Congress, with deviations where deemed necessary. Entries
within each subdivision are, with few exceptions, arranged by date of publica
tion. Each work is given only one entry hut is cross-listed by entry number as
often as deemed appropriate.
An entry consists of the usual bibliographical elements like name, title,^
place and date of publication as well as any additional information such as il
lustration, bibliography, and the like. In order to keep the bibliography with
in manageable limits, annotations are held to an absolute minimum. In most
cases, transliteration of proper names in annotations is the same as in the
works in question. Thus any proper name is likely to appear throughout the bib
liography with several slightly different spellings. Whenever a title in Eng-^
lish, French, or German is sufficiently descriptive, no annotation or translation
is given.
The person index, a feature in all parts of the Bibliotheca Mongolica, de
serves special mention. It includes, besides all authors, also editors, com
pilers, and translators. I believe that such an arrangement may well help some
readers to locate a particular work more quickly. The person index differs
from indexes in most other bibliographies and monographs in at least two respects.
First, translators are included because, contrary to conventional academic opin
ion, I am certain that translations, especially good ones, are not only great
aids to the scholarship of any field but can also be major intellectual accom
plishments in their own right. Second, the person index does not follow the
usual practice of listing only entry numbers or, worse yet, page niunbers. Such
practice is a disservice to the reader whom it obliges in some cases to go back
and forth between the index and the main body of the book dozens of times before
he finds the entry he had been looking for.
Part I: Works in English^ French, and German is complete and has been pub
lished by the Center for East Asian Studies as volume 12 of its Occasional
Papers (since then renamed Studies on East Asia) series. Its 355 pages contain
about 3,000 entries of which more than 95 percent were personally verified by
me. Each of the remaining unverified entries is marked by the notation CNot
seeni.
Western Washington University

Port II;

Henry G. Schwarz

Works in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean

Bibliographies on Mongolia in the Chinese and Japanese languages do exist.
The present task is to update these bibliographies. In
Chang Hsing-t'ang's
Meytg—l<u "bs ^'ccyi—h <20 shu-Tnu
^
^
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(Taipei, 1958) an^ Term Yen-lin*s
Chung-kuo pien-chiang tu-dhi lu
(Peking, 1958) are essential sources for this
project. Chang's work was compiled hy consulting several existing hihliographies on the same subject. It incorporates works in Chinese, Japanese, Mon
golian, and European languages. The sections on works in Chinese and Japanese
languages form an adequate basis for developing a better bibliography on Mon
golia. The present task facing the compiler of this bibliography is as follows:
1. To verify and update the publication data of each entry in these two bib
liographies.
2. To add new materials which are not included in these two bibliographies.
3. To screen important joiirnal articles to be incorporated into the new bib
liographies .
The following gives a general description of the new materials which are going
to be added to this bibliography.
The Chinese sources contain valuable primary information on Mongolia, espe
cially on the period before the twentieth century. The recent massive re
print of Chinese local gazetteers in Taiwan has made available many sources
which have hitherto been difficult to come by. These local gazetteers are a
treasure house of information on local history. The projected bibliography will
try to classify and distill information contained in these gazetteers.
In 197^ the National Palace Museum in Taiwan began publication of the secret
palace memorials of the Ch'ing dynasty (l6Ui+-191l). These memorials were sent
secretly by provincial officials to the emperor reporting on the local situa
tion and have, therefore, never been published previously. The publication of
these memorials, for the first time, is very important not only in the field of
Chinese studies, but also in other areas. So far only the memorials of the
K'ang-hsi (l662-lT22) and the Kuang-hsu (i8T5-1908) reigns have been published.
The memorials of the Yung-cheng reign (1723-1735) are in the process of publica
tion. When this collection is complete, this set of materials will provide
valuable insight to the Ch'ing government's policy towards Mongolia.
The publication of the diplomatic archives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry
dealing with the Sino-Russian relationship between 1917 and 1921 by the Institute
of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taiwan throws much light on the complexity
of diplomatic relations between China, Russia and Mongolia during this period
in question.
In mainland China, the most significant development is probably in the field
of linguistics. Three important dictionaries have been published: Ean-Meng
tz 'u-tien
(Chinese-Mongolian Dictionary) (Nei-Meng-ku jen-min
chu-pan-she
^^ A ^
^
Huhehot
, 196U); Meng-Han
tz 'u-tien
f i ft ^ (Mongolian-Chinese Dictionary) (Nei-Meng-ku chiao-yu
chu-pan-she
^
f di
Huhehot, 1975); Meng-Han tz’u tien ^
ylL i'5
(Mongolian-Chinese Dictionary) (Nei-Meng-ku jen-min chu-panshe
^
it )lk5 Huhehot, 1976) all establishing lexical
standardization for translation between the two languages.
On the other hand, the publication of the punctuated edition of the Twentyfour Dynastic Histories is undoubtedly one of the most important academic
achievements by mainland Chinese scholars. Each work in this series has been
subject to rigorous textual criticism before publication, and modern Chinese
punctuation marks are supplied throughout the text. This series, therefore.
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greatly facilitates research on Chinese history and makes the reading of geo
graphical and personal names in these dynastic histories more intelligible,
especially when these names are of foreign origins.
The two most important Japanese bibliographies on Mongolia are:
^ _
1. Yamane Yukio ih
^ ^ y Gendaishi k.enkyu bunken mokuroku
Classified Bibliography of Articles and Books concerning the Yhan
Period in Japanese and Chinese), Tokyo, 1971. This book covers works pub
lished between 1900 and 1970.
2. Japan Association of Mongolian Studies, Mongoru kenkyu bunken mokuroku ^
> J" /L ^ ^ ^
(Bibliography on Mongolia), Tokyo, 1973.
This book includes works published from 1900 to 1972.
Both of these bibliographies are useful for this project. Generally speaking,
Japanese works are excellent as secondary sources. Before 19^5, because of
Japan's political and military ambitions in Continental Asia, Japanese scholars
produced many works of lasting value in this field. The intelligence report of
the Japanese army and cultural expeditions sponsored by various organizations in
Japan provide a rich reservoir of Information for the period after 1911.
The Chinese part is expected to be complete in 1979, and the Japanese part
in 1980.
University of Saskatchewan

Part III:

Man-kam Leung

Works in Mongolian, Russian, and East European Languages*

J^y work as editor of Part III of the Bibliotheca Mongolica is based on my^
very comprehensive working bibliography and on my cataloging and bibliographic
experience. However, I am basically a historian, and there are areas which it
is proposed to cover in the Bibliotheca Mongolica with which I am not very fa
miliar.
I refer especially to the fields of art and architecture, music, dance
and theater, numismatics, archeology, manners and customs, education, law,
economy, and science and technology. It is obviously possible for me to review
all previous bibliographic sources to extract the relevant references. It is
as equally apparent that outside assistance wo\ild greatly facilitate this task,
but none has materialized to date.
I have encountered several objections to the project among fellow Mongolists
The main objection to the project is due to the fact that it is seen as being
superfluous and a duplication of perfectly good, existing bibliographies, such
as Bibliografiya robot po Mongolii, D. Serzhmyadag, BNMAU-d 1973-1975 and
khevlegdsen mongolin nomin burtgel (and its predecessors). The Mongolian au-^^
thorities are obviously working in the direction of a "national bibliography.
The project has now reached a stage where it is too late to turn back. My
own bibliography is almost complete in all fields other than those listed above
up to 1975. The task now remaining is to collect entries in the missing fields
and to plug any gaps. I still need to organize my files into a form suitable
for typing or otherwise reproducing. This is no mean task as I have no

*Mr. Underdown had to return to Melbourne a few days before the conference,
and his report was read in his absence by Professor Schwarz.
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secretarial or financial assistance to undertake this work.
I am reluctant to put a completion date on Part III, not only because I do
not know whether any assistance will be forthcoming following this conference
or any further appeals the general editor might make, but also because my work
on the project must necessarily be performed alongside my normal duties. How
ever, assuming that I can devote the same amount of time to this project as
hitherto and that the level of assistance remains nil, I would anticipate having
my listings completed by mid-1979.
It is obviously desirable to have the Bibliotheca Mongolica published as
soon as possible, so please send me those lists, etc.
University of Melboiame

Michael Underdown
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